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ABSTRACT
The recent growth of low-fare, low-cost carriers has changed the competitive airline environment. In the
US alone, low-fare carrier market shares have increased from just over 5% in 1990 to almost 25% in
2003. Traditional network carriers have consequently had to adjust to the changing competitive
environment, which has led to cost reductions, fare structure simplifications and service adjustments. In
addition, competitive responses of incumbent network carriers to low-fare entry have prompted concern
regarding the potential for predatory practices in the airline industry.
Assessment of unfair competitive practices in airline markets has typically been based on the analysis of
changes in aggregate measures, such as average fares, traffic and revenues. In this research, the effect of
low-fare entry on incumbent network carriers is examined, with special focus on the impacts of entry on
traditional measures of airline performance. An analysis of various markets with low-fare competition
highlights the typical effects of low-fare entry on these traditional aggregate measures. In a thorough
analysis of two specific cases, we show that these measures, although affected similarly by entry, were
very poor predictors of the new entrant's success in these markets, and inadequate indicators of
incumbent response. AirTran successfully entered the Atlanta-Orlando market, while Spirit failed to
maintain its operations in the Detroit-Boston market. We highlight the differences between these two
markets and explain why the performance of these two carriers was so different.
In a second part, a simulator of competitive airline networks - the Passenger Origin Destination Simulator
- is used to model various scenarios of entry in a single market environment so as to determine the
essential factors affecting traditional measures of airline performance following low-fare entry. Our
simulation results show that these measures are greatly affected by the entrant's capacity relative to the
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incumbent, by the incumbent carrier's competitive pricing response, and by the competitive revenue
management situation. For example, average fares on the incumbent carrier can either increase or
decrease following entry by a new competitor, depending on whether one or both airlines perform
revenue management. In an extension of the simulations to a larger network environment, it is also shown
that network flows of passengers affect the performance of all competitors, as measured by aggregate
measures of performance. Furthermore, use of advanced network revenue management allows the
incumbent carriers to rely on connecting passengers to mitigate the effect of entry on network revenues,
but leads to amplified effects at the local market level.
Consequently, this research establishes that traditional aggregate measures of airline performance on their
own do not constitute a reliable indication of the response of incumbent carriers, and provide even less
information on their strategic intent, which is critical in identifying predation. This research also
demonstrates the relationships between aggregate measures of performance and previously overlooked
factors including relative entrant capacity, competitive pricing and revenue management, and flows of
network passengers.
Thesis Committee:
Dr. Peter P. Belobaba, Principal Research Scientist
Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Committee Chairman
Dr. John-Paul B. Clarke, Associate Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Dr. Amedeo R. Odoni, Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Civil and Environmental
Engineering
Dr. Nancy L. Rose, Professor of Economics
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In 1978, the US airline industry was deregulated to increase competition among air carriers, and to open
the industry to new entrant competition. In the mid-1980s, the European airline industry began its own
deregulation. Today, the focus is on low-fare, low-cost carriers, whose growth throughout the 1990s has
been dramatic. In the US, low-fare carrier market shares have increased from just over 5% in 1990 to
almost 25% in 2003. In Europe, Asia and Australia, low-fare carriers are blossoming.
In this context, traditional network carriers must fight to remain competitive and are therefore making
changes to adapt to this new competitive environment. These changes include fare structure changes, cost
reductions, fleet rationalization and increased partnerships between traditional airlines. Competitive
responses to low-fare entry can also be quite dramatic and have spurred concerns and comments
regarding the existence of predatory behavior by researchers and airlines alike.
In this research, the effect of low-fare entry on incumbent network carriers is examined, with special
focus on the impacts of entry on traditional measures of airline performance. The results illustrate how
important it is to consider the effects of revenue management, network flows and competitive response to
entry when explaining changes in average fares, revenues and other measures of airline performance. The
results also call attention to the inappropriateness of aggregate measures of airline performance in
assessing the nature of the response to entry by incumbent network carriers.
1.1. Overview of Changes in the Airline Industry since Deregulation
In October 1978, the Airline Deregulation Act allowed airlines to compete freely in the US domestic air
transportation market. Individual carriers were given the right to choose where they would fly, how often
and at what price. As a result, deregulation led to numerous changes in the airline industry's structure:
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Among the more noticeable changes, hub and spoke networks, and new pricing and marketing policies
were born. Many research studies show that one of the primary consequences of deregulation has been a
substantial decrease in average fares (References). Other studies have raised concerns of increases in fares
in markets where network carriers have a dominant position (US DOT, 2001; Kaplan, 1995).
Another consequence of deregulation has been a wave of new entry and failure of previously regulated
carriers. Kaplan (1995) reports that, of the 19 jet operators formerly regulated by the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB), only 7 survived until 1995. The most famous survivor, Southwest Airlines (created in
1971), remains a prosperous carrier today. Even more remarkably, it has been profitable almost every
quarter since its creation and for 31 consecutive years (Air Transport World), in an industry where
profitability is extremely volatile and cyclical: $5B net profit in 1997 compared to $8B net losses in 2001
(Hansman, 2003). At the same time, new entrants emerged and failed very quickly. For example, as will
be discussed in Chapter 2, in 1981 alone, 13 new airlines were created, while 28 ceased operations.
Since the early 1990s, a new kind of airline has played an increasing role in the US airline industry. Low-
fare, low-cost carriers have substantially increased their presence in the US domestic market, and now
carry over 25% of total domestic US traffic (Hazel, 2003). Low-fare carrier presence has been expanding
since 1998 when network carrier profitability initially started to decrease. After major network carriers
drastically reduced their capacity (post 9/11/2001), low-fare, low-cost carriers further continued their
expansion. On the east coast, JetBlue started operating in early 2000 from New York to Florida and
southern California; Air Tran began its operations in 1994 out of Orlando and merged in 1997 with
ValuJet's operation out of Atlanta. In the central United States, Midwest Express and ATA operate out of
Chicago/Milwaukee, while Spirit operates out of Detroit. Frontier operates out of Denver, and JetBlue is
expanding its presence on the West Coast, and in Denver. Southwest has a national presence in the United
States, mostly in secondary airports. Other smaller low-fare carriers also operate in other regions of the
United States.
The growth of low-fare carriers in the US has led to a number of responses from established US carriers,
ranging from matching low-fare carriers' fares in competitive markets to offering bonus miles and free
flights. These responses to entry consequently raised the question of unfair and predatory competition, as
we discuss in subsequent chapters. In this context, regulatory bodies in the US (US DOT) and in Canada
(Competition Tribunal) have suggested a need for regulation in order to ensure fair competition. In
addition, a number of legal actions were undertaken in North America to determine whether incumbent
network carriers were competing unfairly against low-fare competitors. For example, in the US, American
Airlines was criticized by a number of its low-fare competitors, and subsequently sued by the US
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Department of Justice (2001), while the Competition Tribunal in Canada attempted to determine whether
Air Canada competed unfairly against CanJet (2000) and WestJet (2001).
As the situation evolves in North America, the recent deregulation of aviation markets in Europe has led
to similar consequences: New entrant carriers proliferate and incumbent network carriers retaliate (i.e.
respond to entry with comparable strategies as their North American counterparts). Burghouwt (2003) and
ICAO (2003) provide a good discussion and description of the history and effects of European
deregulation on aviation markets. Among the more successful low-fare carriers in Europe are EasyJet,
Ryanair and Virgin Express. In this context, European regulators have also questioned the fairness of
incumbent responses, as evidenced by the ruling of the German Federal Cartel Office, which imposed a
E35 premium on Lufthansa's lowest one-way fares between Frankfurt and Berlin relative to that of its
low-fare competitors (Bundeskartellamt, 2002).
The growth of low-fare carriers is not limited to North America and Europe. Asia and Australia are also
currently experiencing the birth and growth of low-fare carriers. This increased competition by low-fare
carriers all over the world has spurred a number of research efforts on the effect of low-fare entry in
airline markets (c.f. Chapter 3).
In this research, we focus on identifying the major drivers of airline performance in the face of low-fare
entry and illustrate the pitfalls associated with using aggregate measures to assess the nature of a response
by incumbent carriers. Such aggregate measures include average fares, revenues and market share. As we
will show, these measures are influenced by additional factors that make them inappropriate indicators of
response to entry.
1.2. Research Objectives
Our goals are twofold. First, after providing essential definitions of low-fare entry and predatory practices
in the airline industry, we highlight the inappropriateness of aggregate measure of airline performance in
assessing the nature of a response to entry by incumbent network carriers. Second, given the inadequacy
of these measures, we determine the important factors that affect such aggregate measures, and explain
the impacts of these factors on these aggregate measures, through the use of simulation.
As we will discuss in the literature review, it is often the case that regulatory agencies and researchers
focus on aggregate measures of airline performance to determine the nature of a competitive response to
entry. While some researchers recognize the difficulties and pitfalls associated with such conclusions, the
lack of available disaggregate data, as well as the availability of aggregate data, often leads to the use
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measures such as average fares, market shares, and passenger traffic to evaluate the nature of a response
to entry. This research will show, by using case studies and simulation, that these aggregate measures are
in fact very poor indicators of the competitive situation. For example, we show in Chapter 4 that two
apparently comparable markets with respect to these aggregate measures, led to opposite competitive
outcomes for the low-fare carriers competing against two different network carriers.
Having illustrated the inappropriateness of these aggregate measures of airline performance, we explain
which important factors affect these measures through the use of simulation. We identify relative
competitor capacity, competitive revenue management capabilities and the flow of network passengers as
major factors leading to various changes in aggregate measures of airline performance. In particular, we
note that average fares, perhaps the most commonly used measure to assess the nature of a competitive
response, tend to be most affected by these factors. As a result, if average fares are the most sensitive to
the previously identified factors, they undoubtedly should not be used as the primary measure in
evaluating the nature of a competitive response.
Another important finding of this research is the importance of revenue management under low-fare
entry. It is often assumed that incumbent carriers engage only in pricing, capacity and marketing
responses to entry. This research shows that even with no such response, the mere use of revenue
management can lead to very different results from cases without revenue management. Furthermore, in a
network environment, network revenue management also has a very distinct impact on individual airline
performance as compared to leg-based revenue management.
1.3. Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is divided into three distinct parts. In the first part, we provide background information
regarding the motivation of the research and the context in which it is set. In particular, we supply a brief
history of the US airline industry and how it was affected by deregulation. We focus the discussion on the
effect deregulation had on the growth of new entrant carriers in general, and follow this discussion with a
description of the low-fare carrier business model (Chapter 2). Although this discussion tends to center on
the US experience, the low-fare business model also applies to worldwide low-fare new entrant carriers.
In this first part, we also discuss the concerns of government agencies with respect to unfair competition
practices in the airline industry. Finally, we provide a discussion of existing literature on the topics of
predatory practices and unfair competition, low-fare entry and revenue management in the airline industry
(Chapter 3).
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In the second part of the thesis (Chapter 4), we use case studies to identify important factors affecting new
entrant and incumbent carrier performance. We first describe the results of general surveys with respect to
individual airline performance before and after low-fare entry as evidenced by aggregate measures of
performance. We then single out two specific markets (Atlanta-Orlando and Detroit-Boston) and provide
an in-depth analysis of the effects of entry. We conclude by observing that aggregate measures of airline
performance (as measured by average fares, market share or revenues) do not provide a complete picture
of the competitive response of incumbent carriers. We also highlight a set of important factors which help
to explain differences in aggregate measures of performance. These factors are relative competitor
capacity, competitive revenue management settings and network flows of passengers.
In the third part of the thesis, we use the Passenger Origin Destination Simulator (PODS) to study the
individual and joint effect of previously identified factors on individual carrier performance under the
assumption of low-fare entry. We first simulate entry in a single market environment (to eliminate
network flow effects) under various pricing conditions for the new entrant carrier. The incumbent carriers
respond to entry by either matching the new entrant carrier's lowest fare only - which we refer to as a
limited match response - or by completely matching the new entrant carrier's fare structure - which we
refer to as a full match response. In this single market environment, we first focus in Chapter 5 on the
effect of relative competitor capacity. In Chapter 6, we add revenue management, and study the effect of
revenue management and relative competitor capacity on individual carrier performance. We then extend
the results to a large network environment (Chapter 7) in order to capture the combined effect of network
flows of passengers with relative competitor capacity and revenue management on individual carrier
performance. Results support the observation that aggregate measures of airline performance are highly
dependent on these individual factors and should therefore not be used to explain the response of
incumbent carriers to entry. Results also show the impact of each of these individual factors on individual
carrier performance as well as the joint effect of these factors.
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CONTEXT AND MOTIVATION OF THE
RESEARCH
New entrant carriers have been the focus of much attention in the recent past as more and more airlines
are created, often with the goal of providing low-fare competition to established carriers. The shift in the
strategy of new entrant carriers in the 1990's - from niche carriers in underserved markets to low-fare
carriers directly challenging the dominance of network carriers - has changed the competitive
environment and the way new entrant carriers are perceived by their competitors: Low-fare new entrant
carriers are now considered a threat to network carrier profitability.
In this chapter, we discuss the evolution of low-fare new entrant carriers and the ensuing concerns with
predatory practices, as motivation to the research and upcoming case studies and simulations. We first
provide a definition of low-fare new entrant carriers and discuss the history and evolution of new entrants
in the U.S. airline industry. We give a brief chronological account of changes in the airline industry
followed by a discussion of the situation as it is today. We highlight the importance the low-fare business
model in the airline industry today and provide a comparison of the traditional model of airlines, as
exemplified by U.S. Majors' and international flag carriers, to this more novel business model introduced
by low-fare new entrant carriers all over the world. We then explore the impact that these carriers have
had on the airline industry and, finally, we discuss the concerns of low-fare carriers and government
agencies alike, with respect to unfair competition and predatory response to entry.
1 Majors are defined by the Department of Transportation as those airlines with annual operating
revenues of over $1,000,000,000.
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2.1. Low-Fare New Entrants: A Definition
Most research studies usually fail to define the term new entrant airline. The wording of these studies
implies that any airline that does not qualify as a "US Major" is a new entrant carrier. Some studies even
go as far as to implicitly equate new entrants to low-fare or low-cost carriers and vice-versa. In the next
few paragraphs, we attempt to set a stricter definition of the term, without restricting the scope of our
study. We first define the concept of a new entrant carrier, and then that of a low-fare new entrant carrier.
2.1.1. New Entrants
The notion of "new entry" literally requires us to distinguish two types of entry: (1) entry into the airline
industry as whole, and (2) entry into a specific market.
Therefore, according to the first type of entry, any airline starting operations should qualify as a new
entrant airline. We will refer to this type of entrant as an industry new entrant. Naturally, "new entrant" is
often equated with "small". A new entrant airline, by our first definition, is a small carrier having recently
started operations in the airline industry. Unsurprisingly, size matters in the airline industry, and a large
established carrier will therefore benefit from economies of scale and will not be overly susceptible to
entry in any single market. A new entrant on the other hand will be more likely to suffer from intense
competition in any one of the few markets it serves. Becoming an established carrier is therefore related
to the size of the airline, which can be measured in terms of fleet, network size or passenger traffic.
A new entrant can also be an airline that offers service in a market that it did not previously serve. We
will refer to this type of entrant as a market new entrant. Note that an established carrier - such as a US
Major - could qualify as a market new entrant. Another observation is that any industry new entrant will
necessarily be a market new entrant in any market it serves. Once again, determining when this carrier
ceases to qualify as an entrant is critical. In this type of entry, while market share and size of the airline
will undoubtedly play an important role in the success of entry, it should not be the only determinant of
the market new entrant status. It therefore seems relevant to limit the length of time during which a carrier
is considered a market new entrant.
The confusion between new entrant carriers and low-fare, low-cost airlines is an easy one to make in that
industry new entrants today are in majority low-fare, low-cost airlines. Market new entrants, on the other
hand, can be established network carriers, or low-fare, low-cost carriers. In the remainder of the thesis, we
focus on new entrant carriers in general: whether they are industry or market new entrants will be
somewhat irrelevant to the research presented here, although the general assumption will be that the
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carriers modeled are market new entrants, operating according to the low-fare carrier business model, as
described in Sections 2.1.2 and 2.3.
2.1.2. Low-Fare New Entrants
Low-fare new entrants are simply industry or market new entrants that provide service at substantially
lower fares than incumbent network carriers did (or still do) post-entry. For example, numerous studies
focus on the "Southwest Effect" (Hallowell and Heskett, 1993; Bennett and Craun, 1993; US DOT, 2001)
and conclude that, as a general rule, when Southwest Airlines enters a new route, average fares decrease
by approximately fifty percent, while traffic at least doubles. In Section 2.2, we expand the discussion on
entry in the US airline industry since deregulation as well as low-fare entry since 1990.
In his 2004 thesis, Dietlin (2004) argues that fares in the airline industry are market driven rather than
cost driven. Fares in the airline industry are based on origin-destination markets, rather on the cost of
providing the service, which depends on the various routings offered by the airline. As a result, Dietlin
argues that the notion of low-fare carrier is inappropriate since all carriers can arbitrarily price at low fare
levels to match their competition, independently of their cost structure. While it is true that fares are in
part market driven in the airline industry, it is also the case that only low-cost carriers can afford to price
below existing steady-state fare levels and maintain a sustainable operation. In this respect, and since
costs will not be taken into account in this thesis, we refer to low-fare airlines with the implication that the
fares are lower because their costs allow for such low-fares.
The notion of low-fare entry is relative to pre-entry fare structure. Therefore, when referring to low-fare
entrants, we will use the following guidelines. A carrier will be deemed a low-fare carrier if its fare
structure undercuts that of the incumbent carriers previously operating in the market. We can arbitrarily
set the minimum level of undercutting deemed admissible to meet the "low-fare" requirements to thirty
percent below pre-entry unrestricted fare levels. Another possible measure of fare level could also be the
average fare2 on the new entrant carrier as compared to the incumbent carrier's pre-entry average fare.
However, as this thesis is set to demonstrate, average fares (and other similar measures) are a limited
indicator of a carrier's pricing structure, as they reflect a number of additional competitive effects that
2 Airlines routinely offer multiple fares within any particular origin-destination market in an attempt to price
discriminate. One measure of the fare paid by passengers in a particular market is therefore the average
fare in the market on a particular airline.
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also influence the carriers' average fares (including, but not limited to, revenue management, relative
competitor's capacity, frequency, etc.).
2.2. The Airline Industry after Deregulation: The Birth of Low-Fare
Carriers
2.2.1. New Entrants since U.S. Deregulation in 1978
Before 1978, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) determined the routes each airline flew and the prices
they should charge in each market. The Airline Deregulation Act, approved by Congress on October 24,
1978, and signed into law four days later by President Jimmy Carter, put an end to the era of regulation.
Deregulation brought many changes to the airline industry: The most notable changes were the growth of
the "hub and spoke" networks, increased competition, reduction in fares, growth in air travel and of
course new entrant carriers (Kaplan, 1995).
In 1978, the CAB reported 37 "certificated route air carriers" in its Air Carrier Financial Statistics
publication (Air carrier financial statistics; Accounting, Cost and Statistics Division, Bureau of Accounts
and Statistics, Civil Aeronautics Board). By 1979, the CAB reported 54 such carriers: of these 54 carriers,
17 were new entrant carriers, while the 37 pre-deregulation carriers remained.
In 1982, the CAB introduced a classification of Certificated Air Carriers into four distinct groups:
1. Majors, whose annual revenues exceed one billion dollars
2. Nationals, whose annual revenues range between $75 million and $1 billion
3. Large regionals, whose annual revenues range between $10 million and $75 million and
4. Medium regionals, whose annual revenues are below $10 million
Note that the $75 million threshold set in 1982 by the CAB was increased to $100 million in 1984. In
addition, the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (Employees Certificated Carriers Database, Office of
Airline Information) also provides an a posteriori breakdown of carriers (including cargo airlines)
according to the CAB classification from 1978 on - even though this classification was only implemented
in 1982.
Table 2.1 shows the evolution of the total number of carriers in the US as well as the breakdown by group
from 1978 on. The total number of carriers quickly increased in the early 1980's as a number of new
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entrant carriers started operations. As shown in Figure 2.1, in 1979 alone, there were 17 new entrant
carriers, compared to a total of 37 carriers listed in 1978, that is, over thirty percent of the carriers flying
in 1979 were new entrant carriers. The total number of carriers kept increasing until 1981 when it started
to level off. The number of airlines increased from 37 in 1978 to 78 in 1981, which represents a 111%
increase within three years of deregulation.
Focusing on individual groups, we observe that in 1978 the CAB referenced 14 majors, 11 nationals, 6
large regionals and 6 medium regionals. By 1981, the number of majors remained constant, while the
number of nationals had increased to 20, the number of large regionals to 9, and the number of medium
regionals to 35, bringing the total number of carriers up from 37 to 78. Table 2.1 highlights the volatility
of the numbers within each group, and
of regional carriers (medium or large).
shows that the greatest variations occur mostly within the category
CARRIER TYPE
YEAR
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Major
14
14
14
14
11
11
13
13
13
12
12
10
12
10
10
11
11
11
12
13
13
13
14
National
11
15
18
20
16
15
14
14
17
12
12
17
15
15
16
16
23
24
24
24
24
24
24
Large
Regional
6
7
10
9
15
20
30
26
27
24
25
21
19
21
19
21
23
28
23
21
21
18
13
Medium
Regional
6
18
24
35
22
23
17
18
17
16
18
17
13
10
20
25
23
23
24
17
19
20
16
TOTAL
37
54
66
78
64
69
74
71
74
64
67
65
59
56
65
73
80
86
83
75
77
75
67
Table 2.1: Civil Aeronautics Board & Bureau of Transportation Statistics - Certified Route Air Carrier
Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of the number of actual new entrants, exits and total airlines from 1979 on.
This number reflects the variation in the total number of carriers from one year to the next. Figure 2.1
illustrates that there were many new entrant airlines immediately after deregulation until the mid 1980's
when fewer carriers entered the US airline industry. In the early 1990's, the number of entries increased
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again to finally stabilize between five and fifteen per year. The number of carriers exiting the market
follows a somewhat similar pattern with a spike in total number of exits in 1981, probably due to the
increase in oil prices in the late 1970's followed by the 1981-82 recession of the US economy. Overall,
entries and exits consistently represent about 15-20% of total airlines.
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Figure 2.1: Annual entering, exiting and total carriers in the U.S. airline industry post-deregulation
(Source: Civil Aeronautics Board & Bureau of Transportation Statistics - Certified Route Air
Carrier)
Figure 2.2 shows the cumulative number of entries and exits in the US airline industry and illustrates the
continued renewal of the airline industry, with over 250 carriers starting operations between 1979 and
2000, and almost as many discontinuing operations in the same time period. Altogether, there were more
cumulative new entrants than exits. Figure 2.2 highlights the number of entries increased consistently
until 1986, after which it leveled off until 1992 when this number started increasing again.
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Figure 2.2: Cumulative number of entrants and exits since 1979 (Source: Bureau of Transportation
Statistics, Office of Airline Information)
It is interesting to note that although one would expect new entrant carriers to start with small operations
(falling under the category of "medium regional"), this is not necessarily the case. America West, for
instance, began operating as a "large regional" in 1983. By 1986, America West became a national, and,
finally, in 1990 reached the status of US major. JetBlue's 2000 revenues also immediately classified the
airlines as a "national" carrier, and it remains a national, despite its 500% growth in revenues between
2000 and 2002. Conversely, AirTran followed a more classical pattern and started operations in 1994 as a
medium regional, then became a large regional in 1997 and a national in 1998. Table 2.2 shows a sample
of new entrants within each of the four categories created by the CAB and emphasizes the fact that most
new entrants start operations as large or medium regionals, with a few notable exceptions such as JetBlue
which started as a national carrier in 2000.
Among the major impacts of deregulation on the US airline industry, we noted the advent of hub-and-
spoke networks, the decrease in average fares and the relative freedom of entry. This discussion
emphasizes the impact of deregulation on entry, and highlights that while many new entrants did not
survive very long, some of today's more successful airlines date back to post-deregulation. We gave the
example of America West, which started as a large regional with three aircraft and became a major in
1990. Conversely, a number of established carriers also disappeared in the period between 1978 and 1990,
for lack of profitability.
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Table 2.2: New entrant carriers 1979-1985
Information)
(Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Employees Certificated Carriers Database, Office of Airline
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Federal Express
0
n Transtar United Parcel Horizon Emery Atlantic Southeast
Trump
0
Air America Orion Gulf Kalita Executive American Int'l Reno Air UFS
Emerald IASCO Northern Braniff Int'l Morris
Evergreen Rich Carnival
" Five Star Westair Simmons
0 Horizon Air Trans States
Interstate
Key
Mid Pacific
Northern Air Cargo
Presidential
Royal West
Skyworld
Aeron Amerijet Air Transport Casino Express Wilbur's Airline of Americas Atlas Air
Challenge Air Cargo Conner Trans Continental North America Airmark Airline Capital Air
w Challenge Air Int'l Express One Trans Intl Private Jet AV Atlantic Continental Micro
Mcclain Florida West Fine Airlines Eagle Airlines
.2 Millon MGM Grand Int'l Cargo Express Empire
Kiwi Omni Air Express
Miami Air Sierra Pacific
Patriot Trans American
Ryan Ultraair
Sierra
Spirit Airlines
Worldwide
Table 2.3: New entrant carriers 1986-1993 (Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Employees Certificated Carriers Database, Office of Airline
Information)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Altantic Southeast Continental Express Atlantic Southeast American Eagle National Jet Blue
R Business Express Mesa Reno Challenge Air Cargo Legend
o DHL Airways Trans States World Airways
Trans Statez
USAIR Shuttle
Air South Challenge Gemini Fine Airlines Champion Air Trans Continental Expressnet
0 Frontier Fine Pan Am Mesaba North American
0 North American Sun Jet Northern Northern Air Cargo
- Polar Air Viscount Northern American Transmeridian
USAfrica Western Pacific
AirTran Air 21 Falcon Capital Cargo Falcon Accessair Ameristar
Capital Air Express Custom Air Jettrain Lynden Pro Air Allegiant Planet
Kitty Hawk Eastwind Laker Panagra Reliant Asia Pacific Southern Air
Midway Nations Pace Sierra Pacific Renown Lorair Sun World
.0 Ryan Int'l Paradise Prestige Sky Trek Sunworld Southeast
Sierra Renown Sierra Tradewinds
E Sportsflight Sierra Pacific Sun Pacific Winair
. Trans American Chrtr Tatonduk Sun World
o Trans Continental Trans Meridian
ValuJet Tri Star
Viscount Air USA Jet
Vanguard
Table 2.4: New entrant carriers 1994-2000 (Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Employees Certificated Carriers Database, Office of Airline
Information)
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2.2.2. New Entrants Today
Since 1990, numerous new entrant carriers have started operations in the US airline industry, while a
significant number of other new entrants were either absorbed by larger airlines or forced to cease
operations for lack of profits. The better known of these new entrant carriers are, for example, Frontier,
Spirit, Midway (bankrupt), JetBlue, Vanguard (bankrupt), AirTran, Pan Am, Reno Air and National
(bankrupt). Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 list new entrants in the US Airline industry between 1986 and 2000,
as reported by the Office of Airline Information. The wave of entry in the US airline industry has changed
in nature from the decade following deregulation. Since the early 1990s, new entrant airlines have
recognized the difficulty of competing with established network carriers and learned from the success of
Southwest Airlines. As a result, new entrant carriers have since then focused on a different business
model: the low-fare business model.
Table 2.5 shows a ranking of the top US domestic carriers as a function of their market share (expressed
in Revenue-Passenger Miles, RPMs) during the fourth quarter of 2001. Among these airlines, low-fare
carriers rank from largest to smallest as follows: Southwest, America West, ATA, JetBlue, AirTran,
National, Spirit and Frontier (as also reported by Aviation Daily, 2002a). We note here that Southwest,
while the largest low-fare carrier, produces less than fifty percent of the total RPMs 3 of United, but has
about fifteen percent more enplanements than United (due to its much shorter haul operations). We also
observe quite substantial differences between RPM rankings and enplanement rankings, be it overall,
amongst traditional carriers or amongst low-fare carriers. For example, we noted the difference between
Southwest and United. Similarly, Delta has about 30% more enplanements than United, but fewer RPMs.
AirTran has about the same RPMs as JetBlue, but almost twice as many enplanements. As mentioned
earlier, the difference between enplanements and RPMs is a consequence of the average distance flown
by the airline (length of haul), since RPMs incorporate distance, whereas enplanements do not.
Based on Table 2.5's numbers, and focusing on the top 20 domestic US carriers, we observe that among
the top 20 carriers, seven are low-fare carriers, which account for 15% of the top 20 carriers' RPMs and
20% of enplanements in the fourth quarter of 2001. At the end of 2003, low-fare carriers' share of
domestic passengers reached 25% (Hazel, 2003) and was still growing.
3 RPMs are Revenue Passenger Miles which measure the product of passengers and mileage flown. As
such, RPMs are a measure of the airline's traffic.
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AIRLINE
United
American
Delta Air
Northwest
Continental
Southwest
US Airways
America West
Trans World
Alaska
American Trans Air
JetBlue
AirTran
Hawaiian Air
American Eagle
Comair
National
Atlantic Southeast
Spirit Air Lines
Frontier
Continental Micronesia
Midwest Express
Mesaba Aviation
Aloha
Air Wisconsin
Horizon Air
Sun Country
Vanguard
Trans States
RPMs (000's)
23,680,752
22,089,489
20,443,957
14,678,525
12,289,078
10,771,113
8,885,143
4,022,802
3,304,974
2,726,362
1,795,555
1,050,217
1,016,512
998,117
784,710
727,000
708,117
642,981
569,412
533,816
473,747
436,570
348,599
321,328
314,633
300,211
265,542
262,290
110,119
ENPLANED
PASSENGERS
15,389,335
16,733,074
20,191,717
10,976,660
9,151,588
17,186,354
11,142,615
4,134,650
3,868,692
3,014,471
1,475,732
904,303
1,853,398
1,228,453
2,691,810
1,815,007
542,622
1,644,382
540,074
621,932
260,368
472,343
1,243,105
962,638
1,023,229
1,033,524
209,979
315,911
395,191
Table 2.5: US airlines RPMs and passenger enplanements in Q4, 2001 (Source: Form 41 database)
2.3. The Low-Fare Carrier Business Model
The growing importance of low-fare carriers in the US domestic market, and in the rest of the world,
warrants a more detailed discussion of the specifics of the low-fare carrier business model. Low-fare
carriers started offering service even before deregulation in the U.S, as intra-state routes were not subject
to federal regulations. Southwest Airlines started its operations in 1971 within Texas by flying two
Boeing 737 aircraft between Dallas and Houston. As discussed earlier, low-fare new entrant carriers kept
developing in the US, but, while Southwest had become a US Major by 1990, low-fare carriers accounted
for less than 7% of US domestic air passengers in 1991, compared to 81% for US Majors (SH&E, 1993).
However, the past decade has seen a tremendous growth in low-fare carrier traffic, which had increased to
18% of US domestic passengers by 2001 (Swelbar, 2002), and close to 25% by 2003 (Hazel, 2003).
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Context and Motivation of the Research
In the following section, we present a comparison between low-fare and traditional carriers and provide
some insights as to the strategic differences and the performance implications of these differences. We
then briefly discuss the overall impact of low-fare carriers on the airline industry.
2.3.1. Comparison of Low-Fare and Traditional Network Carriers
New entrant carriers and traditional network carriers typically have different business models. The four
major elements of the low-fare business model can be summarized as follows: (1) low-fares combined
with low-frills service, (2) simplified distribution and passenger processing, (3) high aircraft utilization
within a simplified fleet, and (4) high labor productivity. As we establish in the next few paragraphs,
while there are some differences between the traditional and low-fare model, these mainly stem from the
performance of operations of each type of carrier and not necessarily from structural differences between
the two types of carriers. In particular, we briefly discuss pricing and its impact on network structure,
distribution and marketing, fleet choice and assignment and employee relations, and how each is affected
by and influences the low-fare business model.
Low-Fares, Low Frills and their Impact on Network Structure
Typical target markets for low-fare entry are "under-served and over-priced" short-haul markets. Swelbar
(2003) notes that 88% of the markets served by low-fare carriers have a daily traffic greater than 100
passengers per day each way (PDEW), which represents 98% of their total traffic. The strategy of low-
fare carriers is thus to offer service in parallel markets with high demand - where they are unlikely to
prompt strong reactions from incumbent carriers - at lower fares and with limited service (e.g. no food or
advance seat assignments). For instance, Southwest Airlines does not offer advance seat assignments,
does not provide meals, and does not process inter-line connections of passengers or luggage with other
airlines. Similarly, EasyJet does not sell connecting tickets and therefore does not guarantee connections
that might have been built by the passengers.
Low-Fares
With respect to actual fares, low-fare carriers claim that they offer a simpler fare structure, which is more
transparent to passengers and therefore more willingly accepted. While the simplicity of the fare structure
is not always obvious, it appears that low-fare new entrants have fewer restrictions on their products (i.e.
less price discrimination), with one substantial difference in the absence of the Saturday night stay on
such carriers as EasyJet or Ryanair, and reduced change fees. The absence of such restrictions as
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minimum stay requirements or Saturday night stay stems from low-fare carriers' willingness to sell one-
way tickets.
Obviously, low-fare carriers offer low fares that are substantially cheaper than most of those of traditional
carriers. For example, the much-discussed "Southwest Effect" (Bennett and Craun, 1993; Hallowell and
Heskett, 1993) usually contends that, upon entry in a market, average fares drop by at least 50% while
traffic at least doubles. As we discuss later in the thesis, the decrease in average market fare can be a
result of the decrease in actual fares offered in the market, but can also be a consequence of the increased
capacity and demand stimulation in the market.
Low-Fare Carrier Network Structure
Although some low-fare carriers do not sell connecting tickets, numerous low-fare carriers do (e.g. ATA,
AirTran, Spirit, JetBlue, Southwest, Frontier), therefore indicating that connections are often allowed. As
a result, and unlike what is often assumed, low-fare carriers do not offer point-to-point4 service only:
Their service is often a hybrid of point-to-point and network strategies. Low-fare carriers generally offer
relatively more point-to-point routes than traditional network carriers, but they also operate out of focus
cities, many of which closely resemble hubs. Furthermore, when studying the route map of any low-fare
carrier, it is quite clear that these carriers concentrate a substantial portion of their flights on their focus
cities. The confusion on the nature of the service offered by low-fare carriers is one that originates with
Southwest Airlines' initial service offerings. In its beginning, Southwest did not offer connecting service
to its passengers, but only because of the legal hurdles it faced in its initial focus city (Dallas Love Field)
that prevented it from operating flights outside of Texas and the three neighboring states and even to sell
connections through Dallas.
The most important reason why low-fare airlines cannot operate strictly on a point-to-point basis resides
partly in the fact that the allocation of aircraft resources is far more efficient in a hub-and-spoke network
than in a point-to-point network. The number of flights necessary to fully serve all possible markets
within a set of n cities, through a hub, is to have one flight in each direction from each spoke to the hub
(properly timed to allow for connections), that is, 2n flights per day. Conversely, the point-to-point
network requires n(n- 1) flights for each market to be served.
4 Point-to-point service refers to operating the airline in such a manner as to serve markets without
requiring a connection through a hub and therefore providing more convenient service to travelers. The
obvious downside of point-to-point service, as opposed to hub-and-spoke service, is the lack of traffic flow
consolidation at the hub.
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Without further discussing the characteristics of hub-and-spoke networks and point-to-point networks, let
us list some of the more important advantages and pros and cons of each type of network, as detailed by
Belobaba (Belobaba and Simpson, 1995):
. As mentioned previously, hub-and-spoke networks require fewer flights to serve the same number
of markets as a point-to-point network.
* Hub-and-spoke networks allow airlines to consolidate multiple origin-destination markets on the
same flights for higher load factors. This in turn allows airlines to serve smaller cities, which
would otherwise not be served.
* The consolidation of traffic in hub-and-spoke networks also allows for more frequent service
between cities.
* Point-to-point networks offer nonstop service, which is a more desirable service to travelers, but at
a greater cost, and lesser frequency.
. With respect to robustness of the network, point-to-point networks are less likely to be impacted
by disruptions as each market can be served individually and independently of other markets.
Overall, the hub-and-spoke network approach has undeniable economies of scale advantages and is
usually adopted by medium and large airlines. As discussed previously, low-fare carriers do not operate a
hub-and-spoke network per se, but their strategy is centered on focus cities where they can take advantage
of these economies of scale. Given the route map of these carriers, most of these connections must be
offered at the focus cities, which now even more closely resemble hubs.
Distribution, Marketing and Passenger Processing
Low-fare carriers take advantage of simplified distribution and marketing practices to reduce their costs
per passenger. For instance, Southwest, Ryanair or EasyJet flights can only be booked through the
airline's own reservation system (internet or telephone reservations) and are not available in traditional
Computer Reservation Systems (CRS), thus bypassing the per-booking charges. Electronic ticketing
further decreases booking costs.
In terms of quality of service, low-fare carriers advertise low-frills and therefore provide less on-board
amenities than traditional carriers, do not offer pre-flight lounges, and rarely offer first class service.
However, other aspects of traditional and low-fare carriers' products are very similar. Both low-fare and
traditional airlines offer frequent flyer programs, even though their marketing may be somewhat different.
Traditional airlines offer mileage-based point accrual while low-fare airlines such as AirTran offer free
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flights after a number of paid flights, or points based on the distance traveled on such carriers as JetBlue.
Altogether, the spirit of the programs is the same: Reward frequent travelers. With respect to redemption
opportunities however, traditional network carriers generally offer more options than do low-fare carriers,
through their more extensive network coverage (particularly internationally) and airline and other partners
(hotels, car rental companies, etc.).
Fleet
Fleet may be the single biggest difference between low-fare new entrant carriers and traditional carriers.
New entrants generally operate a single aircraft type or family of aircraft, thus taking advantage of the
cost savings of "fleet commonality". With a single family of aircraft, all employees are qualified to work
on every airplane in the fleet, hence reducing the cost of training and increasing the flexibility of
workforce scheduling.
Traditional carriers, on the other hand, often rely on numerous aircraft types. To perform a more relevant
comparison, one would have to exclude the international portion of traditional network carriers'
operations. Even so, traditional carriers often operate many more aircraft types than new entrant carriers.
Having realized the cost implications, traditional carriers are beginning to consolidate their fleets around
aircraft families. Nonetheless, this remains a notable difference between low-fare carriers and traditional
network airlines.
In addition, aircraft utilization5 also differs between low-fare airlines and traditional network carriers.
Typically, low-fare airlines achieve greater utilization. For example, Table 2.6 shows that JetBlue's
aircraft utilization for 2000 was 12.0 hours per day, 11.6 hours per day in 2001 (and over 12.7 hours per
day in 2002, according to JetBlue's 2002 annual report). In comparison, United's average daily utilization
was only 10.5 and 10 hours per day in 2000 and 2001 respectively, despite a much longer stage length6
(stage length should be positively correlated with utilization, as the longer the average flight, the less time
the aircraft is expected to spend on the ground, and therefore the higher the utilization).
5 Aircraft Utilization: Average daily aircraft usage in terms of block-hours, i.e. from pushback to arrival at
destination gate.
6 Stage Length: Average distance flown between origin and destination (i.e. between one take-off and the
following landing)
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UTILIZATION STAGE LENGTH
CARRIER 2000 2001 2000 2001
American 10.0 9.7 1,164 1,179
Alaska 10.8 10.4 789 797
American Eagle 7.5 7.1 250 268
C Continental 10.5 10.3 1,154 1,1780
Delta 10.3 9.6 871 885
P Northwest 9.7 9.1 914 928
TWA 10.4 9.9 869 844
United 10.5 10.0 1,145 1,181
US Airways 10.1 9.5 639 667
America West 11.0 9.7 878 894
U ATA 9.5 9.7 1,061 1,208
U- AirTran 10.7 9.9 534 539
o JetBlue 12.0 11.6 831 986
Southwest 11.0 10.8 492 515
Table 2.6: Average daily aircraft utilization (Source: USDOT, T100 database - Form 41)
A more appropriate comparison of utilizations can be achieved by comparing utilization of a single
aircraft type across carriers, as different aircraft types are used for different purposes and routes, thus
distorting the comparison. For example, the technical design of the Boeing 767 as well as its size make it
more suitable for longer haul operations, and, as such, will likely increase the average utilization of the
fleet. In contrast, the Boeing 737 is typically used on much shorter flights, thus having a very different
utilization than that of the 767. Table 2.7 shows the utilization rates of Boeing 737s used by Southwest
and that of Airbus A320s used by JetBlue, compared to the utilization of these same aircraft on traditional
network carriers. JetBlue has a higher utilization rate on its A320s than any of the traditional network
carrier which also use this aircraft type, by as much as 2.5 hours per day compared to US Airways, or
21.4% higher relative utilization, irrespective of the average stage length which may be quite different for
both carriers. These differences are even greater when compared to JetBlue's reported average utilizations
of 12.6 hours and 12.9 hours in 2001 and 2000 respectively (JetBlue annual reports). Similarly, we can
compare Southwest's utilization of 737-300/700s to Delta's utilization of the same aircraft on stage
lengths of 544 and 531 miles respectively. As shown in Table 2.7, Delta's utilization was 8.53 and 8.36
hours per day in 2000 and 2001 respectively, compared to Southwest's 11.23 and 10.87 hours per day.
Altogether, this represents a 24% and 23% higher utilization for each of these two years, in favor of
Southwest Airlines.
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UTILIZATION STAGE LENGTH
A/C TYPE 737-300/700 A320 737-300/700 A320
YEAR 2000 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001
Continental 9.81 9.36 1,048 950
Delta 8.53 8.36 559 553
Northwest 10.70 10.02 1,011 1,035
United 10.07 9.29 11.45 10.39 640 647 1,405 1,313
US Airways 9.48 8.93 9.86 9.12 514 476 691 598
America West 10.05 8.41 12.23 10.95 637 591 1,205 1,154
ATA 10.03
JetBlue 11.99 11.60 831 986
Southwest 11.23 10.87 526 499
Table 2.7: Boeing 737 and Airbus A320 average daily utilization (Source: Form 41)
This higher utilization of aircraft by low-fare carriers is made possible by higher employee productivity
(discussed in the next paragraph) which allows for quicker turnaround times, as exemplified by
Southwest's average turn-around time of 20.3 minutes for continuing flights compared to American's
50.3 minutes in 1993 (SH&E, 2003). In addition, hub banking7 also negatively affects traditional carriers'
aircraft utilization.
Altogether, fleet commonality and utilization are a major difference between traditional carriers and low-
fare airlines.
Employee Relations and Productivity
Without launching into an extended discussion of labor relations in the airline industry, let us mention
here that the airlines have traditionally had poor labor relations. Recent contract negotiations between
United Airlines and its pilots, for example, led to a "work-to-rule sick-out" in the middle of the summer
of 2001. There are numerous such examples amongst traditional network carriers.
By comparison, low-fare carriers such as Southwest Airlines have better employee relations, which
admittedly allow them to achieve higher performance, as explained by Gittell, Hansman and Dunning's
(2000) report of their conversation with Southwest Airlines' top management team. In particular, Libby
Sartain, Vice President, People at Southwest Airlines explains that Southwest is "a work/family friendly
place. ...It's very flexible in scheduling, for example. It's more of an attitude here than formal policies.
We do not have flex time and other family programs officially, but there is a lot of flexibility for shift
7 Hub banking is the practice of timing incoming and outgoing flights at the hub in order to allow
passengers to connect.
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trading and such". Similarly, as described by Gittell and O'Reilly (2001), JetBlue also boasts better
employee relationships, but in a slightly different way than Southwest: from the start, JetBlue centered its
employee groups around five core values - safety, caring, integrity, fun and passion - while focusing on
maintaining a union-free environment. However, the difference lies mostly in employee productivity
rather than in unionization rates or wages. For example, 89% of Southwest Airlines' employees are
unionized. In terms of wages, ramp agents at American Airlines and Southwest Airlines have similar base
hourly wages (Gittell and Oliva, 2002).
The major difference in productivity stems from much more flexible work rules that allow cross-
utilization of employees, whenever possible and legal. At Southwest, for example, pilots often help
prepare the aircraft between flights while flight attendants clean the aircraft. At the same time, ground
staff works hard to perform quick turnarounds of the aircraft. Altogether, these differences are reflected in
aircraft operating costs per block hour, which are much lower for low-fare carriers. For example,
Southwest's total operating costs per block hour on its 737-300/700s were $1738 for the first quarter of
2001, compared to $2995 at Delta for the same aircraft type. Looking at crew costs only, Southwest's
costs are 55% lower than Delta's, at $365 compared to $805 per block hour on the 737-300.
Another usual indicator of employee productivity is available seat miles per employee (ASMs 8 per
employee and per quarter). Once again, during the fourth quarter of 2001, Southwest's 542,050 or
JetBlue's 649,750 ASMs per employee and quarter far exceeded United's 373,400 or American's
369,790, despite the larger aircraft and longer length of haul on the latter carriers. Compared to US
Airways' more similar stage length and aircraft size, Southwest still produces 31% more ASMs per
employee than US Airways' 413,380 (Aviation Daily, 2002b, 7/19/2002).
Overall, labor accounts for about 40% of total airline costs (US DOT, Form 41), and lower labor costs
therefore are a critical advantage in favor of the low-fare carriers. For example, labor costs per available
seat mile (ASM) were 3.61 cents at United and 3.66 cents at American, compared to 2.70 cents at
Southwest in the fourth quarter of 2000, despite the larger aircraft and longer stage length of the two
Majors. However, as explained by Still (2002), part of the cost advantage comes from productivity, but
also from age and seniority levels, which will likely narrow the difference in cost structures in the near
future. Recent press articles report an increase in Southwest Airlines' overall costs, including an increase
in labor costs from 38% of total costs to 45% of total costs (USA Today, 3/2/2004).
8 ASMs are Available Seat Miles and provide a measure of the airline's output.
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Conclusion
Low-fare carriers and traditional network carriers are similar in terms of their network structure and
pricing strategy (beyond route choice and actual fare values). The major difference between traditional
network carriers and low-fare carriers therefore resides in the low-fare carriers' operations and cost
structures, the latter of which being much lower than those of traditional carriers, as a result of their
higher fleet utilization, fleet commonality, greater employee productivity and lower distribution costs. For
example, Southwest's unit costs (cost per available seat mile or CASM) were 7.67 cents in the second
quarter of 2001, or less than 53% of US Airways' unit costs on its domestic operations (14.57 cents).
In terms of operations, low-fare carriers operate pseudo hub-and-spoke networks with slight
modifications in terms of availability of connections and inter-line agreements, and comparatively offer
more non-stop point-to-point service than traditional network carriers.
According to Rollin King and Herb Kelleher, founders of Southwest Airlines, "fyou get your passengers
to their destinations when they want to get there, on time, at the lowest possible fares, and make darn
sure they have a good time doing it, people will fly your airline". This business approach has proven very
successful for Southwest, JetBlue and many other low-fare carriers all around the world.
2.3.2. Impact of Low-Fare Carriers
Upon entry of a low-fare carrier, it is often expected and documented that the average fare will drop by
about 50% while traffic at least doubles (e.g. Bennett and Craun, 1993; Perry, 1995). Once the frequency
of service on the new entrant becomes sufficient, the low-fare carrier becomes a viable alternative for
both business and leisure traveler alike, particularly on short-haul routes where meals and better seating
are not as important as on longer routes.
The impact of low-fare carriers has therefore been rather dramatic on traditional network carriers'
operating profits. As shown in Figure 2.3, all the major traditional carriers experienced net losses starting
late in 2000. While the losses can be attributed in part to the events of September 2001, there is growing
evidence that the expansion of low-fare travel options combined with the decreasing willingness-to-pay of
business travelers, has played a major role in this trend.
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Figure 2.3: Airline operating profits in 2000 and 2001 (Source: Form 41 database)
Hazel (2003) shows that the combined low-fare carrier domestic US market share has been increasing
since the early 1990s from 6% to almost 25% in 2003. Swelbar (2003) shows that the exposure of US
Majors to low-fare competition has generally increased in all regions of the US by one to five percentage
points since September 2001. At the carrier level, however, major network airlines have experienced
variable exposure to low-fare competition. For example in August 2003, relative to September 2001,
Delta's exposure to low-fare competition had increased by over 20%, while US Airways and Northwest
Airlines' exposures had increased somewhat less (Swelbar, 2003). Comparatively, United, American and
Continental's exposures had decreased between September 2001 and August 2003. Since then, JetBlue
has expanded its service on the east coast, and as a result, American's exposure to low-fare competition
has increased.
Other interesting effects of low-fare carriers include the decrease in domestic yields9 in the US airline
industry. While yields have been decreasing, low-fare carrier ASMs have increased, and the cost
differential between low-fare and traditional network carriers has kept increasing (i.e. the cost advantage
9 Yields are revenues per passenger and per mile and represent an indication of unit revenues. Another
measure of unit revenues is RASMV, or revenue per available seat and per mile, which provides a more
appropriate comparison with CASMV (cost per available seat and per mile)
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of low-fare carriers has kept growing). Nonetheless, Swelbar estimates that the growth potential for low-
fare carriers is not unlimited and is nearing its end. He estimates that another 1.6% market share can be
gained by low-fare carriers, given the current US domestic market conditions.
2.4. Predatory Behavior: Concerns Expressed by Governmental
Agencies and New Entrant Carriers
Altogether, operating an airline, let alone a small airline, has proven to be a very uncertain and
challenging business. Numerous new entrant carriers have gone bankrupt or have been acquired by larger
airlines in the past (People Express, Shuttle America, Midway, etc.). Yet, new airlines are still created, as
was JetBlue, which started operating in early 2000, or Virgin USA, which is expected to being operating
soon.
The creation and failure of new entrant airlines and the dominance of network carriers have led the U.S.
and Canadian governments, and the European Union, to worry about the problems of predatory practices
and pricing, which are a subset of deeper concerns that we discuss in the next sections. We start by
defining predation in general and its relevance to the airline industry.
2.4.1. Predatory Practices: Definition
While predatory pricing might be considered a simple concept, and described as such by a number of
authors, Spector (2001) argues in his 2001 article that there has been no unifying definition of predatory
pricing used in the literature. He therefore proposes to "clarify some of the most fundamental questions
regarding the issue of predatory pricing", namely "the definition itself..." In particular, Spector mentions
three definitions of predatory pricing that mistakenly have been assumed to be the same definition:
1. An action is predatory if it is not the most profitable action unless its effects on other firms' entry
or exit decisions are taken into account
2. An action is predatory if (1) is satisfied AND if the ability to later reverse the action which caused
the other firms to exit or not to enter, i.e. the ability to raise prices or decrease output, is necessary
to make the action profitable
3. An action is predatory if it induces the exclusion or prevents the entry of an equally efficient or
more efficient rival.
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Spector concludes, with the help of a simple model and the application of legal theory, that these three
definitions are not equivalent and that the second definition constitutes the "best" definition of predatory
pricing.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) also provides a definition of
predatory pricing as a "straightforward theory" (OECD, 1989). This definition coincides relatively well
with that of Spector but further details the mechanics of predatory pricing: "The predator, already a
dominant firm, sets its prices so low for a sufficient period of time that its competitors leave the market
and others are deterredfrom entering". Under the assumption that both firms are equally efficient, this
strategy implies not only that all firms will suffer substantial losses but more importantly that the predator
has some means of surviving longer than its victim. Such means include availability of cash reserves or
cross-subsidization from other markets or products. Furthermore, for this strategy to be viable, the
predator must have some expectation of recovering its losses through future gains and exploitable market
power.
In addition, this publication rightly observes that predation occurs not only through predatory pricing, but
also by means of "non-price predation". The airline industry provides a good example of an industry
where non-price predation can occur: Airlines have developed frequent flyer programs as an incentive for
customers to stay loyal to one (or a few) airline(s), based on their travel habits, the network reach,
capacity and frequency of service of their airline of interest. We further detail the research efforts
undertaken to define and refine the notions of price and non-price predation in the literature review
(Chapter 3).
2.4.2. Regulatory Agencies' Concern over Predatory Behavior in Airline Markets
One of the concerns of the US DOT (and of other regulatory agencies all over the world) is that
traditional network carriers use their dominance to force new entrant carriers out of markets. For example,
Spirit has complained about Northwest increasing its frequencies and lowering its fares in response to
entry in such markets as Detroit to Boston or Detroit to Philadelphia. In Europe, the Federal Cartel Office
of Germany (Bundeskartellamt, 2002) issued an injunction against Lufthansa's "pricing measures" in the
Berlin-Frankfurt route, in January 2002. The Cartel Office contended that Lufthansa's lowest fares were
too low in regards with Germania Airlines' own fares and demanded that they be raised to 35 euros above
the price charged by Germania instead of the previous five euros. According to the Cartel Office, this
injunction was "warranted by Lufthansa's product advantages such as inflight service, its frequent flyer
program and its greater flight frequency on the route". The Cartel Office thus relies on the potential for
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non-price predation as justification for the decision. Despite an appeal from Lufthansa, this ruling was
upheld in April 2002.
2.4.3. Disadvantages of the lack of competition to travelers
Given the assumption that traditional network carriers are able to force new entrants out of airline
markets, a report by the US DOT (2001) determined that the average fare paid by travelers was, on
average, 54% higher for passengers traveling in a market where no low-fare competition was available.
By this report, the DOT acknowledges the importance of low-fare new entrant carriers in the airline
industry.
In another study, Windle and Dresner (1995) discuss the impact of entry of a new entrant airline on
average fares in a specific market, and focus on the differences between entry by a smaller, low-fare
carrier and by a major network carrier. The study also looks at long run fares: Are the low fares
maintained? The study concludes that low fare carriers have a greater impact on average fares than lack of
concentration: Having low-fare competition in a market reduces the average fares more than having
extensive competition. In addition, the study shows that new entrant carriers tend to maintain their low
prices beyond the first year after entry.
Thus, the major concern of new entrant carriers and government agencies alike is that the major
traditional network carriers unfairly compete against low-fare new entrants, which in turn negatively
impacts the consumers of air travel.
2.5. Conclusion
The US airline industry has changed dramatically since 1990. A new low-fare business model has
emerged and proven to be quite successful and durable, when applied to a subset of the air transportation
markets. While the model's success depends upon these airlines' ability to lower costs and increase
employee productivity (relative to that of traditional network carriers), it does not appear to be a viable
replacement for traditional network carriers altogether. The mere fact that low-fare new entrant carriers
choose not to enter small markets where traditional network carriers can take advantage of the
consolidation of network flows at hub locations shows that low-fare carriers could not profitably meet the
global needs for air transportation. With respect to the difference between the two business models
exemplified by each type of carrier, we contend that the distinction is not so much in the network
structure and operation of the airline as in the lower cost structure created by the increased productivity of
employees and better utilization of capital equipment (e.g. aircraft).
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Nonetheless, the threat posed by low-fare carriers has led to various responses to entry by network
carriers, that in turn raised the awareness of government agencies and low-fare carriers alike. Even as
these low-fare carriers continue to grow in the domestic US air transportation market (and all over the
world), the extent to which a competitive response is perceived to be "unfair" or even predatory remains
of critical importance.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, we review the existing research in three separate areas of interest that relate to this
research: (1) Predatory practices in the general economic sense, (2) Predatory practices as applied to the
airline industry, and (3) Revenue Management.
The notion of predatory pricing and predatory practices occupies an important place in the motivation of
this research. The fear of unfair competition and the desire for a healthy competitive environment have
been at the heart of the debate regarding low-fare entry, between traditional network airlines and low-fare
new entrant carriers, government agencies and network carriers, and government agencies and low-fare
carriers. Our discussion of predatory practices focuses on the fundamental economic concepts and rules
devised by researchers to test for predatory pricing.
The brief introduction to Revenue Management practices in the airline industry presented later in this
chapter provides the basic theory needed to understand the simulation scenarios as discussed in Chapters
5 through 7. This discussion also serves as a preliminary indication of the importance of Revenue
Management effects on average fares, passenger traffic and revenues, and other aggregate measures of
airline performance.
3.1. Economic Basis for Predation
Early research efforts regarding predatory conduct focused on economic relationships between revenues
and costs. According to economic theory, there numerous competitive situations, of which four are of
particular interest for this discussion: Monopolies, where a single firm serves the market for a product and
has no competition; Duopolies, when two firms compete in a market; Oligopolies, when a small number
of firms compete, and, perfect competition. Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2001) explain the basics of
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microeconomics, and the assumptions upon which the above-mentioned competitive situations rely. We
briefly discuss the extremes of perfect competition and monopoly, in relation to predatory pricing.
Predatory pricing is often understood as pricing below cost, which is the assumption we use in the
following examples.
In a situation of perfect competition, predatory pricing is not expected to be a viable strategy as price does
not depend on any individual firm's output but rather on total output (through a price-demand curve),
which cannot be significantly changed by any single firm's output. Therefore, a firm which would try to
price below cost (at any output level) could not expect to have any impact on its competitors. It would
only hurt itself by reducing its own profits. Besides, demand is such that the firm pricing below cost could
not produce high enough outputs to satisfy all the market demand, which would further contribute to its
demise.
Conversely, the monopolistic case is a much more feasible and realistic setting for predatory behavior.
The behavior of any firm has direct impact on price and output levels. There are therefore opportunities to
price below cost without necessarily foregoing substantial amounts of profits while deterring entry. Such
behavior would potentially allow the incumbent to plan on a long-term strategy to later recover profits
lost in the short-term. For example, pricing below marginal cost is clearly sub-optimal as it implies that
marginal revenues are strictly less than marginal costs (since price is typically at least as high as marginal
revenues), which in turn entails sub-optimal profits for the monopolist (as optimality is reached at equal
marginal costs and revenues). Areeda and Turner (1975) further argue that pricing below cost, and more
specifically below marginal cost, is predatory (as we discuss in Section 3.2).
Given this basic economic theory, Areeda and Turner discuss the fact that under certain circumstances,
price competition can have anticompetitive effects. As they state, "a firm which drives out or excludes
rivals by selling at unremunerative prices is not competing on the merits, but engaging in behavior that
may properly be called predatory". In one of the first research efforts on predatory pricing, they propose
an economic approach to testing for predation, setting the stage for numerous research efforts on the issue
of predatory practices, as discussed below.
3.2. History of Research on Testing for Predatory Pricing
In 1958, McGee (1958) set the stage for discussions on predatory pricing. His article focused on the
Standard Oil case of 1911, according to which the company had used monopolistic practices, and more
precisely local price-cutting, to achieve and perpetuate its monopoly position in the oil refining business.
By 1914, in the Clayton Act, predatory price discrimination was hence included in a group of business
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practices which called for explicit statutory prohibition. Interestingly, McGee argues that price predation
is often an unprofitable business strategy which could therefore not have been used by Standard Oil. In
particular, predatory price-cutting does not explain how the predator acquired the monopoly power that he
needs to practice it, nor does it make sense to apply such a strategy, as it would often be more profitable
and reliable to purchase the rival. McGee also points out that variations in prices among similar markets
may be accounted for in terms of variations in demand elasticities, but do not imply that one of the
competitors is preying on the other. As we discuss in this thesis, this last point is critical to airline markets
where decreasing average fares are too often used as an indication of predatory pricing, when in fact, as
McGee explains, they are only a reflection of the price-demand curve in the market. McGee concludes
that predatory pricing is a very unlikely monopolistic strategy which requires unusual market conditions,
such as legal barriers to mergers and acquisitions.
Regardless of McGee's conclusions, the development of game theory in the 1960s and 1970s led to
conclusions that predation might lead to a rational equilibrium under specific conditions. In particular,
Posner (1979) argues that predation is a plausible policy for a profit maximizing firm, which may have
been followed by Standard Oil. Other examples include the "long purse" assumption (Edwards, 1955;
Benoit, 1984), under which the predator is assumed to have infinite resources and the prey limited cash
reserves, which can lead to a Nash equilibrium where predation is the better solution for the predator.
Similarly, reputations models, as described by Kreps and Wilson (1982) or Milgrom and Roberts (1982),
where the multi-product predator develops a reputation for toughness by using predatory practices in one
market to deter entry in others, also make predation a rational behavior.
Areeda and Turner (1975) were consequently among the first to propose a test for the existence of
predatory pricing. They claim that pricing at or above average total cost cannot be considered predatory.
Similarly, they argue that pricing at or above marginal cost does not constitute predatory pricing, even
though equally efficient rivals may be drawn out of the market for lack of available capital. On the other
hand, pricing below marginal cost is predatory unless above average cost. Marginal cost, however, is very
difficult to evaluate, and, as a result, Areeda and Turner propose a test procedure based on the comparison
of prices and average variable costs, which they use as a proxy for marginal costs. Their proposal states
that prices that are profit maximizing, above average total costs or below average total costs but above
marginal costs (or average variable costs as a surrogate for marginal costs) should be considered non-
predatory. Any other price is predatory.
This article prompted immediate discussion from a number of authors, including Scherer (1976) who
instead advocates a method that would maximize total long-term welfare, but does not "know how these
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variables can be assessed without a thorough examination of the factual circumstances accompanying the
monopolist's alleged predatory behavior". Similarly, Williamson (1977) suggests using an output-
maximizing rule in the short term, along with a time limit on the rule to ensure that when the entrant has
recovered the costs of entry, competition becomes free again. In response to these objections and
comments, Areeda and Turner (1977, 1978) provide a discussion and ranking of cost-based and output-
based rules, as shown in Table 3.1. Yet, Baumol (1979) also objects to the Areeda-Turner rule and claims
that they overlook the temporal side of predation and do not account for the prospect of increased long-
term profits from predatory pricing for the established firm. In order to overcome this limitation, Baumol
suggests imposing on the established firm a "quasi-permanence" of the price reduction. Joskow and
Klevorick (1979) propose a unifying framework to approach the problem of price predation, using a two-
tier approach. The first step assesses the market situation and determines if the situation warrants further
scrutiny. The second step consists of a behavioral study of the firms using cost-based rules.
Rule Discouraging Inefficient Inducing Higher Pre-Entry
Entry Output
Average Variable Cost 1 5
Average Cost 2 4
Short Run Marginal Cost 3 3
Output Limitation 4 2
Price Maintenance 5 1
Table 3.1: Areeda and Turner's ranking of various rules (1: Best - 5: Worst)
In his 2001 article, Spector (2001) argues that there has been no unifying definition of predatory pricing
used in the literature, and further offers a comparison of existing definitions, as previously discussed in
Chapter 2. He then proceeds to compare the various rules designed to test for predatory prices (cost,
output or two-tier based, as previously discussed) and concludes that "no single rule, however carefully
designed, can be applied to all predation claims, and that the rule of reason should often be used".
Scherer (1976), Joskow and Klevorick (1979), and Spector (2001) all conclude that a thorough analysis of
the factual circumstances surrounding the claim of predatory behavior is critical.
Furthermore, the previously discussed tests cannot always be used. The airline industry, for instance, does
not offer the possibility of directly comparing revenues and costs. This is a direct consequence of the
dichotomy of supply and demand described by Belobaba (1995): At the market level, it is possible to
determine the revenues and therefore some average measure of price per passenger. However, costs
cannot be estimated in a simple way, as the costs of flying a plane from one city to another cannot be fully
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assigned to local market passengers. Any particular flight usually is shared by local and connecting
passengers, which implies that some the connecting passengers should bear some of the costs of flying the
aircraft. Other approaches (Wu and Dorman, 2002) contend that costs can be assigned at the flight level,
but that revenues should be prorated on any specific flight to account for connecting traffic, which
essentially leads to the same problem of dichotomy of supply and demand. Since there is no way to
accurately assign costs (or revenues, depending on the approach) and therefore compare revenues and
costs, there is a need for another approach to the problem of predation in the airline industry, independent
of cost-based rules.
3.3. Entry and Predation in the Airline Industry
There have been a large number of research efforts on the question of predatory pricing, but notably little
opposition to the concept of predation other than McGee (1958) and Baumol (1982). The latter does not
refute the existence of price predation per se, but rather describes conditions under which a natural
monopoly might behave comparably to perfect competition and thereby be exempt of predatory
behaviors. Baumol identifies equal access to economies of scale, free entry and exit, and sustainable
prices as the conditions for perfect contestability of a market. A number of authors were tempted to apply
contestability to the airline industry (e.g. Bailey, Graham and Kaplan, 1985; Bailey and Baumol, 1984),
but, as Levine (1987) points out, while it "leaves in place the predictions of the structure and
performance of airline markets that were developed before deregulation using vaguer, and probably
inapplicable, forms of the theory of perfect competition" and has the "virtue of focusing relatively
precisely on the conditions necessary to achieve competitive performance from markets with few sellers",
contestability "turns out to be wrong as a predictor of the behavior of deregulated airline markets".
One of the first research efforts in post-deregulation airline markets was undertaken by Bailey, Graham
and Kaplan (1985). They thoroughly describe the positioning of new entrant airlines shortly after
deregulation and further explain the detail of the cost structure differential between established airlines
(pre-deregulation airlines) and new entrant airlines, as we did in Chapter 2. Bailey, Graham and Kaplan
then go on to discuss the issue of contestability of airline markets, and conclude that the airline industry is
not an industry where markets are perfectly contestable, as introduced by Baumol in 1982. Hurdle,
Johnson, Joskow, Werden and Williams (1989) reiterate this observation, and attempt to discover which
deviations from perfect contestability significantly affect performance. Whinston and Collins (1992)
observe the impact of entry on the stock valuation of incumbent airlines and conclude that the drop in
valuation of incumbent airlines upon entry by People Express is an indicator of sunk costs of entry, which
goes against the theory of contestability of airline markets.
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In "uncontestable" airline markets, the discussion of the impacts of competition on average fares led
Bailey, Graham and Kaplan (1985) to present evidence that airlines in concentrated markets (where they
are dominant) are able to charge higher fares than airlines in more competitive markets. In addition, they
study the effect of potential entry on airline performance. Hurdle, Johnson, Joskow, Werden and Williams
(1989) also conclude, through econometric modeling and hypothesis testing, that performance is most
affected by the number and concentration of incumbents, as well as by the number of potential entrants
that are not deterred by economies of scale or scope. In a pragmatic study of the effects of entry and
competition on fares, Morrison and Winston (1990) establish that deregulation led to a decrease in
average fares, compared to equivalent Standard Industry Fare Levels (SIFL) set by the CAB. The study
concludes that there should be a greater focus on enhancing the effects of competition. Whinston and
Collins (1992) study the impact of entry on fares, sales and schedules and find that there is a far greater
impact on the market of entry (airport pair) than on parallel markets (other airport pairs within the city
pair) with the same catchment area.
While most previously discussed studies focused on the immediate impact of entry on incumbent revenue
performance and average fares, Windle and Dresner (1995), also researched the long-term impact of
entry. More specifically, their findings are twofold: First, they observe that the impact of entry is quite
different if the entrant is a low-fare carrier or another traditional network carrier. In the former case, fares
drop sharply, while no such effect is observed in the latter case. In addition, entry by a low-fare carrier is
shown to have a more significant impact on fares than competition: Fares are generally lower if a low-fare
carrier operates within the market than if there is extensive competition between traditional network
carriers in that market (as measured by the Hirschman Hirfindahl index). Second, Windle and Dresner
conclude that the lower prices generated by low-fare competition are sustained beyond entry and are not
merely promotional. Perry (1995) also related her observations on the effect of low-fare, low-cost entry
on the airline industry and on passenger behavior, and observed the impact of deregulation and market
entry on revenues, traffic and fares. In particular, she argues that most of the increase in traffic in such
markets is attributable to incumbent airlines' response to entry. At the same time, the US DOT (1995)
published a report on the revolution introduced by low-cost airlines. The study details the savings to
passengers resulting from entry of low-cost carriers and asserts that one in seven passengers flies because
of the low-cost service now provided to them.
Finally, some of the most recent work includes that of Oster and Strong (2001), and the US Department
of Transportation (2001). In the former, Oster and Strong observe that the benefits of deregulation have
come from two distinct types of competition. In long-haul markets, competition between network carriers
has boosted competition and led to lower prices while, in short-haul markets, it is competition between
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network carriers and low-fare carriers that has produced this increased competition. Oster and Strong
(2001) further explore the details of predation in the airline industry and the challenges in applying a cost-
based test such as Joskow and Klevorick's (1979). The DOT's study focuses on hub fares 0 and notes that
these fares are, on average, much higher in markets without low-fare competition. Furthermore, the
discrepancies are even greater in short-haul markets. Finally, the DOT points out that the usual
explanations for high hub fares - passenger mix, operational cost, quality of service and the "Southwest
Effect" - only apply when low-fare competition is not present. They conclude that it is the lack of
competition and not the rationales listed that explain these high hub fares.
Given previous research efforts on competition in the airline industry, other research studies focused on
predatory behavior in the airline industry and how to test for its existence. In their 1991 study of
predatory behavior in aviation, Dodgson, Katsoulacos and Pryke (1991) provide a detailed discussion on
predation in the airline industry. They define predatory behavior and introduce concepts of relevance in
identifying predation. After reviewing the evidence in Europe and the US, they conclude that none of the
"bright-line" rules suggested in research studies focusing on predation (e.g. Areeda and Turner,
Williamson, or Joskow and Klevorick) can be reasonably and successfully applied to the airline industry.
They advocate the use of the "rule of reason" based on a study of the entry conditions - where medium
barriers to entry are most likely to lead to predatory behavior - and the nature of market competition -
where highly concentrated or localized markets are most conducive to predation, along with a two-tier
approach comparable to that of Joskow and Klevorick's. This approach involves careful analysis of
individual markets and competitive situations to determine whether claims of predatory behavior are valid
or not. If they are, then the use of a rule to test for its existence might become appropriate, although very
careful consideration should be given to estimating costs and revenues. The estimation of costs and
revenues is critical because of the dichotomy of supply and demand (Belobaba, 1995), as previously
discussed. Oster and Strong (2001) also stress the difficulty in applying cost-based test to the airline
industry.
Numerous research efforts were therefore undertaken with respect to the impact of entry in the airline
industry specifically. While many of these studies indicate a growing concern with respect to unfair
competition and predatory pricing, the focus of these studies was on applying existing tests of predation
or on analyzing the effect of entry on traditional aggregate measure of performance such as average fares
10 Hub fares, although undefined, seem to refer to fares in origin-destination markets where the origin city
is a hub for a network airline. For example, a fare in the Atlanta-Boston market would constitute a hub
fare.
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or revenues. For instance, Bailey, Graham and Kaplan (1985), Morrison and Winston (1990), Windle and
Dresner (1995), Perry (1995) and Oster and Strong (2001) discuss the impact of entry on average fares
and traffic and the distinction between entry by a low-fare carrier and a network carrier, and touch upon
the issue of predation. Baumol (1982), Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1983), Hurdle, Johnson, Joskow,
Werden and Williams (1989) and Whinston and Collins (1992) focus on the contestability of airline
markets and how this might affect competition in the airline industry, but conclude that the hypothesis of
contestability is inappropriate. Overall, while predation is clearly a concern, none of these studies has
provided us with a satisfactory solution to evaluate the possibility of predation. Only Dodgson,
Katsoulacos and Pryke (1991) actually focus on predation in the airline industry and offer an approach to
testing for its existence, while remaining very cautious in recommending any particular test of predation.
In particular, they advocate a careful analysis of individual markets on a case-by-case basis.
Finally, recent legal action against various carriers accentuates the concerns of regulatory bodies with
respect to predatory behavior. For example, in the US, American Airlines was sued by the US Department
of Justice (2001), while the Competition Tribunal in Canada attempted to determine whether Air Canada
competed unfairly against CanJet (2000) and WestJet (2001). In 1998, the United States Department of
Transportation (US DOT, 1998) proposed a policy attempting to identify predatory practices based on
high-level market measures.
Unfair competition is therefore a growing concern in the airline industry, in particular given the growth of
low-fare carriers. These concerns call for a careful analysis of the competitive dynamics in the airline
industry in order to be able to identify predatory practices. As previously discussed, prior research on the
topic of predatory pricing - whether in the airline industry or in a more general setting - does not provide
a conclusive approach to testing for the existence of price predation, but rather advocates the use of the
rule of reason. Furthermore, the added complexity of the airline industry (allocation of costs and
revenues, frequent flyer programs, etc.) emphasizes the need for a careful and detailed understanding of
the airline industry's competitive dynamics. Use of aggregate measures of airline performance does not
offer sufficient detail and overlooks the effects of airline specific tools such as Revenue Management.
3.4. Revenue Management
In their analysis of the competitive impacts of low-fare entry in airline markets, previous research studies
usually focus only on the effect of entry on aggregate measures of airline performance such as average
fares, traffic or revenues. As we discuss in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, one of the important factors explaining the
change in these aggregate measures of airline performance following low-fare entry is Revenue
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Management. Airline Revenue Management, also referred to as Yield Management, spurred a lot of
interest in the late 1980s, following US airline deregulation. Revenue management is the combination of
forecasting and seat allocation algorithms that enable the airlines to maximize their revenues given a set
of fares by dedicating part of the inventory (airline seats) to specific fare products based on forecasts of
demand to come. The perishable nature of an airline seat, combined with the different booking patterns of
leisure and business passengers, and the differentiated fare products, created the need for seat inventory
control, and eventually Revenue Management tools. Given differential pricing, Revenue Management is
the practice of determining how many seats to offer for each fare product on each flight. In addition, since
the operating costs of a flight departure on a scheduled airline are essentially fixed in the very short term,
the objective of Revenue Management is to maximize revenues, which is equivalent to maximizing
profits. In the following sections, we briefly review three of the principal techniques of revenue
management: Overbooking, fare class mix seat inventory control and origin-destination control.
3.4.1. Overbooking
Airlines have been overbooking (accepting more bookings than capacity) their aircraft for over two
decades in an attempt to reduce the revenue loss associated with no-shows. The objective of overbooking
algorithms is to determine the total number of seats to sell on a flight, while balancing the loss of revenue
associated with an empty seat and the cost of "bumping" a passenger. Airline overbooking research dates
back to the 1950s with Beckman's (1958) static optimization model. Later statistical models include the
work of Taylor (1962), Simon (1968), Rothstein (1968, 1985), Vickrey (1972) and Smith (1984).
Rothstein's (1968) Ph.D. thesis describes the first dynamic programming model for overbooking. His
1985 work is a survey of previous research on overbooking and discusses the customer service
implications of overbooking. Vickrey's paper suggests the resolution of oversold situations using
auctions, which was dismissed as unrealistic at the time. More recent research includes the work of
Gallego (2004) on another approach to solving overbooked situations by preemptively contacting willing
passengers and rebooking them on less demanded flights.
3.4.2. Fare Class Mix Seat Inventory Control
Fare class mix seat inventory control is the practice of determining the revenue maximizing number of
seats to make available for each product (fare class) for each future flight-leg departure. All airline
Revenue Management systems are designed with the purpose of optimizing the mix of seats available in
each fare class in order to maximize revenues. These systems use forecasts of future demand as inputs to
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their optimizers. Littlewood (1972), L'Heureux (1986), Lee (1990) and Curry (1994) provide discussions
of forecasting methods in the airline industry.
Fare class mix seat allocation algorithms use the demand forecasts to set booking limits in each fare class,
that is the number of seats to protect for any given fare class from other classes. Most airline Revenue
Management systems use "nested" seat allocations, as opposed to allocations within partitioned classes.
The difference lies in the fact that in the nested approach, seat are protected for a given fare class relative
to lower fare classes (cheaper products), but can also be sold in higher fare classes, in the unlikely event
that the entire aircraft capacity can be sold in the highest priced fare class. Littlewood (1972) provided the
basis for the initial research on the topic of seat inventory control. His rule for protecting seats in a dual
fare class environment was extended by Belobaba (1987), who published the first leg-based seat
inventory management algorithm in a nested fare class environment, known as the Expected Marginal
Seat Revenue algorithm (EMSR). Building on this research, Belobaba (1989, 1992, 1994), Curry (1990),
McGill (1995), Wollmer (1992) and others proposed and developed optimal formulations of the multiple
nested class problem.
The general premise of fare class mix seat inventory control models relies on forecasts of average and
standard deviation of demand for each fare class, along with the associated average fare in the class.
Given these forecasts, the expected marginal revenue of each incremental seat is the product of the
average fare in the class multiplied by the probability of selling that seat. The optimal number of seats to
protect for that class is then the number of seats whose marginal revenue exceeds the average fare in the
lower fare class. Because of the assumption that lower fare class traffic books earlier and because higher
fare classes have access to lower fare class inventory in a nested structure, the model finds protection
levels for higher fare classes, and booking limits for lower fare classes. Simulation and airline experience
show that these fare class mix seat inventory allocation systems lead to revenue increases ranging from
2% to 4% (Belobaba, 1989).
3.4.3. Network Revenue Management: Origin-Destination Control
Network Revenue Management constitutes a significant improvement in the management of airline seat
inventory. Origin-Destination (OD) control allows the airlines to allocate seats based on individual
passengers' revenue contribution on the airline's network rather than based on the fare class requested on
a single flight leg. These seat inventory management algorithms, currently used by the more advanced
(network) airlines, provide a better control between local and connecting passengers and evaluate the
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tradeoff between blocking two local seats with a connecting passenger as opposed to potentially flying
one empty seat and filling the other seat with a local passenger.
In a first step towards implementation of network Revenue Management, Smith, Leimkuhler and Darrow
(1992) introduced the notion of "virtual nesting". This process maps each itinerary/fare combination to a
hidden (or virtual) class within the airline's reservation system based on fare value. Initial implementation
used total fares for both local and connecting passengers, which resulted in overprotection for connecting
passengers with relatively higher fares than local passengers, and thus in sub-optimal protection levels.
Later refinements introduced proration of connecting fares, or use linear programming tools to estimate
the displacement cost of a connecting passenger. Smith, Leimkuhler and Darrow (1992) provide a
detailed discussion of the implementation of virtual nesting at American Airlines and quantify the revenue
gains attributable to Revenue Management as a whole as $1.4 billion over a three-year period.
Subsequent developments of OD control strategies include the application of linear programming
methods and heuristic approaches to the maximization of network revenues. Williamson (1992) provides
a detailed description of the application of mathematical programming and network flow models to the
OD seat inventory control problem. More recent research focusing on the application of dynamic
programming to Revenue Management includes the work of Gallego and van Ryzin (1997), de Boer
(2003), and Bertsimas and Popescu (2003). McGill and van Ryzin (1999) provide a thorough review of
the science of Revenue Management and its evolution since deregulation, as do Barnhart, Belobaba and
Odoni (2003).
Even as Revenue Management research keeps developing, the growth of low-fare, low-cost carriers has
put into question the traditional airline business model. Tretheway (2004) explains why he believes the
traditional network airline business model is broken, while Franke (2004) discusses the effect of low-cost
competition on network carriers, and the need for structural change within network carriers. Numerous
additional newspaper articles also claim that traditional network carriers will have to adapt their pricing to
that of low-cost carriers (USA Today (2004), New York Times (2003)). In this new competitive airline
environment, we examine the effects of Revenue Management and flows of network passengers on the
performance of network carriers as well as low-fare airlines, and focus on the impact on aggregate
measures of airline performance, such as average fares, revenues and market share.
3.5. Implications for this Research
Unfair competition and predatory practices have occupied researchers since the 1950s, and led to the
design of three different types of rules on testing for the existence of predatory pricing. Areeda and
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Turner pioneered rules based on the comparison of revenues and costs, Williamson devised an output
maximizing rule, while Joskow and Klevorick advocate the use of a two-tier approach where the "rule of
reason" is applied in the first step. Among the most recent research, Spector concludes that "no single
rule, however carefully designed, can be applied to all predation claims" and that the rule of reason is
therefore the most reasonable approach to predation cases.
The airline industry has recently become concerned with unfair competition as low-fare new entrant
carriers have become more present and successful all over the world. In studying the potential for unfair
competition, most airline research (Perry, 1995; Oster and Strong, 2001) has focused on analyzing the
effect of low-fare entry on aggregate measures of airline performance (on the incumbent carriers).
Dodgson, Katsoulacos and Pryke (1991) recognize the challenges in testing for predatory pricing and
advocate the use of the rule of reason. In addition, the difficulty in matching revenues and costs in the
airline industry (as discussed in Section 3.2) further complicates the use of a cost-based rule (or any other
rule) to assess the possibility of predation. While researchers agree that rules should not be used in
assessing predatory practices, most of the airline-related research on the effect of low-fare entry on the
airline industry has focused on traditional average measures of airline performance such as average fares
or revenues. Regulatory bodies have taken this approach one step further in using this data as a means to
determine whether incumbent carriers competed unfairly against low-fare new entrants (US DOT, 1998;
US DOJ, 2001; Canadian Competition Tribunal, 2000 and 2001).
The consensus therefore is that no particular rule should be used in assessing the potential for predatory
behavior in the airline industry. On the contrary, the "rule of reason" is generally admitted to offer the
most reasonable approach to assessing the existence of predatory conduct. Previous research, however,
generally relies on aggregate measures of performance to evaluate the performance of individual airlines,
and overlooks the impact of flows of connecting passengers and Revenue Management. In particular,
none of the previous research has identified the importance of Revenue Management in explaining
changes in traditional measures of airline performance following low-fare entry. As we discuss in
subsequent chapters, individual airline performance is dependent upon a set of factors that include
Revenue Management, which has played a very important role in the airline business since deregulation.
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CASE STUDIES
Given the changing environment in the airline industry, as exemplified by the growth of low-fare new
entrant carriers and the increasing concern of regulatory bodies regarding the potential for predatory
behavior (discussed in Chapters 2 and 3), we now present a survey of the effects of entry on market and
individual carrier performance based on historical data in a set of markets with low-fare entry (as
identified in previous studies). In Section 4.1, we analyze the effects of entry in a set of markets with low-
fare entry, based on available aggregate data (DB 1 A database, OD Plus survey), and highlight the general
conclusions that can be reached based on this limited data. In the Section 4.2, the discussion centers on
the detailed analysis of two markets (Atlanta-Orlando and Detroit-Boston) which represent two extremes
in terms of low-fare new entrant success and failure. Findings show the limitations of aggregate data and
aggregate measures of airline performance in assessing the response of incumbent carriers to entry.
The analysis provides two important results: First, it is impossible to understand the success or failure of a
new entrant - or new entrants in general - by only focusing on high-level aggregate data. In addition,
such aggregate data does not provide sufficient information to assess the nature of the competitive
response of the incumbent carriers in the market. Second, more detailed market-level data, while
providing better insights, ignores revenue management and network flows of passengers. This observation
helps establish that both factors (revenue management and network flows) have a very important impact
on network carrier revenues and traffic, as well as on the apparent response to entry of the incumbent
network carriers. These effects are usually overlooked and therefore become the focus of the research in
the remainder of this thesis, along with relative new entrant capacity.
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4.1. A Survey of the Effects of Low-Fare Entry on Total Market and
Individual Carrier Traffic, Revenues and Fares
4.1.1. Markets with Low-Fare Entry
Oster and Strong (2001) identify a set of twelve markets where a new entrant started operations at hub
airports, and which represent "examples of potential anti-competitive behavior in response to entry". In
another study, Perry (1995) shows the effect of entry in eight markets. Table 4.1 summarizes a collection
of markets studied by either Oster and Strong or Perry, along with the detail of the entrant carrier and the
incumbent airlines in the market. In addition, to reflect the changing environment created by the birth of
such carriers as JetBlue, we also included some of the markets more recently served by this particular
carrier.
JARTER INCUMBENT
ENTRY CARRIERS**
97-2 DL
96-4 DL
94-1 DL-TW
93-3 US-CO
95-2 AA-DL
96-2 NW
95-4 NW-US
95-2 NW-TW
92-2 HP
95-3 CO-US
95-1 US
93-2 DL
89-2 TW
93-2 AS
92-3 AA-HP
HP
00-2 AA-CO-DL-US
00-2 AA-CO-DL-US
NEW
ENTRANT*
J7
NJ
J7
WN
NJ
NK
NK
NJ
WN
N5
N5
KN/WN
WN
KN/WN
QQ
WN
B6
B6
DISTANCE COMPETITIVE
SITUATION
226 Exited
691 Competing
404 Competing
313 Competing
329 Exited
630 Exited
452 Exited
393 Competing
368 Competing
494 Exited
267 Exited
626 Competing
227 Competing
223 Competing
444 Exited
406 Competing
1,068 Competing
300 Competing
SOURCE
Oster & Strong
Oster & Strong
Perry
Perry
Oster & Strong
Oster & Strong
Oster & Strong
Oster & Strong
Perry
Oster & Strong
Oster & Strong
Perry
Perry
Perry
Perry
Perry
n/a
n/a
Table 4.1: Markets for case studies
(Source: OD Plus database, Perry (1994), and Oster and Strong (2001))
* data for these markets was estimated based on available data
** details of incumbent and new entrant carrier codes can be found in Table 4.2
In this section, we focus on this set of markets and attempt to highlight the similarities and differences in
the strategies of entry of each individual entrant and in the responses of the established carriers within
each market, from the aggregate data available for comparison. In particular, we focus on Perry's
analysis, discuss her findings, and apply the same framework to the markets identified by Oster and
Strong, and two additional JetBlue markets. In the second section (Section 4.2), we provide additional
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OFMARKET
ATL-CLT
ATL-MCI
ATL-MCO*
CLE-BWI
DFW-ICT
DTW-BOS
DTW-PHL
MSP-MCI
PHX-BUR
PIT-BOS
PIT-PHL
SLC-SAN
STL-IND
SEA-GEG
RNO-PDX
LAS-OAK
NYC-FLL
NYC-BUF
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insights in two particular cases, the Detroit-Boston market and the Atlanta-Orlando market, where Spirit
and ValuJet respectively chose to compete against major network carriers, Northwest Airlines and Delta
Air Lines.
Table 4.2 summarizes the airlines involved in the study along with each individual airline code, as
reported below.
INCUMBENT LOW-FARE NEW ENTRANT
AIRLINE CODE AIRLINE CODE
American Airlines AA ValuJet Airlines J7
Continental Airlines CO AirTran Airways FL
Delta Air Lines DL Vanguard Airlines NJ
Northwest Airlines NW Southwest Airlines WN
United Airlines UA Reno Air QQ
Trans World Airlines TW Morris Air KN
US Airways US JetBlue B6
America West Airlines HP Spirit Air Lines NK
Alaska Airlines AS Nation's Air N5
Table 4.2: Airlines names and associated IATA codes
4.1.2. High Level Study of the Impact of Entry: Perry's Approach
In her 1995 study, Perry focused her efforts on the annual number of passengers carried pre and post-
entry and on the average fare before and after entry. Perry defined pre-entry local traffic (average local
fare) as the sum of local traffic (average fare) over the four quarters immediately preceding entry, i.e. the
full year preceding entry. Similarly, post-entry numbers refer to the sum (average) of local traffic (fare)
over the one-year period immediately following entry. In the following paragraphs, we use Perry's
definition of pre and post-entry measures of traffic and average fares to study the effects of entry on
traffic and average fares.
From the outset, we notice advantages and disadvantages in using this approach to defining pre and post-
entry traffic. The advantage of using a one-year period is that it corrects for seasonal effects. The
disadvantage is that it does not pick up the short-term changes that might have happened. For instance, if
the entrant leaves the market within a year, this will not be accounted for with this measure.
Perry attributes the differences in traffic stimulation between markets to the mix of airlines serving each
market, the size of the market, the sensitivity of the market to changes in average airline fares, the
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existing level of airline service, and the competitive responses by the established airlines already serving
each market. These factors can be grouped into two broader categories: market characteristics (including
size and sensitivity of the market) and competitive response characteristics (including mix of airlines,
level of service and competitive response to entry).
Perry also concludes that the key factors affecting the response of established airlines to low-fare entry
are the following:
1. Size of the origin-destination market,
2. Significance of the market within the established airline's network,
3. New lower level of airline fares,
4. Number of daily departures of the new entrant carrier, and,
5. Availability of service at competing airports.
In the following paragraphs, we first discuss the effects of entry on the chosen markets, and then focus on
the impact on traffic, fares and departures. Results show that in general, low-fare entry leads to an
increase in total market traffic and incumbent carrier traffic, along with a decrease in average market fare
and incumbent carrier average fare. Although these are the general trends, we also observe that markets
that are affected similarly with respect to traffic may be affected quite differently in terms of average
fares, thus indicating that differences between markets stem from additional factors.
Overview
Perry provides an analysis of the effect of entry at the market level in terms of passengers, aircraft
departures and average fares. Table 4.3 shows the annual local traffic and average fares at the market
level pre and post-entry, along with the distance between origin and destination in these particular
markets.
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QUARTER NEW ANNUAL LOCAL PAX AVG ONE-WAY FARE
MARKET OF ENTRY INC. CARRIERS ENTRANTS DIST. Pre-Entry Post-Entry Pre-Entry Post-Entry
ATL-CLT 97-2 DL J7 226 147,570 185,680 $ 137.39 $ 122.98
ATL-MCI 96-4 DL NJ 691 185,960 243,360 $ 120.58 $ 116.36
ATL-MCO* 94-1 DL-TW J7 404 357,990 592,120 $ 148.44 $ 89.95
CLE-BWI 93-3 US-CO WN 313 56,480 487,930 $ 179.17 $ 31.73
DFW-ICT 95-2 AA-DL NJ 329 77,690 141,590 $ 104.16 $ 64.60
DTW-BOS 96-2 NW NK 630 232,660 345,350 $ 211.86 $ 137.92
DTW-PHL 95-4 NW-US NK 452 254,740 313,520 $ 163.03 $ 142.35
MSP-MCI 95-2 NW-TW NJ 393 118,310 206,280 $ 192.32 $ 100.66
PHX-BUR 92-2 HP WN 368 134,120 306,580 $ 62.54 $ 44.17
PIT-BOS 95-3 CO-US N5 494 215,890 226,410 $ 148.46 $ 150.68
PIT-PHL 95-1 US N5 267 298,430 452,220 $ 139.89 $ 94.73
SLC-SAN 93-2 DL KN/WN 626 65,630 249,900 $ 128.00 $ 70.00
STL-IND 89-2 TW WN 227 50,070 137,990 $ 122.00 $ 44.00
SEA-GEG 93-2 AS KN/WN 223 251,510 509,990 $ 85.00 $ 47.00
RNO-PDX 92-3 AA-HP QQ 444 64,300 105,100 $ 81.00 $ 68.00
LAS-OAK HP WN 406 187,640 295,670 $ 79.00 $ 56.00
NYC-FLL 00-2 AA-CO-DL-US B6 1,068 1,885,450 2,503,830 $ 117.18 $ 112.64
NYC-BUF 00-2 AA-CO-DL-US B6 300 425,200 706,350 $ 125.85 $ 90.22
Table 4.3: Pre- and post-entry annual local traffic and average one-way fares
(Source: OD Plus database & Perry (1995))
Perry's first observation - in her 1995 paper - was that most of the markets involved were short-haul (less
than 500 miles). This observation still applies to most markets, other than Atlanta - Kansas City, Detroit
- Boston, Salt Lake City - San Diego, and New York - Fort Lauderdale. New entrant airlines
traditionally enter short-haul markets with sufficient demand to allow for profitable operations with
medium to small size, cost-efficient aircraft, which are used intensively throughout the day (as discussed
in Chapter 2). JetBlue, in entering the New York - Fort Lauderdale market, chose to enter a market with
one of the highest demands for air travel in the United States (ranked in the top 10 markets since 1998 and
often the market with the highest demand) with medium-sized efficient A320 aircraft, thus not entirely
deviating from the traditional approach of new entrant airlines. Let us add here that in computing the
traffic and average fare values from New York City (NYC), we included the three major New York
airports (Newark, JFK and La Guardia). By this approach, we attempt to capture the close substitutability
of the three New York airports and to reflect the fact that JetBlue's goal is to get passengers from the New
York area to fly out of (and into) JFK.
Our second observation is that the traditional consequence of entry is an increase in the total local traffic
carried in the market, along with a decrease in the average local fare in the market. The only case that
does not follow this pattern is Pittsburgh - Boston, where the average local market fare increased in the
year following entry (while local traffic increased overall). Note that the same patterns also apply to the
incumbents' traffic and average fares, with the same notable exception (c.f. Table 4.4 and Table 4.6). We
dismiss this case (PIT-BOS) as an outlier, given the very slight increase in average fare, and the
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overwhelming evidence to the fact that entry is followed by an increase in local traffic and a drop in
average local market fare.
Finally, in terms of departures, it appears that entry has a diverse effect on the number of incumbent
departures (c.f. Table 4.7), in that there is no pattern emerging from the study of the change in the number
of departures within a market following entry. Perry notes, however, that this may be a reflection of the
fact that there can be changes in departures at competing airports serving the same markets that are not
recorded in the local origin-destination market numbers. We did attempt to compensate for this in the
case of the New York airports, but this can also be the case in other airports, such as Fort Lauderdale (as a
substitute to Miami), Oakland (San Francisco), Portland (Seattle), etc. Total market departures however
increase following entry, as shown in Table 4.7. Let us further note that departures are a measure of
frequency but do not reflect capacity in the market: in longer-haul markets in particular, frequency of
service has less effect on demand, as travel time is such that multiple daily departures do not add as much
convenience as they do in shorter-haul markets.
Effects of Entry on Local Traffic
Table 4.4 shows the total local traffic carried in each of the markets described previously, along with the
share of the traffic captured by incumbent network carriers and the relative impact of entry on these
carriers. In most cases, entry was followed by an increase in traffic on the incumbent network carrier.
Only in a few cases was entry followed by a decrease in incumbent local traffic, while in all cases, entry
led to an increase in total local market traffic.
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ANNUAL LOCAL ANNUAL INCUMBENT POST-ENTRY MARKET
NEW PASSENGERS PASSENGERS SHARES
MARKET ENTRANT Pre-Entry Post-Entry % Change Pre-Entry Post-Entry % Change Incumbent Entrant
ATL-CLT J7 147,570 185,680 25.8% 147,570 173,970 17.9% 93.7% 6.3%
ATL-MCI NJ 185,960 243,360 30.90/a 185,960 211,170 13.6% 86.8% 13.2%
ATL-MCO* J7 357,990 592,120 65.4% 357,990 430,020 20.1% 72.6% 27.4%
CLE-BWI WN 56,480 487,930 763.9% 56,480 320,470 467.4% 65.7% 34.3%
DFW-ICT NJ 77,690 141,590 82.2/ 77,690 78,330 0.8% 55.3% 44.7%
DTW-BOS NK 232,660 345,350 48.4% 232,660 338,990 45.7% 98.2% 1.8%
DTW-PHL NK 254,740 313,520 23.1% 254,740 270,340 6.1% 86.2% 13.8%
MSP-MCI NJ 118,310 206,280 74.4% 118,310 175,860 48.6% 85.3% 14.7%
PHX-BUR WN 134,120 306,580 128.6% 134,120 174,200 29.9% 56.8% 43.2%
PIT-BOS N5 215,890 226,410 4.9% 215,890 217,340 0.7% 96.0% 4.0%
PIT-PHL N5 298,430 452,220 51.5% 298,430 383,220 28.4% 84.7% 15.3%
SLC-SAN KN/WN 65,630 249,900 280.8% 65,630 171,850 161.8% 68.8% 31.2%
STL-IND WN 50,070 137,990 175.60/a 50,070 84,470 68.7% 61.2% 38.8%
SEA-GEG KN/WN 251,510 509,990 102.8% 251,510 271,980 8.1% 53.3% 46.7%
RNO-PDX QQ 64,300 105,100 63.5% 64,300 47,360 -26.3% 45.1% 54.9%
LAS-OAK WN 187,640 295,670 57.6% 187,640 84,580 -54.9% 28.6% 71.4%
NYC-FLL B6 1,885,450 2,503,830 32.8% 1,885,450 2,137,840 13.4% 85.4% 14.6%
NYC-BUF B6 425,200 706,350 66.1% 425,200 416,690 -2.0% 59.0% 41.0%
Table 4.4: Total local and incumbent market traffic pre- and post-entry
(Source: OD Plus database & Perry 1995))
These cases include Reno - Portland, Las Vegas - Oakland and New York - Buffalo. In these particular
cases, the effect of entry on total local traffic was positive overall, but local traffic on the incumbent
network carriers decreased. The impact on incumbent traffic ranged between -2% and -55%. In these
particular markets, the post-entry market share of the new entrant carrier ranged between 41% and 71%.
As a comparison, in all the other markets, the new entrant's market share never reached more than 47%.
Perry explains away the first two outliers by the fact that Reno Air had substantial market presence in the
Reno - Portland market, while in the Las Vegas - Oakland market, America West chose to reduce its
presence from Oakland and to consolidate its operations at San Francisco airport. Finally, the New York -
Buffalo case appears to be behaving differently from the other markets, but the decrease in incumbent
traffic in this case is quite small (2%) and can thus be considered as remaining constant.
Perry observes that, although new entrant airlines are responsible for the initial introduction of low-fares
in the market, a portion of the increase in local traffic is related to the apparent response of the established
carriers. In addition, Perry notes - as do we - that the established airlines' share of stimulated traffic"
" To compute stimulated traffic, we follow Perry's definition and subtract pre-entry total traffic from post-
entry total traffic. The incumbent stimulated traffic is then the difference between stimulated traffic and
post-entry new entrant traffic. The established airlines' share of stimulated traffic is calculated as the
portion of the stimulated traffic that is carried by the established airlines in the market.
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varies greatly by market, as shown in Table 4.5. On average, in those market where there is an increase in
total traffic after entry, and the incumbents experience an increase in their local traffic from entry (i.e. all
markets other then Reno - Portland, Las Vegas - Oakland, and New' York - Buffalo), the incumbent's
average share of stimulated traffic' 1 is about 41%, with extreme values at 1% and 94%.
QUARTER INCUMBENT NEW TRAFFIC STIMULATION SHARE OF TRAFFIC STIMULATION
MARKET OF ENTRY CARRIERS ENTRANT INCUMBENT NEW ENTRANT INCUMBENT NEW ENTRANT
ATL-CLT 97-2 DL J7 26,400 11,710 69% 31%
ATL-MCI 96-4 DL NJ 25,210 32,190 44% 56%
ATL-MCO* 94-1 DL-TW J7 72,030 162,100 31% 69%
CLE-BWI 93-3 US-CO WN 263,990 167,460 61% 39%
DFW-ICT 95-2 AA-DL NJ 640 63,260 1% 99%
DTW-BOS 96-2 NW NK 106,330 6,360 94% 6%
DTW-PHL 95-4 NW-US NK 15,600 43,180 27% 73%
MSP-MCI 95-2 NW-TW NJ 57,550 30,420 65% 35%
PIT-BOS 95-3 CO-US N5 1,450 9,070 14% 86%
PIT-PHL 95-1 US N5 84,790 69,000 55% 45%
SLC-SAN 93-2 DL KN/WN 106,220 78,050 58% 42%
STL-IND 89-2 TW WN 34,400 53,520 39% 61%
PHX-BUR 92-2 HP WN 44,430 132,380 25% 75%
SEA-GEG 93-2 AS KN/WN 20,470 238,010 8% 92%
RNO-PDX 92-3 AA-HP QQ (16,940) 57,740 100%
LAS-OAK HP WN (103,060) 211,090 100%
NYC-FLL 00-2 AA-CO-DL-4 B6 252,390 365,990 41% 59%
NYC-BUF 00-2 AA-CO-DL-L B6 (8,510) 289,660 100%
Table 4.5: Share of stimulated traffic between incumbent and new entrant carriers (Source: OD Plus
database & Perry 1995)
As mentioned earlier, Perry attributes the difference in traffic stimulation by market, to market
characteristics (including size and sensitivity of the market) and competitive response characteristics
(including mix of airlines, level of service and competitive response to entry). From this high-level study
of the impact of entry on traffic (and fares), it is impossible to conclude whether market characteristics
were a driver of the response to entry in each market. We can however conclude that entry usually
benefits all carriers in terms of local passengers carried in the local market. An increase in traffic does not
necessarily lead to increased revenues or profits at the network level (or even at the local market level if
fares are lower), as some of the additional local passengers can be displacing connecting passengers and
thus lead to lower revenues or profits. We highlight the impact on average fares in the next paragraph.
Effects of Entry on Average Local Fares
The other measure Perry focuses on is average local market fare. Table 4.6 shows the average local
market fare for the entire market before and after entry, the average local market fare on the incumbent
carriers before and after entry (as defined previously), and the average market fare for the new entrant
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upon entry. We now observe that in all but one case, the average local market fare decreased after entry,
on a yearly basis. The only exception to this observation appears in the Pittsburgh - Boston market where
the post-entry average market fare slightly increased overall (as did traffic), as discussed earlier.
AVG OE-WAYFARE ANUAL INNBEN TAVGOItE- ANNUAL FARE NERENT1AL
WAYFAI POST- NEWENTRANT- INClBENTENTRY
ENTRANT
IMN Percent Percert AVG FARE
MARKET ENTRANT Pre-Btry Post-Entry Change Pre-Entry Post-Entry Change Absolute Relative
ATL-CLT J7 $ 137.39 $ 122.98 -10.5%! $ 137.39 $ 127.90 -6.90/ $49.87 $78.03 61.0/6
ATL-MCI NJ $ 120.58 $ 116.36 -3.50/ $ 120.58 $ 122.28 1.4%! $77.47 $44.81 36.6%
ATL-MCO* J7 $ 148.44 $ 89.95 -39.4/ $ 148.44 $ 99.82 -.3280/ $63.78 $36.04 36.1%
CLE-BWI WN $ 179.17 $ 31.73 -82.30/ $ 179.17 $ 35.46 -80.20/ $24.60 $10.87 30.6%
DFW-ICT NJ $ 104.16 $ 64.60 -38.0%! $ 104.16 $ 79.66 -23.5/ $45.96 $33.70 42.3%
DTW-BOS NK $ 211.86 $ 137.92 -34.9/ $ 211.86 $ 139.20 -34.30/ $69.35 $69.86 50.2%
DTW-PHL NK $ 163.03 $ 142.35 -12.7% $ 163.03 $ 155.40 47/ $60.69 $94.71 60.90/
MSP-MCI NJ $ 192.32 $ 100.66 -47.70/ $ 192.32 $ 109.92 -42.80/ $47.14 $62.78 57.1%
PHX-BUR WN $ 62.54 $ 44.17 -29.4/ $ 62.54 $ 49.59 -20.70/ $37.04 $12.55 25.3%
PIT-BOS NS $ 148.46 $ 150.68 1.5"! $ 148.46 $ 153.36 3.30/ $86.38 $66.99 43.7/
PIT-PHL N5 $ 139.89 $ 94.73 -32.30 $ 139.89 $ 101.46 -27.5/ $57.33 $44.14 43.5%/1
SLC-SAN KNN $ 128.00 $ 70.00 -45.3/ $ 128.00 $ 71.00 -44.5% $67.80 $3.20 4.5%
STLAND WN $ 122.00 $ 44.00 -63.90/ $ 122.00 $ 51.00 -58.29 $32.95 $18.05 35.4%
SEA-GEG KNIWN $ 85.00 $ 47.00 -4470/ $ 85.00 $ 68.00 -20.0%! $23.00 $45.00 66.20/
RNO-PDX QQ $ 81.00 $ 68.00 -16.00% $ 81.00 $ 68.00 -16.00% $68.00 $0.00 0.0%
LAS-OAK WN $ 79.00 $ 56.00 -29.1% $ 79.00 $ 66.00 -16.50/ $51.99 $14.01 21.2/6
NYC-FLL B6 $ 117.18 $ 112.64 -3.90/ $ 117.18 $ 113.02 -3.5/ $110.38 $2.64 2.3%
NYC-BUF B6 $ 125.85 $ 90.22 -28.30/ $ 125.85 $ 108.01 -14.2/ $64.63 $43.38 40.2/
Table 4.6: One-way average fares for total market, incumbent and new entrant
(Source: OD Plus, Perry, Official Airline Guide)
When studying the average market fare on the incumbent carrier, we find that it usually decreases after
entry. Once again, there is a single exception to this observation, namely the Atlanta - Kansas City
market. In this market, the average local fare on the incumbent carrier remained stable (increased very
slightly) from the year prior to entry to the year following entry. The average market fare decreased
overall, however, consistent with other market observations.
Finally, when comparing the average fare on the incumbents and on the new entrant, we observe that in
all markets (other than Reno - Portland) the average fare on the incumbent was higher, and in most cases
substantially higher, than on the new entrant carrier. On average, the local fare on the new entrant carrier
was 36% lower than on the incumbent carrier, and as much as 66% lower in the Seattle - Spokane
market.
Comparing the effects of entry on average fares and on total local traffic in the sample markets described
earlier shows that, upon entry, similar changes in local traffic can be accompanied by very different
effects on average fares. As a result, we conclude that, while average fares and total traffic are directly
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linked, the analysis of the effect of entry on average fares and total traffic overlooks the effect of very
important additional factors. For example, the Pittsburgh - Philadelphia and Salt Lake City - San Diego
markets exhibited similar patterns in terms of the incumbent's share of post-entry local traffic stimulation
(55% and 57% respectively, as shown in Table 4.5). The average market fare on the new entrant in the
Pittsburgh - Philadelphia market, however, was 43.5% lower than that of the incumbent carrier, compared
to 4.5% lower in the Salt Lake City - San Diego market. Furthermore, the overall traffic stimulation was
52% in the Pittsburgh - Philadelphia market, compared to 281% in the Salt Lake City - San Diego
market. We therefore conclude that there must be external factors affecting these differences, be they
market related or linked to the preference of passengers for a particular carrier. This further supports the
observation that average fares and local traffic paint a very incomplete picture of the effects of entry.
Overall, the general conclusion from the analysis of fares in response to entry is that average market fares
tend to decrease after entry, as do average market fares on the incumbent. Furthermore, incumbent
average fares are likely to remain higher than those of the new entrant carrier. These observations do not
explain the impact that flows of connecting passengers might have had in influencing the number of seats
made available to various passengers (local market or connecting passengers), and therefore do not lead to
the conclusion that the incumbent carriers' fares remained higher than those of the new entrant.
Effects of Entry on Local Market Capacity and Departures
In an attempt to provide additional information, Perry studied the change in nonstop aircraft departures
before and after entry in each market. Let us note here that nonstop aircraft departures are a useful
measure to evaluate frequency of service, but that it does not give enough detail as to the available
capacity in the market.
In the following discussion, we use Perry's data on nonstop aircraft departures in the market, along with
estimated aircraft departure gathered from Official Airline Guides (OAGs) and ASQP data. Perry notes
that, in response to entry, incumbent carriers behaved very differently in all of the markets studied. As
shown in Table 4.7, in some markets (such as Phoenix - Burbank), incumbent carriers responded with an
increase in the frequency of service, while in other markets, the incumbents did not change their number
of departures (e.g. Salt Lake City - San Diego) or even decreased their frequencies (e.g. Las Vegas -
Oakland).
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ANNUAL INCUMBENT A/C ANNUAL POST- TOTAL MARKET-LEVEL SHARE OF
NEW DEPARTURES ENTRY NEW DEPARTURES DEPARTURES
MARKET ENTRANT Pre-Entry Post-Entry %Change ENTRANT A/C Pre-Entry Post-Entry Incumbents New Entrant
ATL-CLT J7 2,822 2,860 1.40/ 368 2,822 3,228 89% 11%
ATL-MCI NJ 2,509 2,564 2.20/ 822 2,509 3,386 76% 24%
ATL-MCO* J7 4,963 4,200 -15.40/ 1,500 4,963 5,700 74% 26%
ATL-MCO estimated by Penyy'6mo data -Jan-Jun 1994
CLE-BWI WN 1,940 3,096 59.60/ 1,344 1,940 4,440 70% 30%
DFW-ICT NJ 5,241 5,449 4.0% 939 5,241 6,387 85% 15%
DTW-BOS NK 3,246 3,421 5.4% 183 3,246 3,604 95% 5%
DTW-PHL NK 3,493 3,304 -5.40/ 365 3,493 3,669 90% 10%
MSP-MCI NJ 2,086 2,935 40.70/ 801 2,086 3,736 79% 21%
PHX-BUR WN 1,400 1,989 42.1% 1,290 1,400 3,279 61% 39%
PIT-BOS N5 3,181 3,325 4.50/ 600 3,181 3,925 85% 15%
PIT-PHL N5 4,671 3,961 -15.20/ 1,329 4,671 5,290 75% 25%
SLC-SAN KN/WN 1,427 1,448 1.50/ 635 1,427 2,083 70% 30%
STL-IND WN 1,750 1,792 2.40/ 1,614 1,750 3,406 53% 47%
SEA-GEG KN/WN 1,315 907 -31.0/ 1,258 1,315 2,165 42% 58%
RNO-PDX QQ 678 800 18.00/ 1,332 678 2,132 38% 62%
LAS-OAK WN 1,486 834 .43.9% 758 1,486 1,592 52% 48%
NYC-FLL B6 6,272 6,680 6.50% 1,602 6,272 8,282 81% 190/
NYC-BUF B6 6,256 6,994 11.8/ 1,473 6,256 8,467 83% 17%
Table 4.7: Pre- and post-entry aircraft departures (each way)
(Source: OAG and ASQP databases, and Perry)
Perry also stresses that these observations are valid only for the local origin-destination markets, and do
not take into consideration the fact that other flights might have been available at competing airports, and
might therefore have changed as a consequence of entry. For example, a parallel market to the Las Vegas
- Oakland market could be Las Vegas - San Francisco. Thus, the numbers discussed in this paper do not
reflect the impact of entry at Oakland airport on the San Francisco area as a whole.
Conclusions
As evidenced by the highly variable relationships between total traffic, average fares and departures in a
specific market, it is clearly insufficient to only study aggregate measures of entry to understand how
incumbent revenues and traffic are affected by entry and to assess the incumbent carrier's response to
entry. Indeed, for the set of markets studied in this sample, additional information would be required to
fully explain the relationship between total market traffic, average fares and departures, and why they
differ from market to market. The only conclusions that such a high-level analysis provides are that, in
general, low-fare entry leads to:
1. An increase in total local market and incumbent local traffic (c.f. Table 4.4)
2. A decrease in average fares, both at the market level and on the incumbent carriers (c.f. Table
4.6)
3. An increase in total market aircraft departures (c.f. Table 4.7).
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In addition, revenue numbers are easily derived from our analysis of average fares and traffic in each
market, and shown in Table 4.8. In particular, total pre and post-entry annual market revenues and
incumbent annual market revenues show that, again with the exception of a few markets (Detroit-Boston,
Minneapolis-Kansas City, and Saint Louis-Indianapolis), total market revenues increased after entry.
Looking at incumbent revenues, we note that in more than half the cases, entry led to a decrease in
revenues. Although the data indicates that incumbent average fares and revenues decreased, while local
incumbent traffic increased, it would be incorrect to conclude that the incumbents competed unfairly.
Such a conclusion implies that the decrease in average incumbent local market fare was designed to
stimulate traffic, which, in an elastic market, should have led to a relatively greater increase in traffic and
eventually in an increase in revenues. Reaching such conclusion would pose two major problems: First
and foremost, these are local revenues that completely overlook the impact of entry on network flows and
network revenues. Second, revenues are a direct consequence of the changing consumer choice and can
therefore have decreased as a result of the diversion of high fare passengers towards the new entrant or
cheaper seats on the incumbent.
OF NEW TOTAL LOCAL MARKET REVENUES INCUMBENT LOCAL MARKET REVENUES
MARKET ENTRY ENTRANT Pre-Entry Post-Entry % Change Pre-Entry Post-Entry % Change
ATL-CLT 97-2 J7 $ 20,274,127 $ 22,834,531 13% $ 20,274,127 $ 22,250,579 10%
ATL-MCI 96-4 NJ $ 22,423,788 $ 28,316,249 26% $ 22,423,788 $ 25,822,531 15%
ATL-MCO* 94-1 J7 $ 53,139,688 $ 53,263,942 0% $ 53,139,688 $ 42,925,458 -19%
CLE-BWI 93-3 WN $ 10,119,711 $ 15,483,664 53% $ 10,119,711 $ 11,364,939 12%
DFW-ICT 95-2 NJ $ 8,091,829 $ 9,147,057 13% $ 8,091,829 $ 6,239,665 -23%
DTW-BOS 96-2 NK $ 49,290,481 $ 47,630,159 -3% $ 49,290,481 $ 47,189,099 -4%
DTW-PHL 95-4 NK $ 41,530,168 $ 44,630,118 7% $ 41,530,168 $ 42,009,524 1%
MSP-MCI 95-2 NJ $ 22,753,459 $ 20,765,046 -9% $ 22,753,459 $ 19,331,016 -15%
PHX-BUR 92-2 WN $ 8,387,341 $ 13,542,754 61% $ 8,387,341 $ 8,639,270 3%
PIT-BOS 95-3 N5 $ 32,052,015 $ 34,115,744 6% $ 32,052,015 $ 33,332,314 4%
PIT-PHL 95-1 N5 $ 41,747,228 $ 42,837,805 3% $ 41,747,228 $ 38,882,312 -7%
SLC-SAN 93-2 KN/WN $ 8,400,640 $ 17,493,000 108% $ 8,400,640 $ 12,201,350 45%
STL-IND 89-2 WN $ 6,108,540 $ 6,071,560 -1% $ 6,108,540 $ 4,307,970 -29%
SEA-GEG 93-2 KN/WN $ 21,378,350 $ 23,969,530 12% $ 21,378,350 $ 18,494,640 -13%
RNO-PDX 92-3 QQ $ 5,208,300 $ 7,146,800 37% $ 5,208,300 $ 3,220,480 -38%
LAS-OAK WN $ 14,823,560 $ 16,557,520 12% $ 14,823,560 $ 5,582,280 -62%
NYC-FLL 00-2 B6 $ 220,935,754 $ 282,024,698 28% $ 220,935,754 $ 241,626,800 9%
NYC-BUF 00-2 B6 $ 53,511,045 $ 63,729,035 19% $ 53,511,045 $ 45,006,972 -16%
Table 4.8: Total local market and incumbent revenues pre- and post-entry
(Source: OD Plus database)
In the next section, we therefore take a more detailed look at the data for two specific markets, Detroit -
Boston and Atlanta - Orlando. The former market was classified by Oster and Strong as potentially
reflecting anticompetitive behaviors. The latter market was listed by Perry as a market with a new entrant
airline in 1995, but not classified as potentially anticompetitive by Oster and Strong in their 2001 paper.
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We therefore chose to compare these presumably different markets, with respect to the competitive
behaviors of the carriers operating in these markets.
4.2. Two Case Studies: Atlanta-Orlando and Detroit-Boston
In order to better understand Oster and Strong's claims that low-fare competition has led to a decrease in
fares on short-haul routes, and to bring more depth and understanding into the mechanisms of entry
described by Perry, we study two specific origin-destination markets, Atlanta-Orlando and Detroit-
Boston. Both markets are mentioned by Perry as having low-fare competition, while the latter is further
described by Oster and Strong as potentially exhibiting anticompetitive practices from established
network carriers.
In the following subsections, we study each market individually and in detail. We then compare the
observations made for each market to determine whether we can actually conclude that one is
significantly different from the other and exhibits anticompetitive behavior from the incumbent carriers.
Results show that while the outcome of entry in these markets was significantly different (AirTran is still
competing in the Atlanta-Orlando market, while Spirit failed in the Detroit-Boston market), measures of
(and changes in) average fares, total traffic and revenues are comparable for both incumbent carriers, and
therefore provide very little insight as to the relative performance of individual carriers and the response
of incumbent carriers.
4.2.1. Atlanta-Orlando
In the first quarter of 1994, ValuJet entered the Atlanta-Orlando market with 25 weekly roundtrips (as
many as four daily roundtrips on certain days) with a DC9-32 aircraft (with a capacity of about 115 seats).
ValuJet entered the market with substantially lower fares than those offered by the other nonstop carriers
in the market (Delta Airlines and Trans World Airlines). In the quarter before entry, Delta and TWA were
both offering nonstop service in the market, at an average one-way fare of $118 and $88 respectively. In
terms of market share, Delta carried about 80%-90% of the nonstop local traffic, while TWA carried the
remaining 10%-20%.
At the end of the second quarter of 1994, Kiwi entered the market with as many as two daily flights,
effectively providing additional low-fare competition in the market and directly competing with ValuJet
in the low-fare segment in the this market.
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Almost ten years later, ValuJet is still operating in the market (under the name AirTran), as is Delta.
TWA, on the other hand, left the market during the third quarter of 1994, and was eventually purchased
by American Airlines in 2001. Similarly, Kiwi exited the market in the first quarter of 1998, as it ceased
operations.
In the following paragraphs, we first look at an overview of the changes engendered by ValuJet's entry in
the market, then focus on incumbent carrier data, and finally look at entry data for ValuJet. We do not
focus on Kiwi as it behaved as a follower while ValuJet was the carrier that "challenged" the established
carriers, but we do show numbers relative to its performance in Table 4.10.
Market Overview
Total traffic numbers, as reported in Table 4.10, began increasing slowly in the last quarter of 1993,
before increasing by almost 70% upon entry by ValuJet. Generally speaking, entry by ValuJet in this
market led to an increase in traffic, and a change in the base traffic for this market, as shown on Figure
4.1. Before entry, total local one-way traffic ranged in the 80,000 passengers per quarter. After entry, this
number more than doubled as Delta's share of traffic plummeted to less than 50% by 1995, while ValuJet
and Kiwi shared the remainder of traffic.
0
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Figure 4.1: Total local traffic (nonstop) before and after ValuJet entry
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The one-way average market fare, on the other hand, sharply decreased after entry as shown in Table 4.6,
from about $150 to just below $90 (- -40%). In the two years following entry, the average market fare
remained at this lower level.
Finally, let us note that after entry, TWA quickly exited the market within a couple of quarters.
Incumbent Network Carriers: Delta and TWA
While Atlanta is a hub for Delta Airlines, it was, at the time, also a mini-hub on TWA's network -
between 1992 and 1996, TWA attempted to establish itself in Atlanta. Before entry by ValuJet, Delta
carried between 70% and 90% of the nonstop local traffic, while TWA carried the remainder of the local
passengers on this route. In terms of frequencies, Delta offered between 9 and 10 daily departures each
way, compared to TWA's 3 daily departures, in the quarters preceding ValuJet's entry.
140,000 Pre- and post-entry local traffic $200 Pre- and post-entry average fare
120,000 -- TWA $180 -
n Delta $160 -
100,000 - ValuJet $140
u 80,000 $120
U-P- 60,000 10-VA
40,000
20,000
$60 -+- Delta
-u-ValuJet$40 -
$20
93- 9-2 3- 934 4-1942 9-. 944 3-1 932 9-393- 9-1 4- 943$4-
93-1 93-2 93-3 93-4 94-1 94-2 94-3 94-4 93-1 93-2 93-3 93-4 94-1 94-2 94-3 94-4
Quarter Quarter
Figure 4.2: Change in local traffic and average market fares pre- and post-entry
In the quarter of entry by ValuJet, Delta's average one-way fare dropped from $117.60 down to $88.09 (-
25%) while TWA's average fare decreased from $88.13 to $72.54 (-18%). Figure 4.2 also shows the
change in local market traffic between the first quarter of 1993 and the last quarter of 1994. It appears
that, while traffic on Delta and TWA combined seemed to remain relatively constant in the quarters prior
to entry, it increased significantly in the last quarter of 1993 and in the first quarter of 1994, and then
slowly began to decrease to come back down to its pre-entry levels. Note that as traffic started to decrease
on the incumbents, the average fare on these same airlines began to increase slowly while the average fare
on the ValuJet remained relatively constant. By the fourth quarter of 1994, Delta's average market fare
was back up to pre-entry levels, and rising. In the meantime, TWA had exited the market.
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In terms of total incumbent traffic, we observe that, while it is hard to make inferences from previous
years in this particular market, the fourth quarter is traditionally not the strongest quarter for air travel. It
is therefore unusual to see an increase in local traffic by almost 30% from the previous quarter during the
last quarter of 1993. Furthermore, correcting for seasonality, on a year over year basis the increase was
close to 50%. Similarly, in 1992 and 1993, the increase in traffic between the last quarter of the previous
year and the first quarter of that year ranged in the 8%-9%. In 1994, the increase in traffic on the
incumbent carriers was much greater (-18%). Finally, our last comment goes to the decrease in local
market traffic during the entire 1994 year. This is again somewhat unusual in that the second quarter is
traditionally among the strongest quarters of the year in this particular market and one would therefore
have expected an increase in local traffic during that quarter. Instead, traffic steadily decreased by 11%
between quarters 1 and 2 and 9% between quarters 2 and 3.
The decrease in total incumbent traffic between quarters 1 and 2 (of 1994) coincides with an increase in
the average fare on Delta, and a reduction in TWA's presence in the market. The decrease in traffic
between quarters 2 and 3 is more easily explained by the entry of Kiwi in the market, which further
diverted traffic from the remaining incumbent carrier, Delta. Overall, traffic therefore increased compared
to pre-entry levels. Furthermore, it appears that low-fare entry absorbed some of the seasonal effects, as
traffic did not appear to follow traditional seasonal variations after entry.
Looking at market shares, we observe in Table 4.9 that Delta's share of local traffic was always above
80% in the year before entry, while TWA captured the remaining 10%-20% of traffic. Upon entry by
ValuJet, Delta's market share decreased to 66%, while that of TWA dropped below 10%. This pattern
further developed as TWA exited the market, and Delta's share of traffic dropped below 50% as ValuJet
and Kiwi captured over 50% of total market shares (from the first quarter of 1995 and on).
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ONE-WAY DATA 93-1 93-2 93-3 93-4 94-1 94-2 94-3 94-4 95-1 95-2 95-3 95-4
NS Flights/day n/a 10.00 n/a 9.00 9.29 9.00 n/a 9.00 10.32 11.38 12.07 11.64each way
AvgFare $ 180.85 $170.60 $151.15 $117.60 $ 88.09 $103.19 $101.96 $115.51 $137.30 $146.79 $141.66 $119.55
g Traffic 70,320 71,050 74,110 92,100 112,290 102,390 102,380 89,040 77,640 59,050 59,250 65,850
Market Share 82.0% 86.6% 89.3% 85.9% 66.4% 67.6% 60.9% 57.0% 47.7% 34.9% 36.1% 38.6%(NS Pax)
Market Share 81.3% 86.0% 88.7% 85.6% 66.2% 67.2% 60.6% 56.7% 47.5% 34.8% 36.0% 38.5%
NS Flights/day n/a 3.00 n/a 3.00 3.00 -
each way
Avg Fare $ 142.37 $139.64 $ 135.73 $ 88.13 $ 72.54 $ 73.48
6 Traffic 15,460 10,980 8,860 15,110 13,880 10,030
Market Share 18.0% 13.4% 10.7% 14.1% 8.2% 6.6%(NS Pax)
Market Share 17.9% 13.3% 10.6% 14.0% 8.2% 6.6%
Table 4.9: Summary of pre-entry and post-entry effects on average fares, traffic, market share and
departures for Delta and TWA
Focusing on departures and capacity, as shown in Table 4.9, we note that in the quarter of entry, Delta's
number of departures increased from 9 daily departures each way to slightly over 10 daily departures each
way (i.e. as many as 11 departures on certain days of the week). In addition, compared to the quarter
before entry, we estimated the increase in capacity to be about 4% (from 2,270 seats per day each way to
2,350 seats per day each way, based on OAG aircraft type information).
ONE-WAY DATA 93-1 93-2 93-3 93-4 94-1 94-2 94-3 94-4 95-1 95-2 95-3 95-4
NS Flights/day n/a 13.00 n/a 12.00 12.29 9.00 n/a 9.00 10.32 11.38 12.07 11.64
i Avg Fare $ 173.91 $ 166.46 $ 149.50 $ 113.45 $ 86.38 $ 100.54 $ 101.96 $ 115.51 $ 137.30 $ 146.79 $ 141.64 $ 119.55
2 Traffic 85,780 82,030 82,970 107,210 126,170 112,420 102,390 89,040 77,640 59,050 59,260 65,850
Market Share 99.2% 99.2% 99.3% 99.6% 74.4% 73.8% 60.6% 56.7% 47.5% 34.8% 36.0% 38.5%
NS Flights/day each way 4.00 3.86 n/a 5.00 5.00 5.14 5.14 5.29
Avg Fare $ 55.50 $ 66.40 $ 66.42 $ 67.40 $ 66.56 $ 66.10 $ 67.75 $ 69.77
Traffic 42,840 38,060 40,000 41,200 38,370 39,030 34,900 34,580
Market Share 25.3% 25.0% 23.7% 26.3% 23.5% 23.0% 21.2% 20.2%
NS Flights/day each way n/a n/a 2.00 3.00 5.00 6.00 8.00
Avg Fare $ 51.45 $ 57.23 $ 56.44 $ 68.85 $ 70.85 $ 69.90 $ 68.35
Traffic 1,050 25,720 25,910 46,700 71,110 69,810 70,220
Market Share 0.7% 15.2% 16.5% 28.6% 41.9% 42.5% 41.1%
NS Flights/day n/a 13.00 n/a 12.00 16.29 12.86 n/a 16.00 18.32 21.53 23.21 24.93
c Avg Fare $ 173.54 $ 165.89 $ 149.27 $ 113.67 $ 78.80 $ 91.86 $ 86.93 $ 93.23 $ 101.12 $ 96.37 $ 95.46 $ 88.49
1 Traffic 86,510 82,660 83,570 107,620 169,540 152,400 168,950 156,920 163,300 169,700 164,450 171,050
Table 4.10: Summary of pre-entry and post-entry effects on average fares, market share and traffic
Table 4.10 summarizes traffic, average fares, daily departures and market share for the incumbent carriers
(Delta and TWA combined when both were operating nonstop service in the market, and Delta only after
Q4-94), ValuJet, Kiwi, and the entire market. Total market numbers include connecting traffic on other
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carriers, but only nonstop flights in the market. Table 4.10 shows that, after entry, total traffic and total
nonstop departures increased, while average fares dropped.
Aggregate measures of airline performance presented and discussed here for the incumbent carriers show
that the apparent effect of entry on the incumbent carriers was a decrease in market share and average
fare, accompanied by an increase in traffic. The implications for the incumbent carriers' response to low-
fare entry are that they responded by adapting to the changing market conditions without necessarily
aggressively matching the new entrant's fares, or further undercutting these fares. These observations are
only based on aggregate measures of airline performance and, as mentioned in previous chapters, do not
provide any detail as to the actual response of the incumbent carriers.
ValuJet
In the first quarter of 1994, ValuJet entered the Atlanta - Orlando market with up to four daily roundtrips
(25 roundtrips per week), at an average fare of $55.50, roughly 51% lower than that of Delta and TWA
combined in the quarter before entry. Furthermore, even compared to post-entry average fares, ValuJet's
average fare was 36% lower than Delta and TWA's combined average fare, and even lower compared to
Delta's average fare.
Figure 4.2 shows the result of ValuJet's strategy of entry, and in particular its rather stable average market
fare and traffic in the four quarters following entry. Table 4.10 further confirms this observation for the
year 1995 when the average fare on ValuJet remained relatively constant, while its traffic decreased
slightly, as Kiwi entered the market and garnered market shares.
Figure 4.3 shows traffic and average market fare on ValuJet in the 10 quarters following entry. Starting in
the second quarter of 1996, traffic on ValuJet began decreasing as a result of the crash of flight 592 (May
11, 1996) in the Everglades. However, in the period before then, traffic and average market fares
remained relatively stable. ValuJet's market share ranged between 20% and 27% in the same period.
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Figure 4.3: ValuJet traffic and average fares
(Source: OD Plus database)
Finally, based on the OD Plus numbers for traffic and OAG data for nonstop flights, we find that the
average number of local passengers per flight on ValuJet in the quarter of entry was 60 passengers. This
number does not include any connecting traffic that might have been traveling on these particular flights
and originating from (or heading to) cities beyond Atlanta. It does however provide an indication of the
ability of each of the airlines to attract local market traffic, and the effect of the new entrant competition
on the incumbent carrier's local traffic.
Local OD 93-1 93-2 93-3 93-4 94-1 94-2 94-3 94-4 95-1 95-2 95-3 95-4
Pax/Flight
DL n/a 34.7 n/a 48.6 57.1 68.6 n/a 53.8 41.8 28.5 26.7 30.7
J7 59.5 54.2 n/a 44.8 42.6 41.7 36.9 35.6
KP n/a n/a 70.4 86.5 78.1 63.2 47.7
Table 4.11: Local passenger loads per nonstop flight (does not include connecting traffic)
Other Competing Carriers
Other carriers also offered service in the market. In particular, American Airlines, Continental Airlines
and US Airways carried passengers in the market, but only on connecting flights. In previous paragraphs,
we also mentioned that Kiwi was operating in the market: Kiwi started offering nonstop service late in the
second quarter of 1994, as TWA exited the market. Kiwi maintained a strong presence in the market
(stronger than ValuJet starting in 1995) until the third quarter of 1996 when the FAA restricted its
operations. At the peak of its presence, Kiwi offered as many as eight daily departures between Atlanta
- 81 -
Chapter 4
and Orlando, at an average fare comparable to that of ValuJet. In addition, as shown in Table 4.11, on
average, Kiwi carried more passengers per flight than ValuJet. We note here that this is likely a reflection
of the fact that Kiwi offered true origin-destination service in this particular market, while both Delta and
ValuJet carried connecting passengers between and beyond Atlanta and Orlando.
In conclusion, the Atlanta-Orlando market appears to have been a very competitive market where new
entrants prospered. As a result, TWA left the market and Delta substantially suffered in terms of market
share. Traffic was however stimulated as a result of the decrease in average market fare. In addition,
aggregate measures of airline performance give very little information as to the response of the incumbent
carriers. We observed for instance that Delta's average market fare plummeted following ValuJet's entry
into the market, while Delta's traffic increased. Within a few quarters, the average fare on Delta began
increasing again, and traffic decreased. Our analysis show that these effects are related to Kiwi's
increased presence in the market, but another analysis could also conclude that Delta increased its fares
once it determined that it could not compete on price with ValuJet. In short, traffic and average fare
variations do not explain the incumbent's response to entry.
4.2.2. Detroit-Boston
On April 15, 1996, Spirit Airlines started operating one daily roundtrip between Detroit and Boston with
a DC9-21 aircraft (90 seats). This low cost, low fare carrier entered the market with substantially lower
fares than those formerly offered by Northwest, the only airline previously offering nonstop service.
Spirit's average one-way fare in the first quarter of operations was $68 compared to Northwest's previous
quarter average one-way fare of $257. On September 8, 1996, Spirit exited the market, less than five
months after its entry.
Total Market
Figure 4.4 summarizes the total traffic and average fare in the market in years 1995 and 1996, by quarter.
We observe a substantial increase in year-over-year traffic, particularly in quarters 2 and 3. In addition,
the average market fare appeared to be much more volatile with a sharp decrease coinciding with Spirit's
entry in the market, and followed by a gradual increase after Spirit's exit from the market.
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Figure 4.4: Total traffic and average fares
Generally speaking, entry by Spirit and Northwest's response led to a doubling of the total traffic in the
market. Northwest's relative increase in traffic (113%) was even greater than the relative increase in total
traffic (108%). Spirit's traffic, on the other hand, represented less than three percent of the total traffic in
both of its quarters of operation in the market.
A substantial decrease in the average market fare accompanied entry by Spirit: The average market fare
decreased from $250 to $105, as shown in Table 4.12. This decrease in average fare continued in quarter
3 of 1996, when the average market fare further decreased to $99 and finally started increasing again after
Spirit exited the market. Note that Northwest's average market fare was consistently above the average
total market fare by a few dollars, except in the second quarter of 1996 when Spirit started to compete
(c.f. Table 4.12).
Within two quarters after entry, Spirit had exited the market (September 8, 1996), and, by the fourth
quarter of 1996, Northwest recovered its position as the only nonstop carrier. Following Spirit's exit,
Northwest's average fares as well as the average total market fares increased while traffic decreased in the
market. By the first quarter of 1997, Northwest's average market fare was back up to its original level and
the total traffic had decreased to its initial levels (QI -1996).
Northwest Airlines
Detroit is a hub of Northwest Airlines. In the quarter of entry by Spirit, Northwest's average one-way
fares dropped from $257 to $105 (-59%). One possible explanation to the dramatic reduction in
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Northwest's average fares is that Northwest matched Spirit's fares. However, without actual fare
information, such a conclusion cannot be reached with only aggregate data. The decrease in average fare
on Northwest could also be the consequence of a dilution of local revenues because of the increase in
capacity in the local market, or because of a change in consumer behavior.
Figure 4.5 shows Northwest traffic and average fare in 1995 and 1996, by quarter. In particular, Figure
4.5 illustrates the fact that traffic increased significantly more from Q1 to Q2 of 1996 than it did in 1995.
The relative increase in traffic was 51% in 1995 between quarters 1 and 2 compared to the 113% increase
in 1996 over the same period. Similarly, Figure 4.5 shows the change in average fare over the same
periods, and highlights the greater decrease in average fares in 1996 compared to 1995. From quarter 1 to
quarter 2, the average fare decreased by 10% in 1995 compared to 59% in 1996. Between quarters 3 and
4, after the exit of Spirit, a reverse pattern is illustrated in Figure 4.5: Traffic generally decreased while
average fares increased slightly. Once again, the magnitude of the change was greater in 1996 than in
1995: Traffic decreased by 12% in 1995 compared to 40% in 1996. Fares increased by 9% in 1995
compared to 19% in 1996 over the same period.
120,000 $300
100,000 $250
80,000 $200
% 60,000 $150
40,000 $100
20,000 $50
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Pax 96 Pax 95 -e-Avg Fare 96 -X -Avg Fare 95
Figure 4.5: Northwest traffic and average fares by quarter in 1995 and 1996
Table 4.12 further summarizes the traffic, average fares and revenues in the market for the period from
the first quarter of 1995 until the fourth quarter of 1997, by quarter, and for each of the aforementioned
carriers as well as the totals for the market. Table 4.12 shows that Northwest's market share was always
quite high - always above 85% and below 90% only in the first and fourth quarters of 1995 and the fourth
quarter of 1997. This shows the overwhelming dominance of Northwest in this market, even when Spirit
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was competing. Note that Northwest's market share actually peaked during the two quarters when Spirit
was competing. This last observation suggests that Northwest was a fierce competitor and responded
quite aggressively to Spirit's entry. Northwest's response strategy succeeded and the airline was able to
maintain and even increase its market share. However, it is once again only one of many possible
explanations and cannot be confirmed by aggregate measures of performance.
4 0 Post-Enby/
ONE WAY DATA Pc-Enonpting Post-Exit
95-1 95-2 95-3 95.4 96-1 96-2 96-3 96-4 97-1 97-2 97-3 97-4
NS Rights/day 7.88 8.94 9.93 8.74 7.93 10.23 9.69 892 8.64 9.46 9.76 8.62
g Avg Fare $228.81 $204.78 $190.71 $208.17 $257.45 $104.75 $ 99.14 $167.99 $266.61 $217.32 $201.83 $221.60
z Traffic 39,770 59,970 67,770 59,380 45,540 96,840 119,440 76,170 46,540 65,020 70,790 63,330
Market Share 85.2% 90.20/ 91.7% 88.8% 90.6/ 92.9% 92.0% 90.5% 90.70/ 91.4% 90.7% 89.3%
NS Rights/day 1.00 1.00
e Avg Fare $ 68.49 $ 70.06
z Traffic 2,880 3,480
Traffic 28% 270/
NS Rights/day 7.88 8.94 9.93 8.74 7.93 11.23 10.69 8.92 8.64 9.46 9.76 8.62
* Avg Fare (mkt) $219.98 $201.07 $187.30 $200.64 $250.23 $105.09 $ 98.66 $164.28 $256.57 $212.03 $196.51 $213.46
Traffic (mkt) 46,680 66,450 73,910 66,850 50,250 104,260 129,870 84,140 51,320 71,140 78,020 70,920
Table 4.12: Summary of pre-entry and post-exit effects
Table 4.12 also shows that the average number of daily flights operated by Northwest increased from
quarter 1 to quarter 2 of 1996 by 2.3 daily flights (and by as much as three daily flights on some days),
then slightly decreased in quarter 3 by 0.54 flights per day (which corresponds to almost 4 weekly flights)
and finally settled down to about nine daily flights. It is interesting to compare this number to the pre-
entry number of flights in the market for Northwest. After exit by Spirit, the total number of flights
offered by Northwest was higher than in 1995-96 (before entry) in the fourth quarter of 1995 and first
quarter of 1996, by about one daily frequency. The frequency of service did not increase in the second
quarter of 1997, hence becoming comparable to that of the second quarter of 1995. Finally, unlike in
1995, the frequency of service still did not increase in the third quarter of 1997 and therefore became
lower by about one flight, compared to the same quarter in 1995. In terms of capacity, compared to the
year before entry, capacity (as measured using OAG data and generic aircraft capacity) increased by 12%
on Northwest from 1,600 to 1,800 seats per day. Compared to the quarter before entry, the increase in
capacity is even more dramatic, from 1,430 seats per day to 1,800, that is, a 25% increase in daily
capacity.
Finally, we can compute the average number of local passengers per flight on Northwest, as shown in
Table 4.13. We point out the substantial increase in the number of local market passengers carried by
Northwest in the period of competition by Spirit, compared to the same time periods in 1995 (and 1997).
Northwest carried 41% more local passengers per flight in the second quarter and 81% more local
-85 -
Chapter 4
passengers in the third quarter, compared to 1995. Note once again that these numbers do not include
connecting traffic that was also traveling on Northwest (or Spirit) flights, and therefore does not reflect
load factors on either airline.
Local OD 95-1 95-2 95-3 95-4 96-1 96-2 96-3 96-4 97-1 97-2 97-3
Pax/Flight
NW 28.05 36.84 37.08 36.91 31.89 52.00 67.00 46.40 29.91 37.78 39.44
NK 18.95 24.86
Table 4.13: Local passenger loads per nonstop flight (days/quarter on NK: 76 and 70)
Spirit Airlines
Spirit entered the market with one daily roundtrip flight between Detroit and Boston at an average fare of
$68, much lower than Northwest's average fare of $257 before entry (74% lower), and $105 after entry
(35% lower). Figure 4.6 shows the traffic and fare of Spirit while it operated in the market and illustrates
the increase in traffic (+21%) and average fare (+2%) from quarter 2 of 1996 to quarter 3 of 1996. In
particular, we observe that the total traffic carried by Spirit in the quarter of entry represented just about
3% of the traffic carried by Northwest in the same quarter, but also only the equivalent of 6% of
Northwest's traffic in the quarter before entry (Q1, 1996). In quarter 2 of 1996, Spirit had a 2.8% market
share and a 2.7% market share in the third quarter of 1996.
Spirit exited the market in the fourth quarter of 1996, after having operated for less than two quarters.
Pre- and post-entry local traffic
* Spirit
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Quarter
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96-1 96-2
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96-3
Figure 4.6: Spirit traffic and average fare by quarter, in 1996
Table 4.13 shows that Spirit carried fewer than 25 local passengers per flight, compared to Northwest's
50 to 70 local passengers per flight over the same period. This corresponds to average load factors below
28% on a DC9-21 with 90 seats in an all coach configuration.
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Other Competing Carriers
In this market, between 1995 and 1997, there was no nonstop competition to Northwest Airlines, other
than Spirit. In the last quarter of 1995 and the first quarter of 1996, Continental operated one weekly one-
stop flight on Sundays. In the second quarter of 1996, America West offered six weekly one-stop flights.
US Airways also offered six weekly one-stop flights in the fourth quarter of 1996, five weekly one-stop
flights in the first quarter of 1997 and one daily one-stop flight in the third quarter of 1997. Altogether,
competition in this market was always very limited, including when Spirit entered the market.
In conclusion, in the Detroit-Boston market, Spirit's attempt at competing with Northwest was
unsuccessful. As a result, Spirit quickly withdrew from the market. Once again, aggregate measures of
performance, such as average fares and traffic, do not provide much information as to the response of
Northwest to entry by Spirit. While Spirit was unsuccessful in competing with Northwest in this market,
and although Northwest's market share and traffic increased while its average fare decreased, it remains
unclear whether these changes are a consequence of traffic stimulation and healthy competition, or rather
the illustration of unfair competition from Northwest. In the following paragraphs, we compare the two
markets and discuss the performance of individual carriers within the markets. We show that relative
changes in average fares, traffic, revenues and market shares were comparable, which further highlights
the inappropriateness of aggregate measures of performance in assessing the nature of an incumbent's
response to entry.
4.2.3. Comparison of the Two Markets
From the above discussion, we conclude that the Detroit-Boston and Atlanta-Orlando markets were quite
different in the way the entrant made price and schedule entry decisions, in the way the incumbents
responded to these decisions, and in the way the markets responded to the changes in the competitive
environment. The first and most obvious difference between these two markets is that ValuJet survived in
the Atlanta-Orlando market, while Spirit ceased operations very quickly in the Detroit-Boston market.
Another obvious distinction between the two markets is that ValuJet entered the Atlanta-Orlando market
with four daily roundtrips, whereas Spirit only offered a single daily roundtrip in the Detroit-Boston
market. Other differences include the effect on incumbent average fare, local market traffic and market
share.
Using our revised version of Perry's classification of factors influencing new entrant performance, we
respectively focus on the market and competitive response characteristics to clarify the differences in
performance and success of each new entrant. We first discuss external factors that could have influenced
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the apparent performance of the new entrants, and that are not included in the market and competitive
characteristics advocated by Perry.
External Factors influencing the Results
A few obvious factors play an important role in understanding some of the events in these markets. They
should be accounted for when explaining the success and failure of each individual low-fare entrant. In
particular, seasonality is a very important part of airline traffic, as traffic generally increases in the
summer. Therefore, an increase (or decrease) in traffic should not be attributed to any particular factor
without accounting for seasonality. We carefully took seasonality into consideration when studying each
of these two markets.
Other external effects should also be considered: For example, our analysis focuses on the comparison of
the period when Spirit was competing against Northwest as opposed to the period when Spirit did not
operate in the market. However, other new entrants or economic effects (downturn, high oil prices, etc.)
might have created similar conditions in the market at other times. Therefore, the analysis requires
knowledge of the market as well as other external factors. Note that, in the case of the Detroit-Boston
market, there was no other nonstop competition in the market during the period of interest. In the Atlanta
- Orlando market, we mentioned Kiwi's entry as one of the factors that might have precipitated TWA's
exit from the market and the success of ValuJet.
Market Characteristics
We first note that the market sizes were quite different, in that the Atlanta-Orlando market had a size of
roughly 360,000 passengers per year before entry, compared to 233,000 passengers per year in the
Detroit-Boston market. In addition, the market distance was 404 miles for Atlanta-Orlando compared to
630 miles for Detroit-Boston, a 50% greater distance in the latter market. Average fares followed similar
patterns in that the average fare in the Detroit-Boston market was substantially higher (43%) than in the
Atlanta-Orlando market. In short, the two markets had quite different pre-entry traffic and fare levels,
with different distances between origin and destination cities.
These differences in market characteristics had an impact on each of the two new entrant carriers'
operations and success in the market. A shorter distance in the Atlanta-Orlando market allowed ValuJet to
achieve greater aircraft utilization, and thus might explain its greater frequencies than Spirit's. In addition,
the stronger customer base in that market might have played in favor of ValuJet, but could also indicate
greater potential for traffic increase in the Detroit-Boston market. Similarly, average fare levels - lower in
the Atlanta-Orlando market - are indicative of a more competitive market where opportunities to reduce
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fares even further might have been limited, but where the threat of unfair competition might also have
been smaller (given the existing competition).
Competitive Characteristics
Detroit-Boston was a monopoly market where Northwest had been the only airline flying nonstop (and
charging higher fare since 1991), therefore carrying over 90% of the local traffic. In addition, Northwest
was offering between 8 and 10 flights per day. By comparison, in the Atlanta-Orlando market, Delta and
TWA had been competing since 1992 and were both offering nonstop service. Delta was flying roughly
three times as many flights as TWA, and accordingly carrying 70%-80% of the local traffic. Altogether,
the two carriers were offering between 11 and 13 daily departures.
In addition, the strategy of entry and the ensuing response appeared to be quite different in the two
markets. First, Spirit entered the market with single daily flight, while ValuJet started service with as
many as four flights per day on certain days of the week. Furthermore, Northwest appeared to more
aggressively match the fares offered by Spirit, unlike Delta and TWA whose average fares decreased, but
relatively less (-25% on DL compared to -60% on NW, on a quarterly basis).
A major similarity between the two markets worth noting here is that after a few quarters (four in the
Atlanta - Orlando market, three in the Detroit - Boston market), average fares on the incumbent climbed
back to their pre-entry level while traffic on the incumbent network carriers decreased back to pre-entry
level. To better understand what happened, we can get even more detailed data on fare distributions (from
raw DB 1 A data), as discussed in the following paragraphs.
Fare Distributions within each Market
Figure 4.7 highlights the change in average fare pre and post-entry in both markets used as case studies,
and indicates a profound change in the competitive market environment. However, these pictures should
not be used as the sole explanation of success or failure of an entrant. For example, the fact that
Northwest's fare distribution clearly shifted towards lower fares after entry is not a reflection of a change
in the pricing structure at Northwest or an indication that Northwest's strategy was more aggressive than
Delta's. As a matter of fact, the actual range of fares offered (as reported in the DB1A database) did not
appear to change. The real change occurred in the number of passengers traveling at low fares. For
example, pre-entry, the total number of passengers flying on Northwest at fares between $50 and $100
was 200 during the first quarter of 1996. Post-entry, this number increased to 38,140 during the second
quarter of 1996. In comparison, the total number of high fare passengers ($200 or more) decreased from
10,270 to 5,270 over the same time period.
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Figure 4.7: Fare distribution before and after entry in both markets (ATL-MCO and DTW-BOS) -
Source: DB1A database
In the Atlanta-Orlando market, where it appears that the fare distribution shifted prior to entry, the pattern
is similar, if not as pronounced: passengers traveling at fare at or below $100 increased from 23,620 to
36,660 while passengers traveling at fare greater than $100 decreased from 17,680 in the fourth quarter of
1993 to 15,460 in the first quarter of 1994. Once again the range of fares purchased by passengers
remained the same from one quarter to the next.
This example of changes in fare distributions, as a function of passenger traffic rather than pricing
decisions, reflects the effect of revenue management in allocating available seats to the range of fares
offered within a particular market. This further highlights the relationship between revenue management
and network flows of passengers in that the decision to sell more seats to low-fare local passengers should
have been linked to the level of connecting traffic on the route.
We have therefore established a difference in structural market characteristics and in the strategy of entry
of the two new entrant carriers: The Atlanta-Orlando market was a much larger market with exiting
competition and lower fares than the Detroit-Boston market, and ValuJet entered the market with much
higher frequencies than Spirit. In addition, we noted that the response of the two network carriers was
quite different in terms of average fares, capacity increases and local traffic increases, when looking at a
change from the quarter before entry to the quarter of entry. Lastly, the analysis of the change in fare
distributions within each market highlighted the importance of revenue management and flow of network
passengers in explaining the changes in average fares on incumbent network carriers.
4.3. Discussion and Conclusions
Based on annual aggregate numbers (e.g. Table 4.3), we concluded that there are great differences
between various markets with new entrant competition, with respect to the success of entry and the
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response from the incumbents. These differences, according to Perry, stem from either market attributes,
or from competitive characteristics.
However, this high-level market analysis of the effects of entry did not allow us to completely explain the
differences between the responses of various incumbents to entry by diverse new entrants or the success
of some entrants and not of others. We therefore studied in more detail two specific cases. The analysis of
the Detroit-Boston and Atlanta-Orlando markets suggested that there were differences between the two
markets, and pointed to market level differences and entry strategy differences along with potential
differences in the response by incumbent carriers. The markets were quite different at the time of entry in
that the Atlanta-Orlando market had a stronger customer base on a shorter length of haul and more
competition. The strategies of entry were different in that ValuJet entered the Atlanta-Orlando market
with more frequencies than Spirit in the Detroit-Boston market. In addition, as previously discussed, the
response of Northwest appeared more aggressive than that of Delta.
Market level analyses allowed us to get more detail than the high-level analysis performed by Perry, and
in particular to observe the differences between changes immediately after entry and year-over-year
changes. In particular, we observed changes in market fares, traffic and departures that varied greatly
depending on the date of the observation: In the Atlanta-Orlando market, we get a very different picture if
we focus on immediate changes or on changes happening on a year-over-year basis. Year-over-year
comparisons arguably give a better picture of the changes in the market, in that these measures account
for seasonality various and thus allow unbiased comparisons of the effects of entry.
Table 4.14 summarizes the relative changes in each market, at the year-over-year level. The important
conclusion from these numbers is that although we identified substantial differences between the two
markets (structural and competitive), the response of incumbent carriers in terms of traffic, fares and
revenues are not substantially different. Indeed, as shown in Table 4.14, the relative annual changes are
very similar for both incumbents.
Year-Over-Year Percent Change
Airline
Traffic Average Fare Flights Revenues
Delta +59.7% -51.3% Not available -22.2%
ATL-MCO
Northwest +63.3% -48.8% +14.4% -17.4%
DTW-O1 S
Table 4.14: Relative change in quarterly traffic, average fare, departures and revenues on the incumbent
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Table 4.14 shows these numbers in both markets, and highlights two important points:
1. Year-over-year trends were comparable in both markets: Increase in total local traffic, increase in
total number of departures (and capacity) and decrease in average fares.
2. Year-over-year numbers could misleadingly tend to indicate that both markets were very similar
with respect to competition and entry, even though we have shown that these markets are quite
different. This further illustrates the fact that aggregate numbers do not provide a complete
picture of the effect of entry. Furthermore, the more we aggregate the numbers, the less we learn
about the market.
In conclusion, the survey and case studies have shown that, while previous analytical research efforts
provided interesting insights on the effect of low-fare entry in a market (with respect to the impacts on
total traffic, incumbent and new entrant traffic and revenues, average fares, etc.), the level of aggregation
usually provided in these documents does not allow for a full analysis of the effects of entry beyond the
local market. More specifically such analyses overlook the critical role of network flows of passengers for
network carriers who rely on traffic beyond the local market to ensure profitable operations. As a result,
focusing on local market numbers ignores the role of network flows for major network carriers as well as
overstates the importance of local traffic for these carriers.
In particular, the relationship between revenue management and network flows is often ignored. Network
flows typically allow the incumbents to maintain a higher frequency of service between small cities, even
though local traffic may not be sufficient to support such service. However, when combined with high
local traffic demand, revenue management becomes a necessary tool to adequately balance the available
seats between local and connecting passengers in order to maximize revenues. Network revenue
management tools therefore allow network carriers to tailor their resources - airplane seats - to the best
mix of local and connecting passengers, not only as a function of the market demand, but also very
importantly as a function of the competitive situation within its network. In particular, this last capability
allows network carriers to maximize their revenues in response to entry in any particular market. For
example, a decrease in a particular market's average fare might lead the revenue management system to
determine that it is not an appropriate decision to carry any more low-fare leisure passengers in that
market and thus decrease the availability of its seat inventory for this type of passengers. In this case,
entry might have an adverse effect on incumbent local market traffic.
The performance and impact of entry on incumbent and new entrant carriers alike is determined not only
by competitive responses from the incumbents, but also substantially by structural market differences and
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the relationship between revenue management and network flows of traffic. It is these last two effects that
we explain and study in the remainder of the thesis, along with their impact on aggregate measures of
airline performance such as average fares.
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SIMULATION OF ENTRY IN A
COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT: THE
SINGLE MARKET CASE
In previous chapters, we highlighted the growing presence of low-fare new entrant carriers, and the
concerns of regulatory bodies around the world with respect to predatory behavior. We demonstrated
through a survey of markets with low-fare competition and with an in-depth study of two particular
markets that aggregate measures of airline performance (average market fares, local market revenues and
market share) do not provide sufficient information to determine the nature of a response to entry. In
addition, we also identified revenue management, passenger flows on the network, and relative new
entrant capacity as critical factors affecting aggregate measures of airline performance in the case of low-
fare entry.
Using the Passenger Origin Destination Simulator (PODS), we now simulate the impact of entry on
various network situations, and focus the discussion on the effect of relative new entrant capacity,
revenue management and flows of network passengers. To isolate the effect of network flows from the
effect of revenue management and relative capacity, we first simulate entry in a single market case. The
single-market case further limits the impacts of revenue management to those between the extremes of no
revenue management and simple fare class revenue management. In this chapter, we first focus on the
impacts of entry on incumbent carrier performance, as well as new entrant performance, under the
assumption of leg-based fare class revenue management on all carriers and variable new entrant capacity.
In Chapter 6, we allow for the competitive revenue management situation to range from first-come, first-
served acceptance of seat requests to leg-based fare class revenue management, and thus assess the impact
of revenue management on individual carrier performance. In a second set of simulations (Chapter 7), a
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network environment is simulated in order to assess both the effect of network flows of passengers as
well as the impact of more advanced network revenue management methods on aggregate measures of
airline performance.
5.1. The Passenger Origin Destination Simulator (PODS)
The remainder of the thesis presents results from the Passenger Origin Destination Simulator (PODS), a
simulator of competitive airline networks. The simulator was originally developed by Hopperstad, Berge
and Filipowski at the Boeing Company and is an extension of the Boeing Decision Window Model
(Boeing Airplane Company, 1997) used to study the impact of flight schedules on airline market share.
PODS simulates the choices by individual air travelers flying over a network of origin-destination
markets served by several airlines. In the following sections, we first briefly introduce the simulator and
its components, and then discuss the details of the passenger choice model used in PODS.
5.1.1. PODS Architecture
PODS simulates multiple repetitions (a.k.a. "samples") of the same departure day. The initial simulations
of this departure day allow the airlines to progressively build the historical database they need to operate
the forecasting component of their revenue management systems. Each PODS simulation consists of 5
independent sets of samples ("trials"), each composed of 600 successive (and thus correlated) simulations
of departure days ("samples"). The initial 200 samples of each trial are discarded to eliminate the initial
condition effects, and the results from the 5 trials are averaged to give stable and statistically significant
results. For any given flight departure, on any given day in PODS, passengers start booking 63 days
before departure. This 63 day period is divided into 16 time frames. The simulation outputs are the result
of individual passenger choices and lead to airline performance measures, including airline traffic,
revenues and loads.
Briefly described, the Passenger Origin Destination Simulator can be broken into four separate
components, as illustrated in Figure 5.1. The first component is the historical database, which records
passenger bookings from the beginning of the simulation. Historical bookings are then used by the
forecaster to estimate future bookings on flights that have not yet departed. The forecasting component of
PODS is composed of two sub-components: The detruncation sub-component and the forecasting sub-
component. While the forecaster uses historical observed bookings to estimate bookings to come for a
future flight departure and fare class, aircraft capacity constraints lead to constrained observations of
demand (through passenger bookings) for any particular flight and fare class. Indeed, when a class closes
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down (i.e. becomes unavailable for booking) because of capacity constraints (or because the revenue
management optimizer closed the class), the bookings recorded for that class are truncated bookings,
constrained by the lack of remaining capacity to sell. As a result, it is necessary to estimate the
"unconstrained" demand for that particular flight and class, that is, the total demand that would have been
recorded had there been neither capacity nor revenue management constraints. This is the role of the
detruncator. Given the unconstrained historical demand, the forecaster then estimates the demand for
future flights. Skwarek (1996) and Zickus (1998) provide a detailed discussion of the forecasting models
used in PODS.
Given the demand forecasts, the revenue management and seat inventory control component of PODS
allocates seats for each fare class on future flights. The seat allocation process is performed using booking
limits, which determine the maximum number of seats that can be sold within each fare class, and
availability is set according to a nesting strategy. Nesting ensures that a minimum number of seats are
made available within each fare class, but that additional seats can also be sold in higher fare classes,
provided that the availability of lower fare classes is reduced by the amount of additional seats sold. A
discussion of seat allocation strategies and nesting can be found in Belobaba (1987). The reader is
referred to Lee (1998) and Darot (2001) for a detailed discussion of the seat allocation and revenue
management algorithms used in PODS.
Finally, the booking limits and availability levels set by the revenue management system feed into the
passenger choice component, which then determines individual passenger choices based on available
seats for each fare class on any given flight. Passenger choices then loop back into the revenue
management and seat allocation component which leads to a booking (if the passenger's choice is
available) which is then recorded into the historical database. We discuss in more detail the passenger
choice model used in PODS in the following section.
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PATH/CLASS
AVAILABILITY
Figure 5.1: PODS architecture (Source: Hopperstad and The Boeing Company)
5.1.2. The Passenger Choice Model in PODS
The passenger choice model in PODS can be divided into four separate components or steps. In the first
step, demand for air travel within a market on a particular day is generated. Second, individual passenger
characteristics are then produced to reflect their preferences in terms of schedule, willingness to pay and
disutilities of fare restrictions and other parameters. Third, the passenger choice set is defined based on
passenger characteristics in relation to airline availability, and, in the fourth and final step, each passenger
makes a decision within the alternatives available, based on individual preferences. Figure 5.2 illustrates
the structure of the passenger choice model and its integration within the PODS simulator.
In the following paragraphs, we briefly discuss each of the four steps and focus on passenger
characteristics which explain individual passenger choices. The reader is referred to Carrier (2003) for an
extensive discussion of the passenger choice model in PODS.
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Figure 5.2: The passenger choice model in PODS
Demand Generation
In the first step of the passenger choice model in PODS, demand for air travel is determined. Average
total daily demand for air travel is input for each of the markets simulated (based on airline data provided
by the PODS Consortium airline members). This total demand is split between leisure and business
passengers according to airline industry data, with 35% of business travelers and 65% of leisure travelers.
Given this average total demand within each market, the simulator then incorporates random deviations
around the average demand, according to the common industry practice of assessing a variability measure
that depends on the magnitude of the mean. Two alternative forms have been suggested to represent this
stochastic variation referred to as k- and z-factors. PODS uses a combination of the two methods to
determine the deviation from the mean on any given day in a particular market and for a given passenger
type (business or leisure), as explained by Wilson (1995). Finally, given the demand for each market and
passenger type, the arrival of passengers of each type is set according to booking curves (which are inputs
to the model).
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Passenger Characteristics
Once demand has been determined, individual passenger characteristics are generated, according to three
categories: Schedule preference (decision window), willingness to pay, and disutilities associated with
fare restrictions and other parameters. Each passenger is assigned a decision window, which can
conceptually be viewed as the combination of an earliest allowable departure time and a latest allowable
arrival time. In PODS, the decision window is defined by its width (difference between the earliest
departure time and latest arrival time) and its position during the day. The width of the decision window
is determined as the sum of the minimum travel time in the market and a random parameter, the schedule
tolerance. The value of the schedule tolerance is defined randomly for each individual traveler but
depends on the market stage length and the passenger trip purpose. Decision windows are on average
shorter for business travelers than for leisure travelers to reflect the importance of time and schedule on
business passengers. Given the decision window, all paths and fare class combinations that fit within the
window are equally attractive to the passenger, while all other paths are equally unattractive and incur a
replanning disutility, as discussed below.
The maximum willingness to pay represents the maximum fare value a passenger is willing to pay to
travel. As a result, any fare above the maximum willingness to pay of the passenger will be excluded from
his choice set. Maximum willingness to pay values are assigned randomly for each passenger, but drawn
from a price-demand curve for each passenger type, which represent the total passenger demand (or
proportion of passengers) willing to pay a given price for travel within a particular market, as illustrated
in Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.3: Sample business and leisure demand curves in PODS
The equations for the demand curves are the following:
- ln(2) f -basefareD = Do x min 1,e (emult-1)xbasefare , where Do is the average demand in the market for a given
passenger type, basefare is the fare at which all of Do is willing to travel, and emult is the elasticity
multiplier representing the fare value (basefare x emult ) at which half of the demand would be willing
to travel. Once again, the reader is referred to Carrier (2003) for more detail.
Finally, each passenger has a set of disutility values representing his/her sensitivity to fare product
restrictions (restriction disutilities), schedule preference (replanning disutility, if the path is outside of the
previously defined time window), path quality (nonstop vs. connecting) and airline preference. All
disutilities are defined randomly and independently for each passenger and passenger type, but their
average values are a linear function of the market basefare. The intercept and the slope of the disutility
functions were calibrated through a survey of airline representatives, as explained by Lee (2000). All
disutilities are higher on average for business passengers: The underlying assumption is that business
passengers place more importance on the overall quality of the trip (schedule, path quality, unrestricted
fare) than on the actual price of the ticket and are therefore more inconvenienced by restrictions than
leisure passengers. Finally, all disutilities are assumed to be independent and to follow a normal
distribution with a 0.3 k-factor, typical of air transportation demand according to marketing research
conducted by Boeing (The Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, 1978).
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For example, each fare product comes with a set of restrictions. The purpose of these restrictions is to
achieve market segmentation and force business passengers to purchase less restricted but higher fares
that they are willing to pay for. Examples of fare product restrictions include Saturday night stay
requirement, non-refundability and change fee. Given such restrictions, prices are set so that leisure
passengers typically prefer the more restrictive, but cheaper fares, while business passengers prefer less
restrictive, but more expensive fares. Table 5.1 shows an example of the average total cost of individual
fare products when accounting for their associated restrictions, and illustrates how more restrictive
products have a lower total cost for leisure passengers, but a higher total cost for business passengers.
Passenger Fare Class Y B M Q
Type Avg. Cost
Avg. Rest. 1 None $225.00 $225.00 $225.00
C') Avg. Rest. 2 None None $75.00 $75.00
. Avg. Rest. 3 None None None $75.00
Fare $400.00 $200.00 $150.00 $100.00
Average Total Cost $400.00 $425.00 $450.00 $475.00
Avg. Rest. 1 None $175.00 $175.00 $175.00
Avg. Rest. 2 None None $25.00 $25.00
Wn Avg. Rest. 3 None None None $25.00
Fare $400.00 $200.00 $150.00 $100.00
Average Total Cost $400.00 $375.00 $350.00 $325.00
Table 5.1: Average total cost of individual fare products by passenger type (accounting for restrictions
disutility costs)
For more detail on passenger characteristics, the reader is once again referred to Carrier (2003).
Passenger Choice Set
Given individual passenger characteristics, the simulator defines the choice set of each individual
passenger. Depending on the competitive situation, the network size and the number of fare products
available, passengers have a maximum number of alternatives to consider equal to the product of the
number of paths (in the market where they want to fly) and the number of fare class products, along with
the "no-go" alternative. For example, with two competitors each offering four fare classes and flying
three times daily in the market, passengers have a maximum of 24 "go" alternatives to choose from, and
the "no-go" alternative, for a total of 25 choices. Some of the 24 "go" alternatives will be excluded from
the choice set based on the following conditions:
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* The revenue management system has closed down a particular set of fare classes and paths in the
market.
. The passenger does not meet the advance purchase requirements for some of the fare products.
* The passenger's willingness to pay is lower than some fare class product prices.
Passenger Choice
Finally, given the passenger choice set, the passenger makes a decision from all the available alternatives,
including the "no-go" alternative. The choice set of any passenger thus contains at least one alternative,
the "no-go" alternative. If there is at least one feasible "go" alternative available in the passenger choice
set besides the "no-go" alternative, the latter is never chosen and PODS chooses the alternative with
lowest generalized cost. The total generalized cost of each alternative is computed as the sum of the fare
and associated disutilitics, including disutilities from:
* The characteristics of this specific air traveler (O-D market, business or leisure, time window)
* The fare/class (restrictions)
* The path (airline, quality of the path, schedule)
Once the passenger has chosen a path/class, the seat availability is updated by decreasing the airline
inventory by one seat on the legs traversed by the path/class. In addition, this travel decision is recorded
in the historical database that feeds into the forecaster and the optimizer components of the simulator used
to set revenue management controls at the end of each time frame.
As a result, PODS distinguishes between monetary elements (willingness to pay, fare) and non-monetary
elements (disutilities) when modeling passenger choice. The choice of a particular path/class is based on
both considerations but is conditional on each passenger's maximum willingness to pay.
5.1.3. Conclusion
As discussed in the previous section, the Passenger Origin Destination Simulator (PODS), is a simulator
of competitive airline networks which can be broken into four separate components. These four
components - historical database, forecasting, revenue management and passenger choice - provide the
necessary elements to run a simulation of competitive interactions involving revenue management in the
airline industry. Of these four components, the passenger choice model occupies a very important part
upon which depend most of the results.
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In the following sections, we present the results of the simulation of a single market case, and examine the
effect of revenue management and relative new entrant capacity on individual carrier performance.
5.2. Single Market Case
In this single market case, our purpose is to highlight the impact of entry on incumbent revenues, loads
and average fares on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the impact of revenue management on the
same measures of incumbent performance, when a new entrant begins operations in a single market
environment.
To illustrate the impact of entry, we simulate a single market network, with a set of competing airlines
offering service in this market. We start with two incumbent carriers, Airline 1 offering nonstop service,
and Airline 2 offering connecting service. The new entrant carrier (Airline 3) comes in with a schedule
identical to that of the nonstop incumbent carrier and diverse pricing and capacity strategies.
Our simulation results show that incumbent revenues and traffic are greatly impacted by entry and more
specifically by the choice of fares and capacity by the new entrant, as well as by the competitive revenue
management situation. In particular, we demonstrate that average fares on the nonstop incumbent carrier
generally decrease following entry, as do revenues and traffic, regardless of the response of the incumbent
carrier. These results support previous arguments that average fares, traffic and revenues give a very
incomplete picture of the effects of entry in a market (as suggested by Perry and Oster and Strong).
Rather, we show that average fares, revenues and traffic are a direct consequence of other factors such as
new entrant capacity, response of the incumbent to entry, and the use of revenue management by both
airlines.
For instance, we show that, while the nonstop incumbent carrier usually suffers from entry (loss of
revenues), depending on the entrant's strategy of entry, the response that maximizes revenues varies
between matching the new entrant's strategy and only matching the lower fare on the new entrant. The
reason for this lies in the effects of capacity share and revenue management on traffic, including diversion
of high-fare passengers or capacity constraints. In addition, results show that airline and market-level
performance are greatly affected by product differentiation 2 : The more product differentiation, the
greater the market-level and airline-level revenues.
1 Product differentiation is the modification of a product to make it more attractive to the target market
and to differentiate it from other products (competitor's products, or, in the case of airline pricing, other
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As previously mentioned, this chapter focuses on the effect of entry given a fixed competitive revenue
management situation. In Chapter 6, we will show that, even in the absence of network effects, the effects
of entry on traditional aggregate measures of airline performance are greatly affected by the competitive
revenue management situation. In addition, we illustrate the revenue implications (on all competitors)
when the new entrant uses leg-based fare class revenue management (FCRM) as compared to First-Come,
First-Served (FCFS) seat allocation.
5.2.1. Competitive Settings and Market Parameters
Table 5.2 shows the major variables used to define the characteristics of a market in PODS. As we discuss
in the following sections, we simulate changes in airline parameters rather than external parameters in the
simulator. The purpose of the research being to study the effects of entry on incumbent carriers, we
assume that the market does not change structurally after entry. For example, we assume that conditional
passenger preference towards any particular airline remains unchanged by entry: Given that the passenger
does not choose to travel on Airline 3, his (her) preference between airlines 1 and 2 is the same as his
(her) preference when there are only airlines 1 and 2 operating in the market. Similarly, we assume that
total potential demand remains a function of price, as governed by the existing price-demand curve in the
market, irrespective of the number of competitors in the market.
VARIABLES
AIRLINE EXTERNAL
Number of Flights Airline Preference
Aircraft Size Disutility Values
Pricing Demand
Number of Fare Classes Stimulation/Curves
Table 5.2: Important variables in the competitive simulation
The following sections discuss the details of the market parameters and individual scenario settings with
respect to the airline variables shown in Table 5.2.
We describe four scenarios, scenarios 0 through 3, and discuss the results of the simulation of each of
these individual scenarios before actually simulating various revenue management situations and studying
fares on the same airline). Successful product differentiation will move the product from competing based
primarily on price to competing on non-price factors (such as product characteristics, including advance
purchase requirements, restrictions, frequency, etc. in the case of airline markets).
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the impact of revenue management on these results in Chapter 6. We use Scenario 0 as the benchmark
case for comparison, but also compare scenarios amongst themselves.
Market Parameters
In this first set of simulations, airlines operate in a short-haul market (283 miles) with a demand of 165
one-way passengers per day at the current lowest available fare level (c.f. Table 5.5). Of this passenger
demand, 35% is business oriented and the remaining 65% is leisure demand. The difference between
leisure and business passengers resides in business passengers' willingness to pay a higher fare,
sensitivity to fare restrictions, and booking behavior, as discussed in 5.1.2.
Revenue Mana2ement Systems
To study the effect of entry and new entrant capacity on individual carrier performance, we chose to limit
the simulations to a single type of revenue management system on all carriers operating in the market.
The airlines use fare class revenue management (FCRM) to determine how many seats to make available
in each of the four fare classes offered to passengers. As discussed in 5.1.2, each of these fare classes
represent differentiated fare products with different prices and associated restrictions (Y class is the most
expensive unrestricted fare class, while B, M and Q classes have more restrictions but are less restricted).
Given these fare classes, FCRM uses forecasts of demand to come for each of these fare products to set
the booking limits within each fare class for future departures. Under the assumption of stochastic
demand, the booking limits are designed to maximize the expected revenue on each flight. FCRM is a
combination of Booking Curve detruncation, Pick-up forecasting, and Expected Marginal Seat Revenue
algorithm (Belobaba, 1987 and 1992a), as extensively described in the PODS and revenue management
literature (e.g. Gorin, 2000) and used by many airlines. Under the application of fare class revenue
management, revenue management controls are used to protect seats for later-booking high-fare
passengers, in turn limiting seats made available to early-booking low-fare passengers.
5.2.2. Scenario 0: No New Entrant Competition - Standard Fare Structure
Characteristics
In this case, we simulate a single market where initially two incumbent carriers compete. One of these
two carriers offers three daily nonstop flights while its competitor offers three connecting flights, each
with 30 seats on each flight, for a total of 90 seats per day in the market for each carrier.
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CARRIER CAPACITY FREQUENCY SCHEDULE PRICING
Airline 1 90 seats Three daily 11:30am - 3:00pm - 6:30pm Four fare classes(3x30) flights (1h16m travel time) with four different
fare levels
Airline 2 90 seats Three daily 8:08am - 11:38am - 3:08pm Y, B, M and Q(3x30) flights (5h43m travel time) (see Table 5.5)
Table 5.3: Scenario 0 capacity, frequency, schedule and pricing overview
The rationale for modeling two carriers, one of which offers nonstop service and the other offering
connecting service, is the following:
1. We are interested in low-fare entry, where a new entrant carrier starts operating in a short-haul
market and offers nonstop service. Since the purpose of the thesis is to evaluate the impact of
entry on incumbent carriers, we assume that an airline is already serving the market with nonstop
flights.
2. The purpose of Airline 2 - the connecting incumbent carrier -is to act as a "relief valve" for the
excess market demand and to allow passengers to have an alternative to the nonstop carrier.
Airline 2 thus represents all the connecting alternatives available to passengers in a more realistic
market. As a result, we assume that Airline 2 offers a large capacity relative to demand in this
market (identical to that of the nonstop incumbent carrier), even though its connecting flight
options (paths) are far less desirable than those of Airline 1. The loads, revenues and overall
performance of Airline 2 are therefore not of particular interest in this discussion. From here on,
we thus refer to the nonstop incumbent simply as the incumbent carrier.
3. Such short-haul markets are rarely served exclusively by a single carrier operating in a monopoly
situation. Rather, US DOT data shows (Table 5.4) that in the fourth quarter of 2000, out of 2,882
short-haul markets (<500 miles) with nonstop service, only 715 were served by a single carrier
(25%), leaving 75% of them to be served by two or more carriers. In addition, of these same
2,882 markets, 1,740 of them had a competing airline offering connecting service (60%). In the
second quarter of 2002, the numbers were similar, with 72% of the markets with nonstop service
being also served by at least one additional carrier, and 58% of the markets served by a
connecting carrier in addition to the nonstop carrier.
Thus, in our situation of interest where a low-fare carrier enters a market previously served by a network
carrier (with nonstop service), 60% of the time there is an alternative carrier offering connecting service,
and 75% of the time there is an alternative to the carrier offering nonstop service, be it nonstop or
connecting. As such, it is important in our simulations to have a second airline operating in the market
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with connecting service, as an alternative to the existing nonstop carrier. Finally, capacity on this
additional carrier is of small importance as long as it can accommodate the overflow of demand from the
carriers offering nonstop service in the market and thus ensure that passengers wanting to travel can
travel, even though they might have to travel on a far less desirable itinerary.
Q4-2000 Q2-2002
Number of Markets with Percent of Markets with Percent of
Airlines Nonstop Service Total Nonstop Service Total
1 715 25% 722 27%
2 518 18% 425 16%
3 408 14% 374 14%
4 334 12% 279 11%
5 222 8% 204 8%
6 or more 685 24% 647 24%
Total 2,882 100% 2,651 100%
Table 5.4: Number of competitors in short haul markets with nonstop service (< 500 miles) - Source: US
DOT DB1A database, fourth quarter 2000 and second quarter 2002
All other characteristics are exactly the same for both airlines. In particular, we note that airline
preferences are set to be the same for both airlines, as are fares. The only difference between the two
competitors is therefore the fact that one carrier offers nonstop service while its competitor offers
connecting service, as shown in Figure 5.4. As a result, travel times are greater on the carrier offering
connecting service (c.f. Table 5.3 - 1h16 on the nonstop carrier compared to 5h43 on the connecting
carrier). Sensitivity of the simulation results to these parameters will be discussed in Chapter 6, Section
6.3.
Airline 1
Nonstop
Origin 
--
>Destination
Airline 2
Airline 2
Connecting
Hub H2
Figure 5.4: Single market (hub Hi to spoke S) with two competing carriers
Finally, the prices for each fare class are set as shown in Table 5.5, along with the restrictions associated
with each individual fare class in this particular scenario (0). Y class is the unrestricted fare class in the
market, B, M and Q classes have more severe restrictions and advance purchase requirements. We refer to
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this fare structure as the standard fare structure, as fare classes have increasing associated restrictions as
their individual fare values decrease.
Restrictions
Fare Class Fare Saturday Change Non Advance
Night Stay Fee Refundable Purchase
Y $261 No No No No
B $135 Yes No No 7 days
M $92 Yes Yes No 14 days
Q $63 Yes Yes Yes 21 days
Table 5.5: Fare classes, associated fares and restrictions for the standard fare structure in Scenario 0
Table 5.6 summarizes the characteristics of Scenario 0 with respect to service, frequency and capacity,
and fares by fare class. Individual fare values by fare class were selected to represent realistic one-way
fares in a market with comparable attributes as the one simulated here, based on airline data. In addition,
we also assume that both incumbent carriers use fare class revenue management to control the allocation
of seats between passengers (as described in Section 5.2.1). This last assumption reflects the fact that
airlines generally perform revenue management to maximize their revenues.
Scenario 0 Frequency Fares by Fare Class Revenue
& Capacity Y B M Q Management
Airline 1 Nonstop 3x30 $261 $135 $92 $63 FCRM
Airline 2 Connecting 3x30 $261 $135 $92 $63 FCRM
Table 5.6: Scenario 0 summary
We use Scenario 0 as our base case
revenues, loads and average fares.
in the remainder of this chapter, that is, as a benchmark for pre-entry
Simulation Results
The purpose of this first study is to describe the initial situation in which the incumbent carriers find
themselves without competition. From this base case, we will then be able to quantify the additional
impact of the new entrant carrier on incumbent revenues, loads and average fares, as a function of the
choice of a pricing strategy by the new entrant.
Table 5.7 shows loads and revenues by fare class for the entire market, along with average load factor and
average fare for Scenario 0. We observe that the average load factor for the market is 68% while 122
passengers out of a demand of 165 passengers are carried by the two competitors in the market, that is,
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78% of the total demand is satisfied. The remainder of the demand (43 passengers) is willing to pay the
lowest available market fare, but unable to travel because of unmet advance purchase requirements or
lack of available seats given revenue management controls on both airlines. In addition, the distribution of
passengers by fare class (fare class mix) has about 50% of passengers traveling in Q class, 10% in B and
M class respectively, and the remaining 30% in Y class. In terms of revenue distribution, however, the
30% of passengers in Y class generate about 60% of the total market revenues, while the 50% of Q class
passengers only account for 25% of total market revenues.
Measure Rev. Mgt Total Y B M Q
FCRM 122.38 34.68 13.30 12.49 61.90 Avg. Load FactorLoads68
Relative 28% 11% 10% 51% 68%
FCRM $15,914 $9,061 $1,798 $1,150 $3,905 Avg. Fare
Revenues $3Relative 57% 11% 7% 25% $130
Table 5.7: Total loads and revenues by fare class, average load factor and average fare for the entire
market - Scenario 0
Figure 5.5 shows each of the two airlines' revenues under Scenario 0. We first notice an apparent
asymmetry in terms of revenues. This is essentially due to the fact that Airline 2 does not offer nonstop
service in the market. As a result, the path utility on Airline 2, all else being equal, will necessarily be
worse and passengers will book on Airline 1, if it is available. Furthermore, path preference might even
induce passengers into booking a higher fare on Airline 1 rather than the lower fare on Airline 2, if the
added restrictions on Airline 2's lower price ticket further decrease its utility beyond that of the more
expensive ticket on Airline 1.
0
C
0
0
$14,000-
$12,000 -
$10,000-
$8,000 -
$6,000 -
$4,000 -
$2,000-
$0-
FCRM - Sc 0
Airlinel Airline2
Figure 5.5: Incumbent carrier revenues in the case of no new entrant competition
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Table 5.8 highlights the asymmetry between the two carriers in terms of loads by fare class and average
load factors. As previously explained, due to the preference of passengers for Airline 1, we observe
greater loads for Airline 1 in Y, B and M class, the higher fare classes. In Q class, however, loads are far
greater on Airline 2. This observation is the consequence of the fact that Airline 1 is the preferred airline
in terms of path quality and of the fact that both carriers are practicing revenue management. Indeed,
Airline 1 is protecting seats for later-booking high-fare passengers, while Airline 2 is less heavily loaded,
thus allowing all passengers access to its seats, including low-fare passengers.
Passengers by fare class
Rev. Mgt Airline Total Traffic Y B M Q ALF
Airline 1 74.99 30.42 12.69 11.40 20.48 83%
FCRM
Airline 2 47.39 4.26 0.62 1.09 41.42 53%
Table 5.8: Fare class mix, average load factor by airline, Scenario 0
Figure 5.6 shows revenues by fare class for airlines 1 and 2 and highlights the substantial difference in the
source of revenues for each of the airlines, as well as the magnitude of the revenues of each airline. Most
of Airline l's revenues come from Y class traffic (66%) while 67% of Airline 2's revenues come from Q
class traffic.
0
a)
$8,000-
$7,000 -
$6,000-
$5,000 -
$4,000-
$3,000-
$2,000-
$1,000-
$0-
" Airline 1
" Airline 2
1,114 $1,049
Y B M
$I
Q
Figure 5.6: Airline 1 and 2 revenues by fare class, Scenario 0
In summary, in Scenario 0, there is asymmetry in the revenues earned by each airline due to the fact that
Airline 1 offers nonstop service while Airline 2 only offers connecting service in the market. The
asymmetry in revenues is a direct consequence of passenger loads and translates into very high Y class
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revenues on Airline 1, coming primarily from business travelers. On Airline 2, revenues come mostly
from Q class, and are overall substantially lower than on Airline 1.
The result of this asymmetry is a disproportionate share of traffic and revenues in favor of Airline 1, as
shown in Table 5.9. In particular, in this case greater market share leads to disproportionately greater
revenue share.
Market Share Revenue Share
Airline 1 61% 75%
Airline 2 39% 25%
Table 5.9: Market and revenue share in Scenario 0
5.2.3. Scenarios 1 - 3: Competitive Simulations of Entry
To study the impact of entry, we add a new entrant carrier to this single market case. The new entrant
offers nonstop service directly competing with the incumbent carrier offering nonstop service (Airline 1).
In addition, we schedule the new entrant to offer the exact same departure times as the nonstop incumbent
carrier in order to duplicate the behavior of airlines matching each other's schedule, and to further
eliminate the effect of schedule preference on passenger choice.
As shown in Table 5.2, there are a number of airline parameters that we can set in this competitive
situation. In the case of this new entrant carrier, we choose to keep the number of flights, the number of
fare classes and the schedule as fixed, but allow the aircraft size and pricing strategy to change from one
simulation to the next. We define scenarios 1 through 3 to reflect three different pricing strategies on the
new entrant carrier. Within each of these scenarios, we also allow for two sub-levels of scenarios
respectively reflecting different choice of capacity on the new entrant, and pricing response of the
incumbent carriers.
In this first study, we assume that all carriers use fare class revenue management (FCRM). The
underlying rationale is that most airlines practice some form of revenue management in order to
maximize their revenues. In addition, while it is sometimes the case that network carriers rely on more
advanced network revenue management, in our single market case, there are no network traffic flows,
thus eliminating the need for network revenue management.
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Scenario 1: Entry with the Standard Fare Structure and Low-Fare Stimulation of Traffic
Characteristics
Upon entry, the new entrant carrier offers three daily nonstop flights scheduled at the exact same times as
the nonstop incumbent carrier's flights (Airline 1). In addition, the new entrant offers the same standard
fare structure as the incumbents in that the entrant offers four fare classes with the same standard
restrictions and advance purchase requirements as the incumbent carriers.
Upon entry, however, the entrant stimulates traffic by offering a lower price level in the most heavily
restricted Q class, priced at $10 below the original Q fare in Scenario 0. Note that the decrease in Q class
fare leads to an increase in potential leisure demand from the initial 107 passengers to 187 one-way
passengers per day, for a new total market demand of 245 one-way passengers per day (including
business demand which does not change). In all scenarios, we assume that the incumbent carriers match
this lower fare, and thus offer a standard fare structure (with a different Q fare than in Scenario 0).
Scenario 1 Frequency Fares by Fare Class Revenue
& Capacity Y B M Q Management
Airline 1 Nonstop 3x30 $261 $135 $92 $53 FCRM
Airline 2 Connecting 3x30 $261 $135 $92 $53 FCRM
Airline 3 Nonstop 3x1 5-25-30 $261 $135 $92 $53 FCRM
(New Entrant) or 50
Table 5.10: Scenario 1 summary
Table 5.10 summarizes the major settings for Scenario 1, and highlights the lower fare in Q class, along
with the various capacity settings for the new entrant carrier. As mentioned previously, we allow for
various entrant capacities and incumbent fare responses for each scenario. In this particular scenario, the
incumbent carriers match the new entrant's fares. Furthermore, while the incumbent carriers are assumed
to have fixed aircraft capacities (30 seats), we allow for variation of the new entrant's aircraft capacity to
better assess the effect of entrant capacity on post-entry incumbent revenues, loads and average fares. The
new entrant will therefore enter the market with four possible capacities: 15, 25, 30 or 50 seats per flight.
We indicate the sub-scenario with a superscript index reflecting the entrant's capacity. For example, in
the case of Scenario 1 with 25 seats per aircraft on the new entrant, we write Scenario 125.
Note that when referring to Scenario 1, we will be referring to the general class of Scenario 1, thus
allowing us to make general comments and draw general conclusions that are independent of the capacity
level on the new entrant.
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Simulation Results
In Scenario 1, the new entrant carrier offers the same service as the nonstop incumbent carrier in the
market. That is, the new entrant carrier comes into the market with three daily flights scheduled to depart
at the exact same time as the flights on the incumbent carrier, and with the exact same fares (but with a
new lowest market fare to stimulate demand).
Market-Level Changes
Figure 5.7 shows total market revenues for Scenario 1 as a function of new entrant capacity, along with
Scenario 0 revenues (where there is no new entrant carrier and therefore no entrant capacity). We observe
that with a new entrant carrier competing in the market, total market revenues are always greater than
without a new entrant carrier, regardless of the new entrant's capacity (i.e. Scenario 1 revenues are always
greater than Scenario 0 revenues). Furthermore, the greater the capacity on the new entrant carrier, the
higher the total market revenues.
Daily Entrant Cap. (absolute)
0 45 75 90 150
$19,000
$18,000
$17,000
$16,000
$15,000
$14,000
0% 50% 83% 100% 167%
% of NS Inc. Capacity
Figure 5.7: Total market revenues for Scenario 1 as a function of new entrant capacity
Adding a new entrant with the exact same fare structure and frequency as the incumbent carriers has a
positive impact on total market revenues for the following two reasons:
1. The new entrant adds capacity in the market and allows for more passengers to travel. Without
competition (Scenario 0), the average load factor on Airline 1 was 83% with, on average, 43
passengers unable to travel on a daily basis, as we observed that out of the daily demand of 165
passengers per day, only 78% actually traveled. This suggests that even without stimulation of
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traffic, there was unmet demand that could be accommodated by the new entrant carrier and
therefore lead to increased revenues in the market.
2. In addition, while adding capacity by itself could lead to revenue dilution by opening up lower
fare classes, the fact that all carriers also stimulate demand by lowering their Q fare and continue
to use revenue management to ensure that late-booking high-fare passengers always find seats,
leads to an overall increase in revenues.
In short, adding a carrier in the market with nonstop service and with the same fare structure as the
incumbent carriers (Scenario 1) leads to increased market revenues. These revenues increase with the
capacity of the new entrant carrier, until all demand is met and adding more seats in the market has no
additional effect on total revenues. Table 5.11 shows the total market average load factors13 and also
highlights the decrease in average load factor at high new entrant capacity, along with the increase in
average load factor from Scenario 0 to scenarios 115 and 125, which is a consequence of the stimulation of
low-fare traffic combined with the relatively low entrant capacity.
Entrant capacity: absolute (% of nonstop incumbent)
No entrant 3x15 3x25 3x30 3x50Scenario Pricing Measure (0%) (50%) (83%) (100%) (167%)
ALF 68% 74% 70% 65% 56%
Standard (incl. cnx carrier)Sc. 1 fares
Avg. fare $124.98 $104.32 $101.96 $101.36 $100.01
Table 5.11: Total market average load factor and average fare as a function of new entrant capacity
Finally, in terms of average fare, we note that the average fare at the market level decreases with
increasing new entrant capacity. It drops from $125 in Scenario 0 down to as low as $100 in Scenario 150.
Table 5.11 shows the detail of the decrease in average fare and in particular the fact that as soon as the
new entrant enters the market, the average market fare decreases sharply. As the entrant's capacity
increases, the average fare continues to decrease, but the relative decrease is much smaller than that
caused by entry. The decrease in average fare is a consequence of the change in passenger mix between
fare classes, which is the outcome of the new entrant's entry or increase in capacity. Indeed, when the
13 Total Market Average Load Factor is defined as the average load factor at the market level, i.e. total
revenue passenger miles in the market - summed over all three competitors - divided by total available
seat miles in the market - again summed over all three competitors. In this single market case, it is the
same as total market traffic divided by total market capacity.
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entrant operates in the market, the increase in total market capacity relative to pre-entry capacity leads to
a greater availability of lower fare classes, thus allowing a greater proportion of passengers to book in
these lower fare classes and consequently leading to a decrease in average market fare.
Carrier-Level Changes
At the carrier level, we observe that incumbent revenues decrease after entry, and relatively more when
the entrant's capacity increases, as shown on Figure 5.8. Conversely, new entrant revenues increase with
entrant capacity.
Entrant Cap. (absolute)
0 45 75 90 150
$14,000 -
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% of NS Inc. Capacity
Figure 5.8: Airline 1 revenues as a function of new entrant capacity
Upon entry, the nonstop incumbent carrier loses some of its traffic to the new competitor. In addition, the
loss of traffic generally occurs in the higher fare classes, as passengers now have the option of traveling
on the competing carrier. As a result, we observe that Y, B and M classes suffer losses following entry as
entrant capacity increases, while loads in Q class increase compared to Scenario 0 for Airline 1. Table
5.12 shows that, as new entrant capacity increases, loads in all fare classes decrease compared to Scenario
115 on Airline 1. The decrease is approximately equivalent in all fare classes as the average fare on Airline
1 tends to remain relatively constant as a function of the new entrant's capacity. In the case of Scenario
115, the initial increase in loads is a consequence of the increase in demand (demand stimulation) resulting
from the lower Q fare level. Loads in the higher fare classes decrease substantially however, thus leading
to the observed decrease in revenues (Figure 5.8).
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Entrant Capacity Airline 1 Loads
Absolute % of nonstop inc. Total Y B M Q ALF
No Entrant 0% 75 30.4 12.7 11.4 20.5 83%
3x15 50% 77 16.6 6.8 5.0 48.8 86%
3x25 83% 74 16.4 6.6 4.2 47.2 83%
3x30 100% 73 16.2 6.4 3.9 46.9 82%
3x50 167% 72 15.7 6.1 3.1 46.9 80%
Table 5.12: Airline 1 total loads, loads by fare class and average load factor as a function of entrant capacity
Conversely, on the new entrant (Airline 3), total revenues and loads increase with its capacity. It is
important to note here that while revenues increase with increasing new entrant capacity, this increase in
entrant capacity also affects its unit revenues (or revenue per ASM, RASM). For example, in this
scenario, entrant revenues increase from $5,774 at 15 seats per flight to $9,811 at 50 seats per flight on
the entrant. Airline 3's RASM, on the other hand, decreases from $0.454 at 15 seats per flight to $0.231 at
50 seats per flight on the entrant. The decrease in RASM is a consequence of the increase in capacity and
the decrease in average fare with increasing new entrant capacity. Average fare and average load factor
also decrease (c.f. Table 5.13) as the new entrant's capacity increases, due to the fact that:
1. Total capacity in the market becomes greater than total potential demand
2. The additional passengers carried with the added capacity on Airline 3 are mostly low-fare
passengers who were previously unable to travel for lack of available seats
Entrant capacity: absolute (% of nonstop incumbent)
3x15 3x25 3x30 3x50
Airline 3 (entrant) (50%) (83%) (100%) (167%)
Revenues $5,774 $7,279 $7,957 $9,811
Loads 37.6 62.9 73.5 100.8
Avg. Load Factor 84% 84% 82% 67%
Avg. Fare $153.39 $115.63 $108.25 $97.30
Table 5.13: Revenues, loads, average load factor and average fare on Airline 3 as a function of capacity
Finally, looking at average fares also provides additional insight into the impact of entry in the case of
Scenario 1. Figure 5.9 shows that between airlines 1 and 3, the carrier that has the greater capacity also
has the lower average fare. This important observation comes from the fact that the airline with greater
capacity is more likely to have seats available for lower fare passengers as the high-fare passengers are
already forecast (by the revenue management system) by all carriers and therefore traveling in all cases of
entry (regardless of entrant capacity). As a result, the airline with greater capacity will keep its lower fare
classes available longer and thus get more low-fare passengers. This in turn will negatively impact its
average fare, but increase its revenues.
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Figure 5.9: Average fare by airline as a function of entrant capacity - Scenario 1
The above-discussed changes lead to a decrease in Airline l's market and revenue share
capacity increases. The relative impact is greater on revenues, as shown in Table 5.14.
as the entrant's
Entrant capacity Market share (traffic) Revenue share
Absolute n of nonstop Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3incumbent
No Entrant 0% 61% 39% 0% 75% 25% 0%
3x15 50% 46% 31% 23% 48% 19% 33%
3x25 83% 42% 22% 36% 45% 14% 41%
3x30 100% 41% 18% 41% 44% 12% 44%
3x50 167% 39% 6% 55% 42% 5% 53%
Table 5.14: Market and revenue share by airline - Scenario 1
In conclusion, in Scenario 1, both incumbent carriers suffer from Airline 3's entry in the market. Airline 1
remains competitive and ahead of Airline 3 in terms of revenues as long its capacity is greater than that of
Airline 3. In addition, between the two head-to-head nonstop carriers (airlines 1 and 3), the airline with
the greater capacity has the lower average fare, which remains higher than that of Airline 2, which mostly
carries low-fare passengers unable to get their initial choice of carrier for lack of availability. Finally,
upon entry the nonstop incumbent carrier's average fare and revenue numbers decrease compared to
Scenario 0, as shown in Table 5.15.
-118-
Chapter 5
150$180
$160
$140
$120
$100
$80
$60
0%
-+-Airline 1
-- - Airline 2
AAirline 3
---x- -- Average
x- -- X- - - X -
---- 
-
200%
Simulation of Entry in a Competitive Environment: The Single Market Case
Airline 1 (nonstop inc.) Entrant capacity: absolute
% change 3x15 3x25(50%) (83%)
Revenues -31% -33%
Traffic 3% -1%
Avq. Fare -33% -32%
(% of nonstop
3x30
(100%)
-34%
-2%
-32%
Table 5.15: Scenario 1 - relative effect of entry on traditional measures of airline performance for Airline 1
compared to Scenario 0
Table 5.16 shows the details of the impact of entry on daily traffic,
market share and revenue share for the nonstop incumbent carrier
numbers in the case where there is
Scenario 1
No Entrant
(Sc. 0)
3x1 5
3x25
3x30
3x50
Airline
NS Incumbent
NS Incumbent
New Entrant
NS Incumbent
New Entrant
NS Incumbent
New Entrant
NS Incumbent
New Entrant
average
and the
fare, revenues, load factors,
new entrant, as well as the
no new entrant competition.
Pax/Day
75
77
38
74
63
73
74
72
101
Avg Fare
$160.07
$107.67
$153.39
$108.41
$115.63
$108.27
$108.25
$107.22
$97.30
Revenues
$12,003
$8,307
$5,774
$8,063
$7,279
$7,951
$7,957
$7,709
$9,811
ALF
83%
86%
84%
83%
84%
82%
82%
80%
67%
Market RevenueMarket
Share
61%
46%
23%
42%
36%
41%
41%
39%
55%
Revenue
Share
75%
48%
33%
45%
41%
44%
44%
42%
53%
With low capacity, the new entrant carrier's average market fare is substantially higher (42%) than the
average fare on the nonstop incumbent carrier. This is a direct consequence of the combination of lower
capacity and fare class revenue management on the new entrant. As the new entrant's capacity increases,
its average fare decreases, until incumbent and new entrant reach the same capacity when the new
entrant's average fare decreases to the level of the incumbent's average fare. As the new entrant's
capacity keeps increasing, its average fare further decreases. The nonstop incumbent carrier's average
fare, after having sharply decreased following entry, initially increases very slowly, as the new entrant
captures more traffic, and relatively more low fare traffic (as supplies of high-fare traffic decrease), and
diverts a few low-fare passengers away from Airline 1. The result is a slight increase in average fare. As
the new entrant's capacity increases even more, dilution of traffic begins to appear, which explains the
slight decrease in average fare on the nonstop incumbent and more apparent decrease on the new entrant.
Even in this scenario with symmetric pricing and schedules, we observe that relative new entrant capacity
plays a very important role in the observed effect of entry on aggregate measures of airline performance.
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incumbent)
3x50
(167%)
-36%
-2%
-33%
Table 5.16: Scenario 1 summary table
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Average fares, revenues and loads are greatly affected by the new entrant's capacity, without any change
in pricing on the incumbent carriers.
Scenario 2: Entry with a Single Unrestricted Low-Fare Priced $10 Lower than the Q Fare in
Scenario 0
Characteristics
In this scenario, we also assume that the new entrant carrier offers three daily nonstop flights that directly
compete with the nonstop incumbent carrier's flights. In this case, however, the new entrant carrier only
offers a single unrestricted low-fare priced $10 below the Q fare in Scenario 0. As was the case in
Scenario 1, the incumbent carriers always match this fare, at least in their most restricted Q class.
As in Scenario 1, the new entrant carrier has various aircraft capacity options. Since the new entrant
carrier only offers a single fare class, it does not use revenue management and allocates seats in a first-
come first-served (FCFS) manner. Both incumbent carriers still use fare class revenue management
(FCRM).
Given the low-fare structure used by the new entrant carriers, the incumbent carriers now have the options
of either matching the new low fare only their Q class, or of fully matching the entrant's fare structure by
offering a single unrestricted low-fare priced at the same level as the new entrant's fare. We will thus
either refer to Scenario 2 with limited match (LM), reflecting the fact that the incumbent carriers lowered
their Q fare in response to the entrant's unrestricted low fare but maintained their standard fare structure
and restrictions, or Scenario 2 with full match (FM), reflecting the fact that the incumbent carriers fully
matched the new entrant's unrestricted fare structure. The notation will reflect the LM or FM as a
subscript index. For example, Scenario 2'0 refers to the Scenario 2 with three flights with 50-seat
capacity on the new entrant, where the incumbent carriers fully match the fare structure on the new
entrant. Table 5.17 summarizes the details of Scenario 2 characteristics.
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Scenario 2LM/FM Frequency Fares by Fare Class Revenue
& Capacity Y B M Q Management
LM $261 $135 $92 $53 FCRMAirline 1 Nntp33
FM $53 Not offered Not offered Not offered Not Applicable
LM $261 $135 $92 $53 FCRMAirline 2Concig 30
FM $53 Not offered Not offered Not offered Not Applicable
Airline 3 Nonstop 3x1 5-25-30 $53 Not offered Not offered Not offered Not Applicable(New Entrant) or 50
Table 5.17: Scenario 2 summary (including Limited Match and Full Match sub-scenarios)
Note that again, we can omit the sub and superscripts in the notation so as to refer to the entire class of
scenarios, regardless of the capacity on the new entrant and response of the incumbents.
Simulation Results
Scenario 21 M
In this case, we assume that the incumbent carriers maintain their existing standard fare structure and
match the new entrant's fare only in their most restricted fare class (Q). As previously described, the new
entrant carrier comes in with three daily nonstop flights scheduled at the exact same time as that of the
nonstop incumbent.
Focusing on market level impacts of entry, we first note that revenues increase upon entry, but
comparatively much less than in Scenario 1. Even though Scenario 2 LM revenues are higher than Scenario
0 revenues, they decrease with increasing entrant capacity, and, in the case of Scenario 2' , revenues are
back down to levels comparable to those of Scenario 0 (Table 5.18). Looking at revenues by fare class, it
appears that upon entry, revenues generated by Y class passengers increase but those generated by B, M
and Q class passengers decrease. Market level Y class revenues are also affected by the fact that Airline
3's Y class fare is much lower than that of Airline 1, in Scenario 2 LM-
There is an initial increase in load factor between Scenario 0 and scenarios 2' and 2 2 but, as capacity
on the new entrant increases, average load factors decrease and drop below Scenario 0 levels.
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Sc. 2 LM Loads Revenues Avg. Avg.
Load
Entrant Cap. Total Y B M Q Total Y B M Q Fare Factor
0(0%) 122 35 13 12 62 $15,914 $9,061 $1,798 $1,150 $3,286 $130 68.0%
3x15 (50%) 168 75 11 8 73 $16,534 $10,342 $1,541 $770 $3,881 $98 74.7%
3x25(83%) 177 102 10 6 59 $16,411 $11,359 $1,350 $591 $3,111 $93 69.5%
3x30 (loo%) 181 115 9 6 50 $16,291 $11,839 $1,257 $523 $2,672 $90 67.0%
3x50 (167%) 194 163 6 3 21 $15,485 $13,200 $853 $291 $1,141 $80 58.9%
Table 5.18: Scenario 2 LM market loads and revenues by fare class, average market fare and load factor
At the airline level, Table 5.19 shows that Airline l's revenues decrease substantially following entry.
But, compared to Scenario 1, Airline l's revenues are higher in the case of entry under Scenario 2 LM
assumptions (Figure 5.10), except at high new entrant capacity where diversion and revenue dilution is
such that revenues on Airline 1 decrease beyond those of Scenario 150.
0
$13,000
$12,000 -
$11,000 -
8 $10,000 -
I $9,000 -
$8,000
$7,000 -
$6,000 -
0%
45
Entrant Cap. (asolute)
75 90 150
* Scenario 1
" Scenario 2LM
0
N%
50% 83% 100%
Entrant Cap. (% of NS Inc.)
167%
Figure 5.10: Airline 1 revenues under Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 LM
The explanation for the decrease in Airline 1 revenues as the new entrant's capacity increases is the same
as in Scenario 1: Upon entry, Airline 3 diverts some of Airline 1's passengers and revenues. The
explanation for the relatively smaller loss in revenues in Scenario 2 LM (at entrant capacity levels below 50
seats) as compared to Scenario 1 lies in the fact that Airline 3 offers a single fare. As mentioned before,
this implies that Airline 3 cannot perform revenue management (since passengers cannot be
differentiated) and is accepting passengers on a first-come, first-served basis. As a result, Airline 3 tends
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to fill-up with relatively more "naturally low-fare" passengers, and therefore diverts fewer full-fare
passengers from Airline 1. That is, Airline 3 fills up with early-booking passengers, who are traditionally
price sensitive passengers. Airline 3 thus fills up relatively sooner than Airline 1 which can protect seats
for later-booking, high-fare passengers. At high entrant capacity, the diversion is such that numerous
passengers travel on Airline 3, which leads to great dilution of revenues from Airline l's high fare classes
towards Airline 3's single fare class, ultimately leading to total market revenue losses compared to
Scenario 0.
Scenario 2 LM Absolute % of nonstop Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Total
capacity incumbent
No Entrant 0 0% $12,003 $3,910 $15,914
3x1 5 45 50% $10,905 $3,258 $2,371 $16,534
3x25 75 83% $9,970 $2,524 $3,917 $16,411
3x30 90 100% $9,458 $2,158 $4,675 $16,291
3x50 150 167% $7,026 $937 $7,521 $15,485
Table 5.19: Scenario 2 LM revenues by airline
With respect to loads, Airline 1 suffers from entry in all classes, and increasingly so as the entrant's
capacity increases. The greatest relative impact of entry occurs in the intermediate fare classes B and M,
because they have the smaller absolute loads. In absolute terms, the greatest impact occurs in Y class,
followed by M, B and finally Q class. All fare classes are affected by entry as follows: Upon entry,
passengers who were formerly traveling on Airline 1 are now given the opportunity to book an
unrestricted fare on Airline 3, at a much lower price. Given this choice, all passengers will generally
prefer to travel on Airline 3. Capacity constraints, however, limit the number of seats available on the new
entrant, which consequently affects the opportunities for Airline l's passengers to be diverted towards the
new entrant. In addition, since Airline 1 is forecasting late-booking, high fare passengers in its revenue
management system, it is able to protect seats for these passengers, and while Airline 3 fills up with early-
booking lower fare traffic, Airline 1 limits the impacts of entry on higher fare class loads. At high new
entrant capacity, the greater availability of the lower unrestricted fare on the new entrant leads to a
widespread decrease in loads from all fare classes on Airline 1.
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Entrant cap. Airline 1 Loads Relative Decrease (compared to Sc. 0)(% of
nonstop inc.) Total Y B M Q ALF Total Y B M Q
No Entrant 75 30.4 12.7 11.4 20.5 83%
3x15 (50%) 68 29.1 11.2 8.1 19.6 76% -9% -4% -11% -29% -5%
3x25 (83%) 62 27.0 9.8 6.2 19.0 69% -17% -11% -22% -45% -7%
3x30 (100%) 59 25.9 9.2 5.5 18.0 65% -22% -15% -28% -52% -12%
3x50 (167%) 41 20.3 6.2 3.1 11.4 46% -45% -33% -51% -73% -44%
Table 5.20: Scenario 2LM - Airline 1 loads by fare class and relative load variation compared to Scenario 0
Airline 3's revenues increase with its capacity and are lower than in the case of Scenario 1. This result is
expected since Airline 3 offers a single low-fare which leads to a lower average fare ($53 in Scenario 2 LM
compared to $97-$153 in Scenario 1 depending on the capacity on the new entrant). This lower average
fare, despite greater loads, still leads to lower revenues. In addition, the increase in entrant revenues (with
increasing entrant capacity) is also accompanied by a decrease in entrant RASM, from $0.186 to $0.177
at the extremes of tested entrant capacity).
As shown in Figure 5.11, airline-level average fares are affected differently by entry. Indeed, Airline 3's
average fare remains constant at $53, given the new entrant's choice of a pricing structure. Airline l's
average fare is relatively unaffected by entry, but tends to increase as new entrant capacity increases. The
relative stability of Airline 1's average market fare can be explained by the fact that entry leads to
diversion of traffic from all of Airline l's fare classes in comparable numbers, which therefore has
minimal effect on Airline 1's average market fare. As new entrant capacity increases, relatively more
traffic gets diverted from Airline l's lower fare classes (since Airline 3 has more capacity and is not
forecasting late booking, high fare passengers), thus leading to a slight increase in Airline l's average
fare. Airline 2's average fare initially decreases upon entry and increases afterwards as new entrant
capacity increases, and the new entrant begins diverting low-fare traffic from Airline 2. The average
market fare, on the other hand, decreases after entry. This is a consequence of the shift in passengers
between airlines and more precisely from Airline 1 to Airline 3: More passengers booking on Airline 3 at
a lower average fare has the effect of decreasing the average market fare, even though none of the
airlines' average fares change very much.
-124-
Simulation of Entry in a Competitive Environment: The Single Market Case
U.
$180
$160
$140
$120
$100
$80
$60
$40
Entrant Cap. (absolute)
45 75 90
0% 50% 100% 1
Entrant Cap. (% of NS Inc.)
150
50% 200%
Figure 5.11: Average fare by airline as a function of entrant capacity - Scenario 2LM
Finally, the effect of entry on the market and revenue shares of Airline 1 is a negative one: The impact on
Airline l's market share is greater than it is on revenue shares in this case (unlike in Scenario 1). As new
entrant capacity increase, Airline 1's market share decreases substantially, while Airline 1's revenue share
remains greater than 45%. The explanation lies again in the fact that Airline 3 offers only a single low-
fare.
Entrant cap: absolute Market Share (Traffic) Revenue Share
(% of nonstop incumbent) Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3
No Entrant (0%) 61% 39% 0% 75% 25% 0%
3x15 (50%) 40% 33% 27% 66% 20% 14%
3x25 (83%) 35% 23% 42% 61% 15% 24%
3x30 (100%) 32% 19% 49% 58% 13% 29%
3x50 (167%) 21% 6% 73% 45% 6% 49%
Table 5.21: Market and revenue shares by airline - Scenario 2 LM
In summary, in the case of entry with Scenario 2 LM, the incumbent carrier's revenues and loads are
negatively affected by low-fare entry. The average fare of the nonstop incumbent appears to remain
relatively constant following entry, and if anything, to increase slightly as the entrant's capacity increases,
as more and more low-fare passengers are diverted from the nonstop incumbent towards the new entrant,
as shown in Table 5.22.
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Airline 1 Entrant capacity: absolute (% of nonstop inc)
%change 3x15 3x25 3x30 3x50(50%) (83%) (100%) (167%)
Revenues -9% -17% -21% -41%
Traffic -9% -17% -22% -22%
Avg. Fare 0% 0% 1% 7%
Table 5.22: Scenario 2 LM - effect of entry on traditional measures of airline performance (revenues, traffic
and average fares) for Airline 1 compared to Scenario 0
Market Revenue
Scenario 2LM Airline Pax/Day Avg Fare Revenues ALF Share Share
No Entrant NS Incumbent 75 $160.07 $12,003 83% 61% 75%(Sc. 0)
NS Incumbent 68 $160.37 $10,905 76% 40% 66%
Ux15 New Entrant 45 $53.09 $2,371 99% 27% 14%
325 NS Incumbent 62 $160.66 $9,970 69% 35% 61%New Entrant 74 $53.09 $3,917 98% 42% 24%
33 NS Incumbent 59 $161.52 $9,458 65% 32% 58%New Entrant 88 $53.09 $4,675 98% 49% 29%
NS Incumbent 41 $171.52 $7,026 46% 21% 45%
Ux50 New Entrant 142 $53.09 $7,521 94% 73% 49%
Table 5.23: Scenario 2 LM summary table
Table 5.23 shows the impact of entry on traffic, average fare, revenues, load factors, market and revenue
shares for the nonstop incumbent and the new entrant carrier. In particular, it illustrates the very high load
factors on the new entrant carrier when it offers a single unrestricted low-fare while the incumbent
carriers maintain a standard fare structure. The new entrant's market share is severely constrained at low
capacity, and, as its capacity increases, the new entrant quickly garners a large share of traffic, with as
high as 73% market share at 3x50 capacity.
These results show (as we discuss in Section 5.2.4) that the pricing structure of the new entrant, along
with its capacity, have a great impact on aggregate measures of Airline 1's performance. For example, the
average fare on Airline 1 is affected quite differently than in Scenario 1, even though the response of the
incumbent carriers to entry was the same, that is, they only matched the lowest available fare in the
market (with restrictions). Similarly, the effect on revenues and traffic is also quite different.
Scenario 2 Fm
The incumbent carriers now match the new entrant's unrestricted low fare structure (priced at $53) and
shift from the structured fares to the exact same fare structure as the new entrant carrier, as described
earlier.
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Sc. 2 FM Loads Revenues Avg. Avg.
Fare LoadEntrant Cap. Total Y B M Q Total Y B M Q Factor
0(0%) 122 35 13 12 62 $15,914 $9,061 $1,798 $1,150 $3,286 $130 68.0%
3x15 (50%) 195 195 0 0 0 $10,354 $10,354 $0 $0 $0 $53 86.7%
3x25(83%) 210 210 0 0 0 $11,172 $11,172 $0 $0 $0 $53 82.5%
3x30 (100%) 217 217 0 0 0 $11,508 $11,508 $0 $0 $0 $53 80.3%
3x50 (167%) 234 234 0 0 0 $12,449 $12,449 $0 $0 $0 $53 71.1%
Table 5.24: Scenario 2 FM market loads and revenues by fare class, average market fare and load factor
As shown in Table 5.24, when all carriers match the fare structure on the new entrant, total market loads
increase compared to Scenario 0, and increasingly so with increasing new entrant capacity. Furthermore,
the passenger mix shifts completely to Y class - the single fare class now offered in the market.
Compared to any of the other scenarios studied so far, Scenario 2 FM has the highest loads. However, recall
that while passengers all purchase Y class, they pay far less than they used to, as shown in Table 5.24.
This explains the decrease in total market revenues compared to Scenario 0: In previously discussed
scenarios (0, 1 and 2 LM) total market revenues increased compared to Scenario 0, whereas in this scenario,
they decrease. Within Scenario 2 FM, revenues increase with new entrant capacity, but remain lower than
Scenario O's total market revenues (-20% to -35%). In addition, average load factors increase compared to
Scenario 0 but decrease with increasing entrant capacity compared to Scenario 2", as total market
capacity increases faster than traffic.
At the airline level, we note that Airline I's revenues decrease by more than 50% upon entry in Scenario
2 FM, compared to Scenario 0 (c.f. Table 5.25), and continue to decrease slightly as a function of increasing
entrant capacity. The greatest impact on revenues is the impact of entry combined with the lower fares (-
62% relative to Scenario 0, as shown in Table 5.28), followed by a smaller impact of increasing new
entrant capacity on Airline 1 revenues. The lesser impact of increasing new entrant capacity (compared to
the initial effect of entry) is due to the fact that the initial effect of entry includes the change in fares on
the incumbent carriers. Furthermore, there is a surplus in total demand such that even when the new
entrant's capacity increases, there remain enough passengers willing to travel to still fill up both airlines'
planes. In addition, since all carriers are offering the same fare structure, passengers continue to book on
both nonstop carriers. A similar conclusion applies to Airline l's loads (c.f. Table 5.26), in that after
entry, since the fare has dropped substantially on the nonstop incumbent carrier, both in terms of lowest
fare available and in terms of unrestricted fare, loads increase between Scenario 0 and Scenario 2 1 and
then tend to decrease slightly when capacity increases on Airline 3. Finally, the average fare on Airline 1
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naturally drops to the single available fare, $53 while Airline l's average load
in Scenario 0 to over 90% in Scenario 2 FM, regardless of entrant capacity.
factor increases from 83%
Scenario 2 FM Absolute % of nonstop Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Totalcapacity incumbent
No Entrant 0 0% $12,003 $3,910 $15,914
3x15 45 50% $4,516 $3,510 $2,328 $10,354
3x25 75 83% $4,418 $3,013 $3,740 $11,172
3x30 90 100% $4,383 $2,742 $4,382 $11,508
3x50 150 167% $4,331 $1,689 $6,428 $12,449
Table 5.25: Scenario 2 FM revenues by airline
Entrant cap. Airline 1 Loads Airline 3 Loads
(% of
nonstop inc.) Total Y B M Q ALF Total Y B M Q ALF
No Entrant 75 30.4 12.7 11.4 20.5 83%
3x15 (50%) 85 85.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 95% 44 43.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 97%
3x25 (83%) 83 83.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 92% 70 70.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 94%
3x30 (100%) 83 82.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 92% 83 82.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 92%
3x50(167%) 82 81.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 91% 121 121.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 81%
Table 5.26: Loads by airline and fare class - Scenario 2 FM
On the new entrant (Airline 3), the picture is similar because all carriers in the market have the same fare
structure. In terms of passenger loads, however, the airline with the greater capacity gets the higher
market share. When the new entrant carrier has less capacity, it gets less traffic than Airline 1; when it has
the same capacity, both carriers have similar traffic numbers; and when Airline 3 offers more capacity
than Airline 1, it then carries more passengers. Table 5.27 shows the detail of market share and revenue
share by carrier, and the fact that again, revenue shares are more affected than market share on Airline 1,
as revenue shares were higher in Scenario 0. Since both airlines are offering a single fare structure, they
have the same average market fare, and each airline consequently has equal market and revenue share.
These results are a consequence of the symmetry of the pricing structure of the competing nonstop
carriers, as well as the lack of differentiation between these carriers with respect to revenue management,
and reflect expected competitive results under perfectly symmetric competitive offers between the two
competing carriers.
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Entrant cap: absolute
(% of nonstop incumbent)
No Entrant (0%)
3x15 (50%)
3x25 (83%)
3x30 (100%)
3x50 (167%)
Market Share (Traffic)
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3
61% 39% 0%
44% 34% 22%
40% 27% 33%
38% 24% 38%
35% 14% 52%
Revenue Share
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3
75% 25% 0%
44% 34% 22%
40% 27% 33%
38% 24% 38%
35% 14% 52%
Table 5.27: Market and revenue share by airline - Scenario 2 FM
In summary, entry has somewhat different effects in the case of Scenario 2 FM: Airline 1 traffic increases
compared to Scenario 0 and is less affected by entrant capacity than was the case previously. However,
while traffic does increase, revenues decrease substantially for Airline 1 and at the total market level,
compared to pre-entry levels, as summarized in Table 5.28.
Airline 1 Entrant capacity: absolute (% of nonstop inc)
3x15 3x25 3x30 3x50
% change (50%) (83%) (100%) (167%)
Revenues -62% -63% -63% -64%
Traffic 13% 11% 10% 10%
Avg. Fare -67% -67% -67% -67%
Table 5.28: Scenario 2 FM - effect of entry on traditional measures of performance for Airline 1 compared to
Scenario 0
Scenario 2FM
No Entrant
(Sc. 0)
3x1 5
3x25
3x30
3x50
Airline
NS Incumbent
NS Incumbent
New Entrant
NS Incumbent
New Entrant
NS Incumbent
New Entrant
NS Incumbent
New Entrant
Pax/Day
75
85
44
83
70
83
83
82
121
Avg Fare
$160.07
$53.09
$53.09
$53.09
$53.09
$53.09
$53.09
$53.09
$53.09
Revenues
$12,003
$4,516
$2,328
$4,418
$3,740
$4,383
$4,382
$4,331
$6.428
ALF
83%
95%
97%
92%
94%
92%
92%
91%
81%
Market
Share
61%
44%
22%
40%
33%
38%
38%
35%
52%
Revenue
Share
75%
44%
22%
40%
33%
38%
38%
35%
52%
Table 5.29: Scenario 2 FM summary table
Table 5.29 shows the impact of entry in the case of Scenario 2 FM, and highlights the effect of capacity on
revenues, loads, market and revenue share, when both the nonstop incumbent and the new entrant carrier
offer a single unrestricted low-fare. In particular, the carrier with the greater capacity achieves the higher
revenues, traffic, revenue share and market share, but the lower average load factor.
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This scenario illustrates the impact of a full match response to a new entrant coming in with a single low-
fare. It shows the impact of the full match response on incumbent traffic and revenues, and in particular
that the increase in incumbent traffic comes at the expense of revenues, as a consequence of low-fare
entry in the market. Relative to Scenario 2 LM, Airline 1 suffers greater revenue losses, but increases its
share of post-entry local traffic. We discuss in more detail the effect of incumbent response to entry in
Section 5.2.4.
Scenario 3: Entry with a Two-Tier Fare Structure
Characteristics
In this last scenario, the new entrant carrier still offers the same schedule as the nonstop incumbent
carrier, but with a two-tier fare structure as follows (c.f. Table 5.30):
1. Fully unrestricted Y class fare set at $135 (the same fare as the B class fare on the incumbent
carrier in Scenario 0, or 48% lower than the incumbents' baseline Y fare)
2. Restricted M class fare (roundtrip and Saturday night stay requirements with 14 days advance
purchase) priced $10 below the Q fare in Scenario 0 at $53
Restrictions
Fare Class Fare Roundtrip Saturday Non Advance
Requirement Night Stay Ref undable Purchase
Y $135 No No No No
M $53 Yes Yes No 14 days
Table 5.30: Two-tier fare structure details
In this scenario, there is once again a set of sub-scenarios, defined by the variability in the entrant's
aircraft capacity, and indicated as previously by a superscript index, and the response of the incumbent
carriers who once again have the option to maintain a standard fare structure with a lower Q fare
reflecting the $10 decrease or of fully matching the two-tier structure on the new entrant carrier.
The notation will therefore either not mention any sub-setting, which thus designates the entire class of
Scenario 3, or reflect all or part of these sub-scenarios indices. For example, Scenario 3 30 refers to
Scenario 3 with 30 seats per aircraft on the new entrant and full match of the fare structure by the
incumbent. Scenario 3 FM refers to the entire set of scenarios where the new entrant uses a two-tier fare
structure matched by the incumbent carriers, all carriers using FCRM, at all capacity levels tested on the
new entrant (15, 25, 30 and 50 seats per aircraft).
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Scenario3LM/FM Service Frequency Fares by Fare Class Revenue
& Capacity Y B M Q Management
LM $261 $135 $92 $53
Airline 1 Nonstop 3x30 FCRM
FM $135 Not offered $53 Not offered
LM $261 $135 $92 $53
Airline 2 Connecting 3x30 FCRM
FM $135 Not offered $53 Not offered
Airline a Nonstop 3x1 5-25-30 $135 Not offered $53 Not offered FCRM(New Entrant) Nntpor 50
Table 5.31: Scenario 3 summary (including Limited Match and Full Match sub-scenarios)
Simulation Results
Scenario 31 m
Table 5.32 shows a summary of some of the measures characterizing the impact of entry, at the market
level (i.e. summed or averaged over all three airlines operating in the market). We first note that total
market revenues vary slowly after entry and tend to increase slightly (up to 3.5% increase between
Scenario 3 and Scenario 37 5) with entrant capacity (after initially decreasing by 4.3% compared to
Scenario 0). This differs from scenarios 1 and 2 where revenues increased or decreased more noticeably.
The impact on revenues is due to the combined effect of the new entrant carrier offering only two fares
priced lower than comparable fare classes on the incumbent carriers and stimulation in overall demand
(due to the lower Q class fare). The result is a change in passenger mix at the market level: Passengers
revise their fare class preference following entry and the introduction of the new entrant's fares, priced
relatively lower than similar fares on the incumbent carrier. More intuitively, since less restricted fare
classes are now cheaper on the new entrant, more passengers are likely to purchase these less restricted
fare classes and to switch to the new entrant. In addition, the change in passenger mix is accompanied by
a decrease in the average fare paid within Y, M and Q classes. For example, passengers buying Y class on
Airline 1 pay more than passengers booking in the same fare class on the new entrant carrier (as shown in
Table 5.31), which affects the average fare paid by fare class at the market level. In B class, however, the
fare remains the same (since the new entrant does not offer a B class fare, and the fare has not changed on
the incumbent carriers).
The re-distribution of passengers among fare classes (a.k.a. change in passenger mix) combined with the
low-fare traffic stimulation generated by a lower Q class fare, lead to a decrease in the average market
fare, an increase in total traffic, an initial increase in average load factor followed by a decrease in load
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factor (as new entrant capacity increases), and a slow increase in total market revenues (after an initial
decrease following entry), as shown in Table 5.32.
Note that B class traffic almost entirely disappears, as it shifts to Y class on Airline 3: Indeed, former B
class passengers have very little incentive to continue to buy B class, as long as Y class on Airline 3 is
available, since there are fewer restrictions and advance purchase requirements on Y class, while the fare
is the same as B class on the incumbents. M class on the new entrant carrier is priced at the same fare
level as Q class on the incumbent carriers and is thus more attractive to leisure passengers, as it has fewer
restrictions and advance purchase requirements than Q class on the incumbent carriers. Airline 3 is
however using revenue management and therefore more likely to close down M class to keep seats
available in its Y class for later-booking passengers who generate more revenues. As a consequence,
passengers who would be interested in M class on Airline 3 are likely to be turned down (at lower entrant
capacity) when requesting a seat, and thus to book on airlines 1 and 2. This explains the increase in Q
class loads following entry, as well as the initial decrease in M class loads.
Sc. 3 LM Loads Revenues Avg. Avg.
Fae LoadEntrant Cap. Total Y B M Q Total Y B M Q Fare Factor
0(0%) 122 35 13 12 62 $15,914 $9,061 $1,798 $1,150 $3,286 $130 68.0%
3x15(50%) 163 54 2 7 100 $15,237 $9,037 $292 $590 $5,318 $94 72.4%
3x25 (83%) 178 57 0 20 100 $15,247 $8,689 $51 $1,196 $5,311 $86 69.6%
3x30 (100%) 182 57 0 33 90 $15,420 $8,680 $46 $1,894 $4,800 $85 67.2%
3x50 (167%) 190 58 0 83 49 $15,775 $8,671 $28 $4,484 $2,592 $83 57.7%
Table 5.32: Scenario 3 LM total market loads and revenues by fare class, average market fare and load factor
At the airline level, we note that Airline l's revenues are severely impacted by entry, as shown in Table
5.33. In the case of Scenario 3 15 Airline 1's revenues decrease by 48% compared to Scenario 0, and the
decrease in revenues becomes increasingly severe as the new entrant's capacity increases. At the highest
capacity on the new entrant (3x50), the relative decrease in Airline 1's revenues reaches 72% of Scenario
0 revenues. The explanation for the decrease in Airline 1 revenues lies in the fact that Airline 3 is:
1. Offering more attractive Y and M products than airlines 1 and 2
2. Differentiating between Y and M class products
Practicing revenue management to maximize Y class loads, consequently increasing the revenue
diversion from Airline 1 towards Airline 3 - unlike the previous case (Scenario 2) where Airline 3 was
offering a single fare product and therefore not using revenue management.
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As a result, Airline 1 loses most of its Y, B and M class traffic to the new entrant: Former Y (resp. M)
class passengers now see more utility in purchasing a cheaper unrestricted Y (resp. M) class fare on the
new entrant; similarly, former B (resp. Q) class passengers now prefer a less restricted Y (resp. M) class
ticket for the price of B (resp. Q) class on Airline 1. In addition, as Airline 3 is now differentiating
between Y and M class passengers, it is able to revenue-manage its seats and ensure that Y class seats
remain available for later-booking higher-fare passengers, hence further allowing former Y and B class
passengers on Airline 1 to book on Airline 3. This increases the amount of revenue diversion from Airline
1. Stimulation of low-fare demand (through the new lowest market fare) allows the nonstop incumbent
carrier to initially maintain (and even increase) its loads in Q class. In the case of Scenario 350 , the high
capacity on the new entrant carrier leads higher availability of M class seats on the new entrant and thus
to the diversion of Q class passengers from the nonstop incumbent carrier.
Scenario 3 LM Absolute % of nonstop Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3 Totalcapacity incumbent
No Entrant 0 0% $12,003 $3,910 $15,914
3x15 45 50% $6,197 $3,628 $5,412 $15,237
3x25 75 83% $4,794 $2,847 $7,606 $15,247
3x30 90 100% $4,559 $2,466 $8,395 $15,420
3x50 150 167% $3,370 $1,033 $11,372 $15,775
Table 5.33: Revenues by airline as a function of new entrant capacity - Scenario 3 LM
Figure 5.12 shows the impact of entry on revenues by fare class on Airline 1, and highlights the decrease
in revenues from upper classes (Y, B and M). Figure 5.12 also shows the change in revenues in Q class,
and in particular the initial increase in Q class revenues following entry. In this case, as Airline 3 diverts
higher fare class traffic from Airline 1, the nonstop incumbent finds itself with more seats available in the
lower fare classes. These seats fill-up with lower-fare passengers (because of demand stimulation), which
explains the revenue increase in Q class. As we discuss later on, the increased availability in Q class is
created by the revenue management system.
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Figure 5.12: Airline 1 revenues by fare class pre- and post-entry - Scenario 3 LM
As shown in Figure 5.13, the average fare on Airline 1 decreases sharply upon entry, as a result of the
traffic diversion described earlier, but it is also interesting to note that the average fare starts increasing in
the case of Scenario 350 (compared to3 30 ). This is a consequence of the large capacity on the new
entrant, and the fact that Airline 3 now begins to divert passengers from all classes, rather than only the
higher fare classes. The result is that the mix on Airline 1 shifts back towards the higher fare classes,
which is reflected in the average fare (c.f. Figure 5.13).
Finally, average load factors are also severely impacted by entry and decrease from 83% to as low as 47%
on Airline 1 in Scenario 35L, , as shown in Table 5.34.
We must here discuss the shift in passengers between incumbent carriers as well. Indeed, looking at
Airline l's revenues and passenger loads, we observed that Q class loads increase slowly post-entry. This
relatively slow increase is somewhat striking in that one would have expected a much greater impact on
Airline 1's Q class loads due to both the stimulation of low-fare traffic and the diversion of passengers
from Airline 1 towards Airline 3. However, the initial impact of entry leads to an increase in Q class loads
mostly on Airline 2 and not on Airline 1, as would have been expected (c.f. Table 5.34).
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Entrant cap. Airline 1 Loads Airline 2 Loads(% of
nonstop inc.) Total Y B M Q ALF Total Y B M Q ALF
No Entrant 75 30.4 12.7 11.4 20.5 83% 47 4.3 0.6 1.1 41.4 53%
3x15 (50%) 56 13.7 2.1 5.6 34.0 62% 67 0.4 0.0 0.1 66.1 74%
3x25 (83%) 64 6.0 0.3 3.2 54.5 71% 48 1.4 0.1 0.5 45.6 53%
3x30 (100%) 61 5.7 0.3 2.8 52.3 68% 40 1.5 0.0 0.4 38.1 45%
3x50 (167%) 42 4.9 0.2 2.0 35.2 47% 15 1.1 0.0 0.1 13.6 17%
Table 5.34: Airline 1 and 2 loads by fare class - Scenario 3 LM
Table 5.35 shows passenger preferences by passenger type for Scenario 3 - business or leisure, and
more specifically the aggregated first choice of passengers, for example the total number of business
passengers whose first choice is Y class on Airline 3 (59), and whether these passengers got their first
choice or at least their first choice airline and class, but not flight. In our example of 59 business
passengers whose first choice is Y class on Airline 3, only 33 of these passengers get Y class on Airline 3
and on the flight of interest, while an additional 5 passengers get Y class on another flight on Airline 3 but
not Y class on the flight of interest.
As apparent when looking at passenger choice statistics, upon entry, passengers prefer Airline 3, and it is
natural to infer that business passengers prefer Airline 3's Y class while leisure travelers prefer Airline 3's
M class. We expect that passengers will always prefer Airline 3 to any other airline, since fares are lower
on Airline 3 for the same restrictions and advance purchase requirements. However, because of capacity
constraints on Airline 3, only 56% of passengers wanting to book Y class on Airline 3 (and 0.3% of those
interested in M class) get their first choice. The remaining passengers get redistributed between airlines 1
and 2 and the "NoGo" alternative.
Meanwhile, as Airline 1 still observes traffic in its higher fare classes, the revenue management system
continues to protect Airline l's higher fare classes to make sure that seats remain available for later-
booking passengers. On Airline 2, however, there is no such protection (because bookings are low), thus
leading to more availability of low fare classes (Q in particular).
The added effect of very limited availability in M class on Airline 3, limited availability in Q class on
Airline 1, both because of revenue management controls, and the greater availability of Q class on Airline
2 (also because of revenue management controls), leads to an increase in Q class loads on Airline 2,
compared to Scenario 0, in Scenario 3M . As new entrant capacity increases, the loads in Q class (and on
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2 in general) start decreasing and eventually drop below those of Scenario 0, as the new entrant is
accommodate more of its first choice traffic, particularly in M class.
Pax
Type Airline Class
First Choice
Obs/Day
Get First
Choice
Get First Choice
Airline/Class but not Flight
1 Y/B/M/Q 0 0 0
2 Y/B/M/Q 0 0 0
a)C 3 Y 59 33 5
B
M M 0 0 0
Q
1 Y/B/M/Q 1 0 0
2 Y/B/M/Q 0 0 0
3 Y 2 2 0
B 0 0 0
M 148 0 1
Q 0 0 0
Table 5.35: Scenario 3 passenger preference and choice, by passenger type
On Airline 3, at low capacity, passengers book mostly in Y class, given its fewer restrictions and lesser
fare. As capacity increases, passenger mix shifts towards the lower fare class as more passengers get
diverted from airlines 1 and 2, as shown in Table 5.36 (since Airline 3 is able to accommodate more
traffic).
As a result of this change in passenger mix as the new entrant's capacity increases, Airline 3's average
fare decreases, contrary to that of Airline 1 which increases with the entrant's capacity.
Entrant cap.
(% of
nonstop inc.)
3x1 5 (50%)
3x25 (83%)
3x30 (100%)
3x50 (167%)
Total
41
66
80
133
Y
39.6
49.9
50.3
52.4
Airline 3 Loads
B M
0.0 1.2
0.0 16.1
0.0 30.1
0.0 80.8
Q
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
ALF
91%
88%
89%
89%
Table 5.36: New entrant loads by fare class as a function of new entrant capacity - Scenario 3 LM
Finally, looking at average fares by airline, we observe that in this case, Airline 3 has the highest average
fare regardless of the capacity settings tested here. As new entrant capacity increases, however, the
differential between the new entrant's average fare and that of the incumbent carrier decreases.
Furthermore, as capacity on the new entrant increases, the fare differential initially increases between the
two nonstop carriers, in favor of the new entrant, because it is able to divert mostly high-fare traffic from
the incumbent carriers. As its capacity increases, the new entrant must also rely on low-fare passengers
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and thus experiences a decrease in average fare, thus closing the gap between the two nonstop carriers'
average fares.
$170
$150
$130
0
$90
$70
$50
Entrant Cap. (absolute)
45 75 90
0% 50% 100% 150%
Entrant Cap. (% of NS Inc.)
150
200%
Figure 5.13: Average fares by airline - Scenario 3 LM
The impact of entry on Airline l's market and revenue share is again negative, and leads to a decrease in
market and revenue shares of Airline 1. The impact on revenues is once again greater than the impact on
market shares, as shown in Table 5.37. At high new entrant capacity, the new entrant captures over 70%
of market share and revenue share.
Entrant cap: absolute
(% of nonstop incumbent)
No Entrant (0%)
3x15 (50%)
3x25 (83%)
3x30 (100%)
3x50 (167%)
Market Share (Traffic)
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3
61% 39% 0%
34% 41% 25%
36% 27% 37%
34% 22% 44%
22% 8% 70%
Revenue Share
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3
75% 25% 0%
41% 24% 36%
31% 19% 50%
30% 16% 54%
21% 7% 72%
Table 5.37: Market and revenue share by airline - Scenario 3 LM
In summary, entry with Scenario 3 LM parameters has substantially negative impacts on the nonstop
incumbent carrier, in terms of revenues, average fares, and load factor. The new entrant carrier, who is
now offering two lower fares with fewer restrictions, uses revenue management to ensure that its higher
fares remain available late into the booking process. As a result, later-booking, higher fare passengers,
who traditionally would book on Airline 1 (whose seats remained available and were more attractive than
connecting seats on Airline 2), now have the option of booking on Airline 1 or Airline 3. Since fares are
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cheaper on Airline 3, these passengers will prefer to book on Airline 3. The excess demand still allows
Airline 1 to extract some revenues from these passengers (at low entrant capacity), but much less than
before entry. The result is a significant dilution of Airline 1's revenues, average fares and load factors, as
shown in Table 5.38.
Airline 1 Entrant capacity: absolute (% of nonstop inc)
%3change x15 3x25 3x30 3x50(50%) (83%) (100%) (167%)
Revenues -48% -60% -62% -72%
Traffic -26% -15% -19% -19%
Avg. Fare -30% -53% -53% -50%
Table 5.38: Scenario 3 LM - effect of entry on traditional measures of performance for Airline 1 compared to
Scenario 0
Market Revenue
Scenario 3LM Airline Pax/Day Avg Fare Revenues ALF Share Share
No Entrant NS Incumbent 75 $160.07 $12,003 83% 61% 75%(Sc. 0)
315 NS Incumbent 56 $111.62 $6,197 62% 34% 41%New Entrant 41 $132.78 $5,412 91% 25% 36%
325 NS Incumbent 64 $74.94 $4,794 71% 36% 31%New Entrant 66 $115.12 $7,606 88% 37% 50%
33 NS Incumbent 61 $74.68 $4,559 68% 34% 30%New Entrant 80 $104.43 $8,395 89% 44% 54%
350 NS Incumbent 42 $79.54 $3,370 47% 22% 21%New Entrant 133 $85.39 $11,372 89% 70% 72%
Table 5.39: Scenario 3 LM summary table
Table 5.39 shows the impact of entry on traffic, average fares, revenues, load factors, market and revenue
shares by airline as a function of new entrant capacity. In particular, Table 5.39 illustrates that in the case
of Scenario 3 LM, the new entrant consistently achieves a higher average fare than the incumbent carrier (in
the scenarios tested here), and that, as the new entrant's capacity increases, both carriers' average fares
decrease. This is a consequence of the combination of capacity and revenue management effects, as, when
the new entrant's capacity increases, the revenue management system opens up more seats in the lower
fare classes which has a direct impact on the new entrant's average fare. In addition, the greater the new
entrant's capacity, the greater the diversion from Airline 1 (the nonstop incumbent) towards the new
entrant, which then affects the incumbent's average fare. Finally, the relatively more attractive fares on
the new entrant carrier lead to the inability of the nonstop incumbent carrier to maintain high revenue
traffic, which leads to the decrease in the nonstop incumbent's average fare to levels below those of the
new entrant carrier.
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This scenario illustrates another case of entry where the aggregate measures of airline performance do not
provide any indication of the response of the incumbent carrier. Compared to previous cases of entry
(scenarios 1 and 2 LM) Scenario 3 LM provides yet another set of effects of entry on aggregate measures of
incumbent performance. Incumbent average fares respond differently to entry with a two-tier fare
structure than they did in the previous cases, as do revenues and market shares.
Scenario 3 m
In this case, the incumbent and new entrant carriers all offer the same two-tier fare structure. Table 5.40
summarizes the impact of entry on total market revenues, loads and average fare. As was the case in all
other scenarios of entry, low-fare stimulation of demand, along with the new entrant's added capacity in
the market, lead to significant increases in total market loads. In terms of passenger mix, the change to a
two-tier fare structure from Scenario 0 leads to a shift in passengers from Y/B classes towards the new Y
class in the two-tier structure and from M/Q classes towards the new M class in Scenario 3 FM*
Total market revenues, however, initially decrease upon entry at low entrant capacity (e.g. in the case of
Scenario 3M as compared to Scenario 0). The explanation is directly linked to passenger mix and the fact
that the average fare is now lower than in Scenario 0, in all cases of Scenario 3 FM . As a result, at low
entrant capacity, traffic stimulation is not sufficient to balance the lower fares and generate equivalent
revenues. As new entrant capacity increases, total market revenues increase as well and eventually reach
Scenario 0 revenue levels.
Average fares decrease by about 35% upon entry and decrease slightly as new entrant capacity increases.
Average load factors initially increase due to the stimulation of low-fare traffic and the relatively low
increase in total market capacity (Scenario 31), and steadily decrease as the new entrant's capacity
increases.
Sc. 3 FM Loads Revenues Avg. Avg.
Fae Load
Entrant Cap. Total Y B M Q Total Y B M Q Fare Factor
0(0%) 122 35 13 12 62 $15,914 $9,061 $1,798 $1,150 $3,286 $130 68.0%
3x15 (50%) 176 57 0 119 0 $14,062 $7,761 $0 $6,300 $0 $80 78.3%
3x25 (83%) 190 58 0 132 0 $14,827 $7,842 $0 $6,985 $1 $78 74.4%
3x30 (100%) 195 58 0 136 0 $15,116 $7,880 $0 $7,235 $1 $78 72.1%
3x50 (167%) 206 60 0 146 0 $15,805 $8,049 $0 $7,754 $2 $77 62.3%
Table 5.40: Scenario 3 FM market loads and revenues by fare class, average market fare and load factor
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At the airline level, we observe that Airline l's revenues decrease substantially after entry, between 44%
and 49% (c.f. Table 5.42), increasingly with entrant capacity, compared to Scenario 0. The decrease in
revenues is a consequence of the change in passenger mix and the decrease in average fare. Indeed, loads
remain relatively constant regardless of the entrant's capacity. In addition, the decrease in revenues is
accompanied by a shift in revenues by fare class: Y class revenues decrease by about 50% while M class
revenues more than double and B and Q class disappear (due to the new pricing structure), as shown in
Figure 5.14.
$8,000-
$7,000-
M Scenario 0
$6,000- MSc 3FM - 3x15
* $5,000- 0 Sc 3FM - 3x25
OSc 3FM - 3x30
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Figure 5.14: Airline 1 revenues by fare class - Scenario 3 FM
By comparison, new entrant revenues vary with new entrant capacity and do not make up for lost
incumbent revenues (compared to total market revenues under Scenario 0, as shown in Table 5.43) until
new entrant capacity increases to 150 seats per day, in which case the total revenues come back to
Scenario 0 levels, but at much higher load levels, as discussed earlier. In addition, the increase in
revenues is accompanied by a decrease in RASM on the new entrant carrier - from $0.307 at 15 seats per
flight to $0.197 at 50 seats per flight - as was the case in all other scenarios.
Figure 5.15 shows the average fare by airline as a function of new entrant capacity, and highlights the fact
that the nonstop carriers' average fares are generally higher than the average market fare. In addition, the
nonstop carrier with the greater capacity has the lower average fare among nonstop carriers.
-140-
Simulation of Entry in a Competitive Environment: The Single Market Case
$180
$160
$140
$120
$100
$80
$60
0% 50% 100% 150%
Entrant Cap. (% of NS Inc.)
200%
Figure 5.15: Scenario 3 FM average fare by airline as a function of new entrant capacity
Table 5.41 shows the market and revenue share by airline and the impact of entry on Airline l's share of
revenues and traffic. Once again, Airline l's revenue share suffers disproportionately from entry
compared to market shares.
Entrant cap: absolute
(% of nonstop incumbent)
No Entrant (0%)
3x15 (50%)
3x25 (83%)
3x30 (100%)
3x50 (167%)
Market Share (Traffic)
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3
61% 39% 0%
45% 31% 24%
41% 24% 35%
40% 20% 40%
37% 9% 53%
Revenue Share
Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 3
75% 25% 0%
48% 24% 28%
43% 19% 38%
42% 17% 42%
39% 8% 53%
Table 5.41: Market and revenue share by airline - Scenario 3 FM
In summary, entry under Scenario 3 FM conditions has negative impacts on nonstop incumbent
performance such as revenues and average fares. Average fares are affected by the change in the fare
products offered by the incumbent carriers, and more specifically the fact that the nonstop incumbent
carrier switches from a set of four fares to only two fares, priced lower on average than the original four
fares. Revenues are then affected by the change in fares, and the fact that the new entrant carrier is
offering the same fares as the incumbent carrier, thus forcing both carriers to split high fare demand. The
effect is a change in passenger mix for the nonstop incumbent, and a decrease in revenues.
Traffic is not affected by entry as much because of the stimulation of low-fare traffic, combined with the
incumbent's match of the new entrant's pricing strategy. As previously mentioned, passenger mix
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changes and leads to a decrease in average fare on the incumbent carrier. Table 5.42 summarizes the
relative impact of entry on revenues, traffic and average fares on Airline 1. While revenues and average
fare decrease by almost 50%, traffic increases slightly, because of traffic stimulation and the fact that the
incumbent carriers match the new entrant's fare structure.
The more intuitive explanation is that, as the new entrant comes in and the incumbent carriers match its
fares, three effects follow:
1. Demand is greatly stimulated by the lower fares
2. Passengers are able to purchase lower fares because of the change in all carriers' fare structure
3. Capacity and competition have increased, thus spreading the demand between more competitors
Airline 1 Entrant capacity: absolute (% of nonstop inc)
%change 3x15 3x25 3x30 3x50(50%) (83%) (100%) (167%)
Revenues -44% -47% -48% -49%
Traffic 6% 4% 3% 3%
Avg. Fare -47% -49% -49% -50%
Table 5.42: Scenario 3 FM - effect of entry on traditional measures of performance for Airline 1 compared to
Scenario 0
Table 5.43 summarizes the impact of entry on
Airline
NS Incumbent
NS Incumbent
New Entrant
NS Incumbent
New Entrant
NS Incumbent
New Entrant
NS Incumbent
New Entrant
Pax/Day
75
79
41
78
67
78
78
76
110
the nonstop incumbent and its new entrant competitor.
Avg Fare
$160.07
$84.39
$94.47
$81.63
$84.04
$81.18
$81.20
$80.51
$76.08
Revenues
$12,003
$6,707
$3,914
$6,388
$5,600
$6,300
$6,304
$6,149
$8,366
ALF
83%
88%
92%
87%
89%
86%
86%
85%
73%
Market
Share
61%
45%
24%
41%
35%
40%
40%
37%
53%
Revenue
Share
75%
48%
28%
43%
38%
42%
42%
39%
53%
Table 5.43: Scenario 3 FM summary table
Table 5.43 highlights the traffic, average fare, revenues, load factors and market and revenue share for the
nonstop incumbent and the new entrant carrier as a function of new entrant capacity and highlights the
fact that, as was the case in Scenario 1, when all carriers offer the same fare structure, the average fare on
the new entrant carrier is higher than the nonstop incumbent's average fare, at lower new entrant capacity
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3x25
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levels. This is a consequence of the joint effect of revenue management and capacity, and is discussed in
more detail in Section 5.2.4.
This scenario illustrates the effect of a full fare match from the incumbent carriers. It highlights in
particular that the nonstop incumbent carrier now benefits from matching the new entrant's fare structure
with respect to revenues. In Scenario 2, matching the new entrant's single unrestricted low-fare led to
revenue decreases on the incumbent carrier. In Scenario 3, matching now leads to an increase in revenues.
These competitive interactions further illustrate the limits of aggregate measures of airline performance in
assessing the response of incumbent carriers to low-fare entry.
5.2.4. Summary and Comparison of Scenarios 0 through 3 - Cross-Scenario
Comparisons
In Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 we discussed the characteristics and competitive settings of each individual
scenario. In particular, we distinguished scenario 0 where there is no new entrant operating in the market
from scenarios 1 through 3 where a new entrant offers nonstop service in the market, in direct competition
with that of the incumbent carrier also offering nonstop service (Airline 1).
In scenarios 1 through 3, the new entrant carrier always offers three daily nonstop flights scheduled at the
exact same times as the nonstop incumbent carrier's flights. The major competitive difference between
scenarios 1, 2 and 3 lies in the pricing structure on the new entrant carrier and the incumbents' response.
These three different pricing structures are summarized in Table 5.44.
New Entrant Fares by Fare Class
Y B M Q
Scenario 1 $261 $135 $92 $53
Scenario 2 $53 Not offered Not offered Not offered
Scenario 3 $135 Not offered $53 Not offered
Table 5.44: New entrant fares by fare class and scenario
Market-Level Comparison of the Impact of Entry
In Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3, we discussed the impact of entry and more specifically focused on the impact
on revenues, average fares and loads at the market level and on the nonstop incumbent carrier, within
each scenario and as a function of new entrant capacity. We now compare the impact of entry across
scenarios at the market level.
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Figure 5.16: Total market revenues as a function of the scenario of entry
Figure 5.16 shows that revenues are impacted differently by entry, and that the relative ranking between
scenarios (given a fixed new entrant capacity), at the total market level, is generally the same regardless
of the capacity on the new entrant. Scenarios 1 and 2 LM generally lead to higher total market revenues
than our benchmark case (Scenario 0). Scenarios 2 FM and Scenario 3 lead to a decrease in total market
revenues, the worse case being that of Scenario 2 FM- Scenario 2 LM'S revenues become lower than those of
scenarios 3 LM and 3 FM at high entrant capacity because the entrant's increasing capacity has an
increasingly negative effect on total market revenues.
More specifically, Scenario 1 always leads to the greatest market revenues because all carriers offer
differentiated fare products on which they perform revenue management to ensure revenue maximization.
Scenario 2 LM often leads to increased total market revenues, but the increase decreases with increasing
new entrant capacity because the new entrant diverts increasing numbers of Airline 1 passengers and lets
these passengers purchase a lower fare. Initially, this effect is balanced by the increase in low-fare
demand which leads Airline 3 to run out of availability early and thus does not substantially affect Airline
1's revenues, overall leading to an increase in total market revenues. As new entrant capacity increases,
diversion becomes more important and eventually leads to total market revenue losses.
Scenario 2 FM leads to substantial revenue decreases because all carriers change their pricing structure and
offer a single low-fare that is not balanced by sufficient increases in traffic (since it is limited by
capacity). The end result is a major decrease in revenues, decrease which is reduced as new entrant
capacity increases, but remains substantially greater than in any other scenario. Scenario 3 losses are
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smaller than those of Scenario 2 FM and decrease with increasing new entrant capacity, as the airlines are
able to satisfy more of the total demand and also perform some product differentiation, albeit less than in
scenarios 0 and 1. Scenario 350 revenues surpass those of Scenario 2 5.
In summary, at the total market level, each scenario behaves differently with respect to revenues and, if
all carriers use the same fare structure, more product differentiation combined with revenue management
is better than limited or no product differentiation. Indeed, Scenario 1 has higher revenues than Scenario
3 FM (with a two-tier fare structure) and even better than Scenario 2 FM (with a single low fare). Similarly,
when only the new entrant uses a simplified fare structure, total market revenues are always higher when
the new entrant differentiates its fare products rather than offers a single low-fare.
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Figure 5.17: Average market fare as a function of new entrant capacity and scenario
Figure 5.17 shows the effect of entry in each scenario on average market fares, and the fact that the
average fare is indeed greatly affected by entry. The major conclusion is that in all cases of entry, the
average market fare decreases. This is due to the fact that upon entry, all carriers stimulate low-fare traffic
(by offering a lower fare than the previously available Q fare). In addition, the increased capacity in the
market leads to additional low-fare seat availability and thus to lower average fares. The extent of the
decrease in average fare (in each scenario, relative to Scenario 0) is a consequence of the entrant and
incumbents' pricing strategy and the entrant's relative capacity, as discussed in each individual scenario
discussion. This leads to the same relative ranking of total market average fares by scenario as observed
for revenues (except at very high new entrant capacity).
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Figure 5.18: Total market loads as a function of entrant capacity and scenario
Finally, with respect to loads and average load factors, the rankings are reversed compared to revenues or
average fares: The lower the average market fare, the greater the total traffic in the market. While a lower
average market fare does lead to greater loads, the constraints with respect to total market capacity can
lead to a decrease in total market revenues compared to Scenario 0 revenues.
Airline-Level Comparison of the Impact of Entry: Effects on the Nonstop Incumbent Carrier
Figure 5.19 shows Airline 1 revenues as a function of the new entrant's capacity and scenario settings.
The first observation is that Airline 1's revenues are affected differently by entry and by each scenario. In
addition, unlike total market revenues, Airline 1's revenues are generally not the highest when the new
entrant comes in with Scenario 1 characteristics.
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Figure 5.19: Airline 1 revenues as a function of entrant capacity and scenario settings
Scenario 2 LM brings the highest revenues to Airline 1, as long as the new entrant's capacity remains
relatively low, since the new entrant carrier then fills up with low fare traffic and leaves higher fare
passengers to Airline 1. Scenario 1 has the second highest revenues for Airline 1. In addition, Scenario 1
revenues remain relatively unaffected by the new entrant's capacity, as is the case for scenarios 3 FM and
2 FM-
Figure 5.19 thus allows us to conclude that entry always (in these simulations) has a negative impact on
incumbent revenues (compared to no entrant competition as simulated in Scenario 0). In addition,
incumbent revenues decrease with increasing new entrant capacity, with different rates of decrease
depending on the scenario. Finally, we also observe that from Airline l's perspective, matching the new
entrant's pricing strategy can sometimes be a better alternative to maintaining its standard fare structure.
For example, in the case of entry with a two-tier structure, the nonstop incumbent suffers a smaller
revenue decrease (relative to Scenario 0 revenues) when matching the entrant's two-tier structure as
compared to not matching the fare structure. Alternatively, in the case of entry with a single low-fare, the
nonstop incumbent experiences a smaller decrease in revenues (relative to Scenario 0 revenues) by
maintaining its structured fares rather than matching the new entrant's fare structure. These extreme
examples illustrate the fact that the incumbent's best response, revenue-wise, is not the same in all
situations.
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Figure 5.20: Airline 1 average fare as a function of entrant capacity and scenario
The average fare on Airline 1 also reacts very differently depending on the scenario of entry, as shown in
Figure 5.20. Generally speaking, the average fare decreases upon entry, except in the case of Scenario 2LM
where the average fare actually increases slightly following entry, as the new entrant carrier diverts low-
fare traffic away from the nonstop incumbent. Figure 5.20 also shows that even without matching the new
entrant's fares or otherwise responding to entry by capacity, frequency or pricing changes, the average
fare on the nonstop incumbent carrier will vary. The variation can be an increase or a decrease, and
depends on the new entrant's capacity.
Figure 5.20 also shows that a limited response from the incumbent carriers to entry can lead to a lower
average fare than a full-match response. For example, in the case of Scenario 3, the limited match
response leads to a lower average fare on the incumbent carrier than the full match response, when the
new entrant's capacity is greater than 15 seats per flight. These results emphasize the lack of information
provided by average fares, relative to the response of incumbents to entry.
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Figure 5.21: Airline 1 average load factor as a function of entrant capacity and scenario
Figure 5.21 shows the impact of entry on Airline l's average load factors. We explained in Section 5.2.3
the reason for the initial increase in average load factor between scenarios 3 and 3 M1, and why it is
accompanied by a decrease in average fare. Relatively speaking, average load factors are higher when the
nonstop incumbent carrier matches the new entrant's pricing structure, as should be expected. When the
nonstop incumbent carrier does not match the new entrant's fares, the average load factors on Airline 1
are much lower and decrease substantially as new entrant capacity increases.
Finally, Figure 5.22 shows the impact of entry on Airline l's market and revenue shares. In particular,
Scenario 2 LM exhibits a somewhat unusual pattern in that Airline I's market share suffers most from
entry, while Airline 1's revenue share suffers substantially less from entry. This can be explained by the
fact that Scenario 2 LM presents the particularity of having Airline 3 come in with a single unrestricted low
fare. As a consequence, Airline 3 diverts substantial amounts of traffic (mostly low fare traffic) but not
revenues, as Airline 1 is still able to extract revenues from high fare passengers.
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Airline 1 Market Share - Fig 5.22.1 Airline 1 Revenue Share - Fig 5.22.2
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Figure 5.22: Market and revenue share for Airline 1
Comparison of Revenues, Average Fares and Loads across Carriers
We now focus on the relative performance of the nonstop incumbent and the new entrant carrier across
scenarios and compared to one another. Results show that each scenario leads to very diverse situations,
as described below.
Figure 5.23 shows revenues by airline in each scenario as a function of new entrant capacity. As apparent
in Figure 5.23, the relative performance of one carrier compared to the other nonstop carrier is highly
dependant on the scenario and entrant capacity. The first obvious trend is that incumbent revenues
decrease as new entrant capacity increases, while new entrant revenues increase with new entrant
capacity. The second trend is that in the full match cases, scenarios 1, 2 FM and 3 FM, airlines 1 and 3 share
revenues as a function of their relative capacity: The carrier with the greater capacity has the higher
revenues. In the case of limited match scenarios, the revenue shares vary more and Airline 1 performs
better when Airline 3 has a single fare compared to the case where Airline 3 has two fares. This implies
that more price differentiation is better for the new entrant carrier with respect to revenue maximization.
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Figure 5.23: Airlines 1 and 3 revenues as a function of entrant capacity and scenario
Figure 5.24 shows average fares by airline in each scenario as a function of new entrant capacity. Once
again, we note that the relative average fare between carriers depends on the scenario and the new entrant
capacity. The most noteworthy trend is that the incumbent's average fare decreases with entry, in most
cases. Only in Scenario 2 LM is this not the case, due to the fact that the new entrant diverts all of the low-
fare traffic from the incumbent carrier, and that there is sufficient surplus of demand to ensure higher
average fares on the incumbent.
In addition, it is also often the case that the carrier with the greater capacity has the lower average fare in
the market. As previously explained, this is related to the fact that the carrier with greater capacity is more
likely to have availability to carry more low fare traffic, which will negatively impact its average fare.
One notable exception appears in Scenario 3 LM where the new entrant maintains a higher average fare
even at high capacity. The fare differential between airlines 1 and 3 decreases, however, with increasing
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new entrant capacity. The explanation for this unusual case lies in the fact that the new entrant carrier has
a simplified two-tier fare structure and is able to generate sufficient higher-fare stimulation and diversion
from Airline 1 to maintain a higher average fare. The case of Scenario 2 LM is of course dismissed as the
new entrant only offers one low-fare, which thus imposes that its average fare be the lowest available fare
in the market, hence above that of the incumbent carrier.
Finally, Figure 5.24 shows that the relative positioning of the incumbent and the new entrant's average
fare is highly dependant on the situation and is not indicative of a particular response: For example, in
scenarios 115, 125 and 3 LM, the incumbent carrier has a lower average fare than the new entrant, even
though the incumbent carrier did not respond (other than by matching the lowest fare in the market) to
Airline 3's entry in the market. This once again illustrates the great dependence of relative average fares
(between carriers) on relative capacity and new entrant pricing strategy.
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Figure 5.24: Airlines 1 and 3 average fares as a function of entrant capacity and scenario
Figure 5.25 shows revenue share between Airline 1 and Airline 3 as a function of entrant capacity and
scenario (Airline 2 revenue share is implied but not shown). Figure 5.25 highlights the fact that in all
scenarios, Airline 3's revenue share increases with increasing new entrant capacity, while Airline l's
share of revenues decreases. Furthermore, there is an inversion between Airline 1 and Airline 3's share of
revenues as new entrant capacity increases. The point where this inversion occurs is a function of the
scenario.
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In the case of "full-match" scenarios (1, 2 FM and 3 FM), the inversion occurs when both carriers have the
same capacity: That is, the carrier with the greater capacity has the greater share of revenues. This
intuitively makes sense as the two nonstop carriers both offer the same service at the same times and at
the same fares. We therefore expect the carrier with greater capacity to garner a greater share of revenues
and traffic (which is also the case).
In the case of "limited match" scenarios (2 LM and 3 LM), the inversion occurs either before or after the new
entrant's capacity increases beyond that of the nonstop incumbent carrier. In the case of Scenario 2 LM, the
new entrant carrier offers a single low-fare, while the nonstop incumbents still offer a standard fare
structure. In this case, the new entrant quickly takes over in terms of market share (between 3x15 and
3x25 seats on the new entrant) while its share of revenues remains very low. The reason for the lower
revenues is that the new entrant essentially dilutes much of its potential revenues by offering a single low
fare, and is unable to differentiate between passengers and to use revenue management controls. As a
result, while its market share is higher, its share of revenues is quite low.
In contrast, in Scenario 3 LM, the opposite picture can be observed. This is because the new entrant carrier
is able to differentiate between passengers effectively (and practice revenue management), and thus divert
not only low-fare traffic from the incumbent carrier, but also high-fare traffic. The result is a diversion of
a substantial amount of high-fare passengers from airlines 1 and 2, and fewer low-fare passengers, overall
leading to a much quicker increase in market and revenue share for the new entrant carrier. In this case,
the new entrant carrier acquires market share and revenue share dominance simultaneously, even before it
reaches equal capacity with the nonstop incumbent carrier.
We thus observe very different effects on market and revenue shares for airlines 1 and 3, as a function of
the scenario and the response of the incumbent carriers. When they match the new entrant's fare structure,
market and revenue shares are dominated by the nonstop carrier with the greater capacity. When the
incumbent carriers do not fully match the entrant's fare structure, the impact on market and revenue share
depends on the new entrant's ability to differentiate between passengers and offer a more attractive
product than the incumbent carriers.
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Scenario 1 - Airline 1 and Airline 3 Revenue Share
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Figure 5.25: Airlines 1 and 3 revenue share as a function of new entrant capacity and scenario
Conclusions
Through simulation of entry in a single market case under various pricing and response strategies, we
have identified a number of major factors explaining incumbent and new entrant performance. In
particular, the simulation results illustrate the importance of the new entrant's capacity relative to that of
the incumbent carriers' and total market demand. For example, incumbent revenues, loads and average
fares are increasingly affected by increasing new entrant capacity. Under the assumption of full match of
the entrant's fare structure by the incumbent carriers, incumbent revenues and average fares generally
decrease following entry, while loads increase. Under the assumption of a match of the entrant's fare
- 155 -
-.- Airline 1
-=-Airline 3
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
0% 200%
i
V
Chapter 5
structure limited to the lowest fare available (limited match), incumbent revenues and loads decrease,
while average fares can either increase or decrease depending on the entrant's pricing strategy (single
unrestricted or differentiated two-tier fare structure).
Furthermore, the simulation results also show that the impact of entry on incumbent and new entrant
average fares is highly dependent on the new entrant's relative capacity. Under full match cases, the
carrier with the greater capacity has the lower average fare, while under asymmetric pricing conditions,
the impacts on relative average fares varies as a function of the relative pricing and capacities of the
nonstop competitors.
The results also show that, from a strategic perspective, matching the new entrant's pricing structure is
not always the revenue and market share maximizing strategy for the incumbent carrier. Depending on the
incumbent carriers' goals, one strategy might be better than the other. For example, in the case of entry
with a single unrestricted low fare, between the two alternatives simulated, the limited match response
leads to greater revenues on the incumbent carrier than the full match response. The latter response,
however, maximizes the incumbent carrier's market share.
The simulations also highlight the inadequacy of aggregate measures of airline performance in assessing
the response of an incumbent carrier to entry. The Detroit-Boston and Atlanta-Orlando case studies had
allowed us to conclude that two markets that appeared to have had identical responses to entry (according
to aggregate measures of airline performance), could in fact have been experiencing quite different
competitive conditions with respect to low-fare entry. The results of this single market case simulation
showed that identical responses to entry (in the limited match case) under different entry strategies (but
identical demand and market parameter conditions) could lead to considerably different outcomes in
terms of measures of average fare, revenues and traffic on the nonstop incumbent carrier, thus reinforcing
the inadequacy of aggregate measures of performance.
Finally, in explaining the impact of entry on individual airline performance, we relied heavily on the
effects of revenue management in clarifying the causes of passenger shifts between airlines. This
implicitly stresses the importance of revenue management and its influence on individual carrier
performance, as we discuss in the next chapter. In addition, this single market case does not include the
effect of network flows of passengers, which are modeled in Chapter 7.
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EFFECT OF REVENUE MANAGEMENT ON
TRADITIONAL MEASURES OF AIRLINE
PERFORMANCE IN THE SINGLE MARKET
CASE
6.1. Effects of Revenue Management on Incumbent Performance
In Chapter 5, we discussed the impact of entry on total market and airline revenues, average fares and
traffic under specific default revenue management assumptions for all carriers. We assumed that all
airlines in the market used Fare Class Revenue Management (FCRM). The results from Chapter 5 showed
that airline performance depends greatly on capacity, fare structures and response of the incumbents to
entry, and that relative average fares or traffic cannot be used alone to determine whether an incumbent's
response to entry (or lack thereof) was revenue maximizing.
We are now interested in the additional impact of revenue management on the effect of entry. In this
chapter, we show that more advanced revenue management allows the airlines to increase their revenues
and be less affected by entry. Our simulation results also illustrate the impacts of revenue management on
aggregate measures of airline performance. These results reinforce our previous conclusions that such
measures provide very few insights on the response of incumbents to low-fare entry. To illustrate the
importance of revenue management, we now allow all carriers to either use Fare Class Revenue
Management or rely solely on advance purchase requirements as a segmentation of their passengers, and
thus accept passenger requests on a First-Come, First-Served (FCFS) basis.
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6.1.1. Competitive Revenue Management Settings
Using the scenarios defined in Chapter 5, we now allow the incumbent and new entrant carriers to modify
their revenue management systems to evaluate the impact of revenue management on incumbent and new
entrant performances (with respect to revenues, fares and traffic).
To reflect revenue management choices by airline, we define the following three competitive situations,
applicable in scenarios 0, 1, 2 and 3:
a) None of the carriers perform revenue management and therefore all accept requests for seats on
first-come first-served (FCFS) basis
b) Both incumbent carriers use FCRM but the entrant uses FCFS
c) All three carriers use FCRM
Table 6.1 summarizes the various competitive revenue management alternatives tested in the upcoming
discussion of the effects of revenue management on traditional measures of airline performance.
Revenue Management
Scenario Airline I Airline 2 Airline 3
SCENARIO 0 FCFS FCFS N/A
FCRM FCRM N/A
FCFS FCFS FCFS
SCENARIO 1 FCRM FCRM FCFS
FCRM FCRM FCRM
SCENARIO 2 FCFS FCFS FCFS
FCRM FCRM FCFS
FCFS FCFS FCFS
SCENARIO 3 FCRM FCRM FCFS
FCRM FCRM FCRM
Table 6.1: Revenue management settings by scenario
The scenarios tested in Chapter 5 are scenarios 0, 1, 2 and 3 when all competing carriers use FCRM. Note
the absence of Scenario 2 with all three carriers using FCRM because of the fact that in Scenario 2, the
new entrant offers a single fare structure. As a result, revenue management is not used by the new entrant
carrier.
In the remainder of this discussion, we study the impact of changing revenue management settings within
each scenario. The first case, in which all carriers accept passenger bookings on a first-come first-served
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basis, is somewhat unrealistic but will provide an estimate of the gains (revenues and traffic) that can be
attributed to revenue management, and illustrates the effect of revenue management on traditional
measures of airlines performance, even in the absence of low-fare competition. It also provides a baseline
to further study the impact of the incumbents and new entrant using FCRM instead of FCFS.
The second case (where only the incumbent carriers use FCRM while the new entrant uses FCFS),
although it assumes that the new entrant carrier does not perform revenue management, enables us to
replicate the situation where the incumbent carriers use more advanced revenue management than the new
entrant. This case will also allow us to assess the impact of revenue management on the incumbent
carriers alone, and how it affects measures of performance on all three carriers.
Finally, the third case further illustrates the effects of revenue management on aggregate measures of
performance when all competitors use FCRM in a single market environment. Comparison of all three
cases will show how traditional measures of performance respond to changes in the competitive revenue
management situation.
In a first step, we discuss the effects of revenue management when there is no new entrant competition.
We then study the impact of revenue management on average fares, revenues and traffic in each case of
entry (scenarios 1 through 3). In a third step, we compare the impacts across scenarios when the
incumbent carriers and the new entrant carrier use FCRM instead of FCFS, and conclude to the impact of
revenue management on traditional measures of airline performance as a function of the competitive
scenario settings. Lastly, we discuss the sensitivity of the results presented in Chapters 5 and 6 to changes
in some of the fundamental simulation assumptions, and show that the general trends presented in these
results remain unchanged.
6.1.2. Scenario 0: No New Entrant Competition
In this section, we focus on the revenue impact of using fare class revenue management for the incumbent
carriers, in the absence of a new entrant competitor. We thus compare previously discussed results for
Scenario 0 when both incumbents use FCRM (in Chapter 5) to those for Scenario 0 when none of the
competitors use revenue management, as simulated here.
We first examine incumbent carrier revenues. Figure 6.1 shows each of the two airlines' revenues, and
highlights an apparent asymmetry, even in the case where both carriers accept bookings on a first-come
first-served basis. This is essentially due to the fact that Airline 2 does not offer nonstop service in the
market. As a result, the path utility on Airline 2, all else being equal, will necessarily be worse and
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passengers will book on Airline 1, if it is available. Furthermore, path preference might even induce
passengers into booking a higher fare on Airline 1 rather than the lower fare on Airline 2, if the added
restrictions on Airline 2's lower fare ticket further decrease its utility beyond that of the more expensive
ticket on Airline 1.
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Figure 6.1: Incumbent carrier revenues in the case of no new entrant competition
The next step is to observe that when both carriers use FCRM, the asymmetry is even greater, in favor of
Airline 1, the carrier which offers nonstop service. In addition, total market revenues increase from
$15,205 to $15,914, or by 4.7%.
The increase in market revenues can be explained by the fact that fare class revenue management now
allows both carriers to protect seats for later-booking passengers, under the assumption that the expected
additional revenue from these passengers is greater than the expected revenue from earlier-booking, low-
fare passengers. Table 6.2 shows traffic and revenues by fare class in each of the two scenario settings
and confirms that with fare class revenue management, loads are higher in Y, B and M classes and lower
in Q class, as are revenues, overall leading to higher market revenues.
Revenue Total Y B M QManagement
Traffic (FCFS; FCFS) 125.51 31.12 12.73 7.00 74.66(FCRM; FCRM) 122.38 34.68 13.30 12.49 61.90
Revenues (FCFS; FCFS) $15,205 $8,130 $1,721 $644 $4,710(FCRM; FCRM) $15,914 $9,061 $1,798 $1,150 $3,905
Table 6.2: Total traffic and revenues by fare class as a function of the revenue management environment
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At the airline level, however, the impact is positive on Airline 1, whose revenues increase by 41.4% from
$8,490 to $12,003, and negative on Airline 2, whose revenues decrease by 41.8% from $6,714 to $3,910.
The explanation for this shift is now the combination of the effect of revenue management along with the
fact that passengers will generally prefer Airline 1 to Airline 2 because of its better path quality (nonstop
vs. connecting). As a result of these combined effects, passenger traffic in the higher fare classes
decreases on Airline 2, which now carries exclusively low-fare passengers, while Airline 1 is able to
protect seats for later-booking high-fare passengers and thus increase its own revenues. Figure 6.2 shows
the change in fare class revenues on Airline 1 and further highlights the increase in higher fare class
revenues and decrease in low fare class revenues. Airline l's average fare consequently increases by 58%
from $101 to $160.
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Figure 6.2: Airline 1 revenues by fare class under each revenue management environment
Finally, Figure 6.3 shows the traffic on Airline 1, by fare class and as a function of the competitive
revenue management environment. Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 show that with FCRM, loads and revenues
are greater in Y, B and M classes on Airline 1 and substantially lower in Q class. The overall impact on
Airline l's revenues, as mentioned earlier, is an increase in market revenues, accompanied by a decrease
in average load factor from 93% under FCFS on both carriers to 83% when both incumbents use FCRM.
On Airline 2, the opposite change occurs at the fare class level: Traffic in Y, B and M classes decreases,
while Q class loads increase substantially. This results in a reduction in revenues and an increase in
average load factor (from 46% to 53%).
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Figure 6.3: Airline 1 traffic by fare class and scenario
In summary, in the case of two airlines, there is asymmetry in the revenues earned by each airline due to
the fact that Airline 1 offers nonstop service while Airline 2 only offers connecting service in the market.
In addition, use of fare class revenue management by both carriers further increases the asymmetry in
favor of Airline 1 whose revenues increase by 41% while Airline 2's revenues decrease by 42% (relative
to FCFS revenues). The result is a dramatic change in market share and revenue share, whereby Airline
l's revenue share increases to 75% (from 56%) while its market share drops from 67% to 61%, as shown
in Table 6.3.
Market Share Revenue Share
Revenue Management Airline 1 Airline 2 Airline 1 Airline 2
(FCFS; FCFS) 67% 33% 56% 44%
(FCRM;FCRM) 61% 39% 75% 25%
Table 6.3: Market and revenue share - Scenario 0
Use of FCRM on both incumbents leads to a substantial increase in revenues (+41%) and average fare
(+58%) on Airline 1, mostly due to an increase in full fare Y class passenger revenues and a change in
passenger mix, accompanied by a decrease in average load factor. This illustrates the impacts of revenue
management on aggregate measures of airline performance, even without low-fare new entrant
competition.
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6.1.3. Scenarios 1 - 3: Competitive Simulation of Entry
Scenario 1: Entry with the Standard Fare Structure and Stimulation of Low-Fare Traffic
We now study the impact of revenue management on revenues, traffic and average fares in the case of
Scenario 1. We show that the use of revenue management on the incumbents only and then on all three
competitors generally leads to an increase in total market revenues, a decrease in total market traffic and
thus an overall increase in average market fare (regardless of the new entrant's capacity in the market).
On Airline 1, however, we show that FCRM leads to an increase in revenues compared to FCFS, with a
decrease in traffic, and that the magnitude of the increase is directly related to the revenue management
setting for Airline 3: When Airline 3 uses FCFS, Airline 1's revenues are higher than when Airline 3 uses
FCRM. Airline 1's traffic and average fares are also affected quite differently by changing new entrant
capacity as a function of the competitive revenue management situation, as we discuss below.
Market-Level Impacts
Figure 6.4 shows revenues at the total market level, as a function of new entrant capacity and revenue
management settings for Scenario 1. Revenues increase when first the incumbents, then all three
competitors, use FCRM, relative to FCFS on all three carriers. The increase in total revenues, relative to
FCFS on all three carriers, is comparable when only the incumbents use FCRM and when all three
competitors use FCRM. This relative increase in revenues (within each new entrant capacity case) varies
between 0.6% at high new entrant capacity and 9% at low new entrant capacity. The reason for the greater
relative increase in revenues at low new entrant capacity is related to the fact that there are greater
capacity constraints at low capacity. The "industry as a whole" therefore benefits more from practicing
revenue management at low capacity than when capacity is less constraining, in which case the airlines
can accept all passengers without the risk of displacing a high-fare passenger by accepting a low-fare
passenger, if in addition price segmentation is properly achieved.
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Figure 6.4: Total market revenues as a function of the revenue management settings and new entrant
capacity - Scenario 1 (Scenarios with FCRM on the incumbents only and FCRM on all carriers
overlap)
Figure 6.5 corroborates the "improvement" in passenger mix (shift towards higher fare classes) and shows
the increase in average market fare when the airlines use FCRM, as more seats are protected for high fare
passengers. Furthermore, the average fare varies with capacity within each scenario: When all carriers use
FCFS, the average fare increases with new entrant capacity, as more high fare passengers can travel when
capacity is high. In contrast, the average fare decreases with capacity in either case with FCRM, as more
low-fare passengers can travel at high new entrant capacity, as compared to lower capacity levels, where
FCRM protects seats for high-fare passengers rather than giving them away to earlier-booking low-fare
passengers. This difference in the response of average market fares to low-fare entry as a function of the
competitive revenue management situation is of critical importance.
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Figure 6.5: Average market fare as a function of the revenue management settings and new entrant
capacity - Scenario 1
Finally, with respect to average load factors, we observe in Table 6.4 that use of revenue management
leads to a decrease in average load factors at the market level. As more carriers use revenue management,
they trade low fare passengers (with a higher probability of booking) for high fare passengers with a
lower probability of booking, but a higher revenue contribution. This leads to lower load factors. In
addition, the decrease is more apparent at low new entrant capacity, as relatively more low fare
passengers are turned down for high fare passengers.
Entrant capacity Traffic ALF
Absolute % of nonstop FCFS All (FCRM; FCRM; FCRM All FCFS All (FCRM; FCRM Allincumbent FCFS) FCRM; FCFS)
3x15 50% 172 168 167 76% 75% 74%
3x25 83% 179 176 176 70% 69% 69%
3x30 100% 181 179 179 67% 66% 66%
3x50 167% 185 185 185 56% 56% 56%
Table 6.4: Total market traffic and average load factors - Scenario 1
Airline-Level Impacts
The impact of competitive revenue management situation on Airline 1 follows the pattern shown in
Figure 6.6, regardless of the new entrant's capacity. When only the incumbents use FCRM, Airline 1
gains substantial revenues (between 23% and 62% increases, decreasingly so with increasing new entrant
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capacity). When the new entrant then also uses FCRM, the increase is smaller, that is, relative to the case
where only the incumbents use FCRM, Airline 1 incurs a loss in revenues. This loss ranges between 5%
and 25%, but remains a significant increase over the case where none of the carriers use revenue
management (between 17% and 22%). The loss in Airline 1 revenues when the new entrant uses revenue
management (relative to when only the incumbents use FCRM) can be explained by the fact that Airline 3
is now able to better allocate its available seats between low-fare early-booking and higher-fare later-
booking passengers.
Airline I Revenues and Loads - New Entrant Capacity 3x30
$12,000 (i.e. 100% of nonstop incumbent capacity)
Revenues
$10,000-+ Traffic 76
$8,000--
72 m
$6,000
70 -J
$4,000-
68
$2,000-- 66
$0 64
FCFS All FCRM; FCRM; FCFS FCRM All
Figure 6.6: Airline 1 revenues and traffic as a function of incumbent and new entrant revenue management
- Scenario 130
While revenues increase when the incumbents use FCRM relative to FCFS, traffic decreases by 6% to
14%, and by 4% to 5% when all three carriers use FCRM, as shown in Table 6.5. In addition, as the new
entrant's capacity increases, the relative traffic losses and revenue gains on Airline 1 decrease, when
either the incumbents only, or all three carriers, use FCRM (relative to no revenue management). The
decrease in traffic as the airlines shift to revenue management is explained by the fact that the premise of
revenue management is to protect seats for later-booking, higher-fare passengers, with a lesser probability
of filling the seats, but higher expected revenues. Thus, as the airlines shift to FCRM from FCFS, we
expect traffic to decrease, but revenues to increase. When airlines move from only the incumbents using
FCRM to all carriers using FCRM, increasing competition for high-fare late-booking passengers leads to
a decreasing probability of filling seats with high-fare late-booking passengers. As a result, airlines trade
less likely high-fare passengers for more likely low-fare passengers to mitigate the revenue loss. This
leads to higher loads. Finally, the smaller revenue gains (greater traffic losses) at higher new entrant
capacity are again a consequence of the lesser efficacy of revenue management at lower load factors.
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Percent change relative to Revenues TrafficFCFS on all carriers
Entrant % of nonstop FCRM on FCRM FCRM on FCRM
capacity incumbent incs only all incs only all
No Entrant 0% 41% n/a -11% n/a
45 50% 62% 21% -14% -5%
75 83% 51% 19% -12% -5%
90 100% 45% 18% -10% -4%
150 167% 23% 17% -6% -4%
Table 6.5: Airline 1 relative revenue and traffic variation
As illustrated in Figure 6.7, the average fare on Airline 1 increases
than FCFS (at all capacity levels). The increase is greater on Airline
uses FCRM and the new entrant continues accepting seat requests on
when the airlines use FCRM rather
1 when only the incumbent carriers
a first-come, first-served basis, as a
result of the changes in traffic and revenues described previously. Overall, when comparing no revenue
management to FCRM on the incumbents or on all carriers, the average fare on Airline 1 increases.
Figure 6.7 also shows that the effect of increasing new entrant capacity on average fares differs depending
on the competitive revenue management situation. When only the incumbents use FCRM, the average
fare decreases with increasing new entrant capacity because the new entrant diverts increasing numbers of
high fare passengers. By comparison, in the other two cases, the incumbent's average fare remains much
more stable because of the symmetry in the competitive revenue management situation.
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Figure 6.7: Average fare on Airline 1 as a function of scenario settings and new entrant capacity - Sc. 1
Finally, Airline l's average load factors are also impacted by the change in revenue management: As
shown in Table 6.6, when comparing no revenue management to FCRM on the incumbent carriers,
Airline l's average load factor decreases significantly (by as much as 13 percentage points at low entrant
capacity). When all three carriers use FCRM, Airline l's average load factors reach a middle ground
between the other two scenarios. As mentioned earlier, when the incumbents use FCRM, Airline l's
revenue management system is trading loads for revenues, and, when this cannot be done anymore (either
under FCFS on all carriers or FCRM on all carriers), Airline 1 lets more passengers on, thus increasing its
traffic and revenues.
Entrant Daily Capacity Average Load Factor
Absolute of nonstop FCFS all inFCRM on FCRM allincumbent incumbents only
3x15 50% 91% 78% 86%
3x25 83% 87% 76% 83%
3x30 100% 85% 77% 82%
3x50 167% 83% 79% 80%
Table 6.6: Airline 1 average load factor as a function of
Scenario 1
scenario settings and new entrant capacity -
On Airline 3, contrary to Airline 1, comparing no revenue management to FCRM on the incumbents only,
or on all three competitors, does not always lead to an increase in revenues. In particular, when only the
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incumbent carriers use FCRM, the new entrant loses revenues relative to FCFS on all carriers (c.f. Figure
6.8). This is an expected decrease in revenues, as the incumbent carriers now protect more seats for
higher-fare passengers. The relative revenue loss does not depend on the new entrant's capacity, in our
simulations.
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Figure 6.8: Relative revenue changes on Airline 3 as a function of capacity and ccenario settings - Sc. 1
The decrease in revenues when only the incumbents use FCRM is accompanied by an increase in traffic
on Airline 3, and by a change in passenger mix, compared to no revenue management (as shown in Table
6.7). The new entrant, which is now the only airline accepting passenger bookings on a first-come, first-
served basis, fills up early with low-fare passengers, as the incumbents now reject these passengers. The
result is that Airline 3 carries more passengers, but at a lower average fare, hence the lower revenues.
Table 6.7 shows the decrease in average fare on the new entrant carrier when only the incumbents use
revenue management relative to when all carriers accept booking requests using FCFS.
Entrant Daily Cap.
% of
Absolute nonstop
incumbent
3x15 50%
3x25 83%
3x30 100%
3x50 167%
(FCFS;
FCFS;
FCFS)
43
67
77
100
Traffic
(FCRM;
FCRM;
FCFS)
44
69
80
104
(FCRM;
FCRM;
FCRM)
38
63
74
101
Average Load
(FCFS; (FCRM;
FCFS; FCRM;
FCFS) FCFS)
96% 97%
90% 92%
85% 89%
67% 69%
Factor
(FCRM;
FCRM;
FCRM)
84%
84%
82%
67%
Average Fare
(FCFS; (FCRM; (FCRM;
FCFS; FCRM; FCRM;
FCFS) FCFS) FCRM)
$77 $70 $153
$84 $73 $116
$88 $75 $108
$101 $87 $97
Table 6.7: New entrant traffic, load factors and average fares
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When the new entrant also accepts seat requests using FCRM, we observe that it generally benefits from
this change in revenue management system. At low entrant capacity, revenues increase by as much as
72.5% over FCFS on all carriers, and by as much as 91% when the new entrant uses FCRM relative to
when only the incumbents do, as shown in Figure 6.8. This relative increase in revenues decreases when
the entrant's capacity increases. The reason for this decrease in relative revenue increase comes from the
fact that as the new entrant's capacity increases, even if requests for seats are accommodated on a first-
come, first-served basis, given the larger capacity, there always remain seats available for later-booking
passengers. It therefore becomes less critical to perform revenue management, as the revenue
management system itself would recognize the available capacity and thus allow all passengers to book,
as does FCFS. In short, this once again highlights the relatively lesser importance of revenue management
at lower load factors.
Compared to when only the incumbents use FCRM, when Airline 3 also uses FCRM, the new entrant's
traffic decreases, but the mix of passengers shifts towards higher fare classes, thus leading to an increase
in average fares and revenues, as shown in Figure 6.8 and Table 6.7. In addition, as was the case for
Airline 1 when using FCRM, the relative decrease in traffic is smaller as capacity increases on the new
entrant.
Finally, Figure 6.8 also shows that at high new entrant capacity, i.e. 150 seats on the new entrant carrier,
compared to no revenue management, FCRM on all carriers has a negative cumulative impact on Airline
3's revenues. We had shown earlier than Airline 1 benefited from its use of FCRM in general, but more
from the asymmetric revenue management scenario. For Airline 3, it is less attractive to have all airlines
using revenue management at high capacity, as opposed to all airlines accepting seat requests on a first-
come, first-served basis. The problem, at high new entrant capacity, is that both nonstop carriers are now
expecting later-booking high-fare passengers, but, given the high capacity on the new entrant, most of
demand can be satisfied. The challenge remains to capture high-fare passengers, which both Airline 1 and
Airline 3 manage through FCRM, but at a loss to Airline 3 compared to when none of the airlines
practiced revenue management, because Airline 1 does not fill up as quickly. In Scenario 150 without
revenue management, Airline 1 had less capacity than Airline 3, and therefore filled up sooner than
Airline 3. This left Airline 3 with available seats for later-booking high-fare passengers, which generated
disproportionate amounts of revenues. By comparison, in Scenario 150 with revenue management on all
carriers, Airline 1 also expects these passengers and thus diverts some revenues from Airline 3. This
explains the decrease in revenues on Airline 3 from between no revenue management and revenue
management on all carriers at high new entrant capacity shown in Table 6.8. In addition, Airline 3
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RASMs are also affected by the change in revenue management methods, in comparable ways as the
revenues, but they decrease with increasing new entrant capacity, as discussed in Chapter 5.
Entrant Daily Capacity Airline 1 Revenues Airline 3 Revenues
% of (FCFS; (FCRM; (FCRM; (FCFS; (FCRM; (FCRM;
Absolute nonstop FCFS; FCRM; FCRM; FCFS; FCRM; FCRM;
incumbent FCFS) FCFS) FCRM) FCFS) FCFS) FCRM)
3x15 50% $6,852 $11,095 $8,307 $3,348 $3,031 $3,874
3x25 83% $6,796 $10,255 $8,063 $5,663 $5,038 $4,091
3x30 100% $6,738 $9,785 $7,951 $6,752 $5,977 $4,232
3x50 167% $6,586 $8,113 $7,709 $10,059 $9,031 $4,708
Table 6.8: Nonstop incumbent and new entrant revenues - Scenario 1
The impact of the change in revenue management systems on Airline 3's average load factors is the
opposite as the impact on Airline 1, as apparent in Table 6.7. The asymmetric revenue management
scenario (FCRM on the incumbents vs. FCFS on the new entrant) consistently leads to the highest traffic
on Airline 3, as the nonstop incumbent manages its revenues and forces low-fare traffic to book on
Airline 3, which thus tends to fill up more often. When all carriers use FCRM, the new entrant also
practices revenue management and trades revenue for loads, thus leading to the smallest average load
factors.
Summary
In summary, we have highlighted the tremendous impact of revenue management on traditional measures
of airline performance and discussed the competitive effects which explain these behaviors. In particular,
the simulation results show that average fares (at the total market or individual airline level) are affected
quite differently by entry under different competitive revenue management situations. Total market
average fare, for example, increases with increasing new entrant capacity under FCFS on all competitors.
In contrast, it decreases in the other two competitive cases. On the nonstop incumbent carrier however,
the average fare decreases when only the incumbents use FCRM (and not the low-fare new entrant), and
remains relatively stable otherwise. We have explained that this effect is a direct consequence of the
asymmetry in revenue management methods between the incumbents and the new entrant, combined with
the capacity constraints on the low-fare carrier (at low capacity).
We have also illustrated how a symmetric revenue management situation leads to the even distribution of
traffic and revenues among competitors as a function of relative capacity levels, under the assumption of
identical fare structures on all competitors. The results also show that revenue management generally
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leads to higher revenues than FCFS (in symmetric cases) by protecting more seats for late booking high
fare passengers. By comparison, under FCFS, revenues and average fares are lower due to the lack of
protection for later booking, higher fare passengers.
In asymmetric revenue management conditions, the airline(s) using revenue management force the low-
fare traffic onto the carrier accepting requests on a first-come first-served basis, which negatively affects
average fares and revenues on that carrier and leads to a feedback loop whereby the airline(s) using
FCRM forecast more high fare traffic and protects more seats for these passengers.
These competitive revenue management lessons remain true in the remainder of the discussion in the
chapter, and play a very important role in explaining the effects of revenue management on the traditional
measures airline performance. In subsequent sections, we also discuss the effect of fare structures
combined with revenue management settings on airline performance.
Scenario 2: Entry with a Single Unrestricted Low-Fare Priced $10 Lower than the Q Fare in
Scenario 0
We now look at the impact of revenue management in the case of entry under the assumptions of Scenario
2 where the new entrant offers a single unrestricted low-fare. In this case, we focus on only one of the two
sub-scenarios, Scenario 2 LM (limited match) where the incumbent carriers only match the lower fare level
in Q class. Scenario 2 FM (full match) does not provide any interesting insights in that all carriers are
offering a single fare, and therefore do not use revenue management since there is no product
differentiation. This also implies that the only scenarios we discuss here are those where either all carriers
use FCFS, or only the incumbent carriers use FCRM. Airline 3 does not offer a differentiated fare
structure and therefore does not use FCRM.
We show in this section that revenue management helps the nonstop incumbent carrier recover some
revenues lost after entry, and again affects aggregate measures of airline performance.
Market-Level Impact
At the market level, we observe that total revenues increase when the incumbent carriers use FCRM. The
relative increase in revenues ranges between 1% and 10%, decreasingly so with increasing new entrant
capacity. As previously explained, the increase in relative revenue gains as new entrant capacity decreases
(c.f. Figure 6.9) is linked to capacity constraints on the new entrant, which limit its ability to divert
passengers, and thus lets the nonstop incumbent carry more high-fare passengers, when it uses FCRM
(and thus protects seats for these passengers). In addition, while revenues initially increase as new entrant
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capacity increases when the incumbents use FCRM (as discussed in Chapter 5), they continuously
decrease under the assumption of no revenue management, thereby emphasizing the impact of revenue
management on total market revenues.
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Figure 6.9: Total market revenues as a function of revenue management settings - Scenario 2 LM
With respect to total market traffic and load factors, use of FCRM (on the incumbents) leads to a decrease
in total market traffic, as the incumbent carriers now protect seats for later-booking passengers (c.f. Table
6.9). Accordingly, average load factors decrease. At the same time, average fares also increase relative to
when the incumbents use FCFS, at a given new entrant capacity setting, as shown in Table 6.9. The
relative increase (respectively decrease) in average fare (respectively traffic) is greater at low entrant
capacity because revenue management has a greater effect in a capacity constrained environment, as
discussed earlier. At the total market level, the effect of capacity on average fares and traffic is the same
in both competitive revenue management cases, even though the fares are greater in when the incumbents
use FCRM while loads are higher when they don't.
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Entrant Daily Capacity Traffic Average Load Factor Average Fare
of nonstop (FCFS; (FCRM; (FCFS; (FCRM; (FCFS; (FCRM;Absolute %nont FCFS; FCRM; FCFS; FCRM; FCFS; FCRM;
FCFS) FCFS) FCFS) FCFS) FCFS) FCFS)
3x15 50% 172 168 76.4% 74.7% $87.96 $98.39
3x25 83% 179 177 70.3% 69.5% $87.24 $92.57
3x30 100% 182 181 67.6% 67.0% $86.28 $90.11
3x50 167% 195 194 59.0% 58.9% $79.05 $79.67
Table 6.9: Total market traffic and average market load factor - Scenario 2 LM
Airline-Level Impacts
Airline 1 benefits from the use of revenue management by 14% to 60%, once again increasingly with
decreasing new entrant capacity. Figure 6.10 shows Airline 1 revenues in each sub-scenario case, and
more generally the lesser increase in revenues (as a function of revenue management) at high new entrant
capacity. This, as discussed previously, is the consequence of the fact that at high new entrant capacity, a
large portion of traffic is diverted by the new entrant's more attractive fares, and that, given the lesser
capacity constraint, the negative revenue impact on the incumbent is greater.
Entrant Cap. (absolute)
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Figure 6.10: Airline 1 revenues as a function of scenario settings and new entrant capacity - Scenario 2 LM
These results show that, while Airline 1 revenues decrease with increasing new entrant capacity
(regardless of the revenue management situation), incumbents are relatively more affected by increasing
new entrant capacity when they use FCRM. The reason for this is that the mix of passengers carried under
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FCRM has more high fare passengers. When the new entrant's capacity increases, it diverts relatively
more high fare passengers, resulting in a greater relative impact on the incumbent carrier.
Figure 6.11 shows the change in loads by fare class on Airline 1 depending on the competitive revenue
management situation. The mix in passengers is clearly skewed towards higher fare classes when the
incumbents use FCRM, predominantly at low new entrant capacity. In addition, all fare classes are
affected by increasing new entrant capacity under FCRM while it is mostly Q class that suffers under
FCFS on the incumbent carriers. As a result, under FCRM, Airline 1 revenues and loads are more
severely affected by increasing new entrant capacity.
Airline I Loads by Fare Class Airline 1 Loads by Fare Class
FCFS on all carriers FCRM on Incumbents only
60o 3x15 (50%) 60
50 a 3x25 (83%) so
m 3x30 (100%)
40 m 3x50 (167%) 40
30 30=
20- 20
10- 1u
Y B M Q Y B M Q
Figure 6.11: Airline 1 Loads by Fare Class and Scenario - Scenario 2 LM
As a consequence of the competitive revenue management situation, average fares are substantially higher
on Airline 1 when the incumbents use FCRM rather than FCFS. In addition, average fares increase with
new entrant capacity in both cases, as shown in Table 6.10. The increase in average fares as new entrant
capacity increases is again a consequence of the revenue management situation, as explained in Section
6.1.3 (Scenario 1). With FCRM however, the increase in average fare is smaller on the incumbent carrier
since the new entrant diverts traffic more evenly from all fare classes on the incumbent. The use of
revenue management by the incumbent carriers allows Airline 1 to forecast high fare passengers, which
explains the higher fare, and highlights the difference in the effect of entry on average fares under FCRM
as compared to FCFS.
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Entrant Daily Capacity Revenues Average Fare Traffic ALF
% of (FCFS; (FCRM; (FCFS; (FCRM; (FCFS; (FCRM; (FCFS; (FCRM;
Absolute nonstop FCFS; FCRM; FCFS; FCRM; FCFS; FCRM; FCFS; FCRM;
incumbent FCFS) FCFS) FCFS) FCFS) FCFS) FCFS) FCFS) FCFS)
3x15 50% $6,941 $10,905 $86.41 $160.37 80.33 68.00 89% 76%
3x25 83% $7,025 $9,970 $97.24 $160.66 72.24 62.06 80% 69%
3x30 100% $6,996 $9,458 $104.16 $161.52 67.17 58.55 75% 65%
3x50 167% $6,178 $7,026 $141.61 $171.52 43.63 40.96 48% 46%
Table 6.10: Airline 1 revenues, average fare, traffic and average load factor - Scenario 2 LM
On Airline 3, the impact of the use of FCRM on airlines 1 and 2 is negligible. Indeed, as Airline 3 only
offers one unrestricted low-fare priced at the same level as the lowest fare on Airline 1, its revenues only
depend on traffic in that single fare class. This traffic is unaffected by the change in the incumbents'
revenue management system: As explained previously, when the incumbent carriers use FCRM, total
traffic decreases at the market level and on Airline 1. This indicates that there must be excess demand, as
compared to the case where all carriers accept seat requests using FCFS. This excess demand can thus
feed into Airline 3's flights. As a result of the use of FCRM on the incumbents, we would have expected
an increase in Airline 3's traffic. However, given the excess demand and the capacity constraints on
Airline 3, there is no increase in traffic following the incumbent carriers' use of FCRM, and therefore
very little change in Airline 3's revenues.
Summary
We have shown that once again, FCRM leads to increased revenues on the nonstop incumbent carrier
over FCFS. In particular, for the nonstop incumbent, revenue gains can be as high as 60% over FCFS.
While revenues increase, traffic and average load factors decrease on the nonstop incumbent, and average
fares increase. As a result, the nonstop incumbent carrier's share of traffic decreases when it moves to
FCRM, while its revenue share increases by as much as 20 percentage points (at 3x 15).
More importantly, our results show once again that revenues, traffic and average fares are affected quite
differently by entry under FCFS or FCRM conditions on the incumbent carriers. Under FCRM, Airline 1
revenues are more affected by increasing new entrant capacity than under FCFS, while average fare and
loads are more affected under FCFS. The general trends of the effect of entry are the same when the
incumbents use FCFS or FCRM, except revenues which are affected quite differently as a function of the
revenue management situation (as discussed earlier). Airline 3 does not suffer or benefit from the change
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in revenue management on the incumbent carriers, as the demand is very high and Airline 3 offers a
single unrestricted low fare.
Scenario 3: Entry with a Two-Tier Fare Structure
The focus of this section is on the impact of revenue management on the performance of the three
competitors in the case of Scenario 3 settings. In this scenario, the incumbent airlines have the option of
offering a standard fare structure and matching the lowest market fare in Q class (limited match) or fully
matching the new entrant's simplified two-tier fare structure (full match). The new entrant carrier offers
only the simplified two-tier fare structure.
As in Chapter 5, we divide the analysis into two sub-scenarios, the first one where the incumbent carriers
maintain their standard fare structure (referred to as Limited Match, with subscript LM), and the second
one where the incumbent carriers fully match the new entrant's two-tier fare structure (referred to as Full
Match, with subscript FM).
The analysis will show that there are once again benefits in using revenue management for the incumbent
carriers, and thus in mitigating the effect of entry on revenue losses. In addition, the simulation results
illustrate the impact of revenue management on traditional measures of airline performance and highlight
the changes in behavior of these indicators under different revenue management situations. For example,
average fares respond very differently to increasing new entrant capacity depending on the competitive
revenue management situation.
Scenario 3 LM: Limited Match
In this scenario, the new entrant carrier comes in with a two-tier fare structure. Its two fares are
respectively unrestricted and with restrictions equivalent to those of M class on the incumbent carriers,
but priced at the B and Q class level on the incumbent carrier (c.f. Chapter 5, Section 5.2.3, Scenario 3).
In addition, the new entrant prices its lower fare at $53, that is, $10 cheaper than the cheapest fare class in
Scenario 0. In Scenario 3 LM, the incumbent carriers adjust their lowest fare (Q) to match the lower fare
value on the new entrant, but do not match the two-tier structure on the new entrant nor the fewer
restrictions of the new entrant carrier.
Market-Level Impact
As shown in Figure 6.12, upon entry with first-come, first-served accommodation of seat requests, total
market revenues increase with new entrant capacity. The more seats are available in the market, the
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greater the total revenues, as more passengers are able to book when total market capacity increases.
Furthermore, given passenger behavior (early booking passengers are price-sensitive passengers), we also
anticipate a large increase in revenues as new entrant capacity increases. Indeed, as capacity constraints
are relaxed, more high-fare, late-booking passengers are able to book. Since these passengers' revenue
contribution is greater than that of early-booking low-fare passengers, the overall impact on revenues is
greater, as apparent in Figure 6.12.
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$17,50045 75 90 150
$17,000
-+ FCFS All
$16,500 -*- FCRM; FCRM; FCFS
-A- FCRM All
$16,000
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Figure 6.12: Total market revenues as a function of the revenue management setting and new entrant
capacity - Scenario 3 LM
In the case where either only the incumbents or all carriers use FCRM, total market revenues also increase
with new entrant capacity, simply because of the fact that there is greater capacity in the market, which
allows more passengers to travel. Figure 6.12 shows that when only the incumbents use FCRM, revenues
generally increase with new entrant capacity, except at high capacity (3x50) where revenues are lower
than with 3x25 seats. The explanation for this result comes from the fact that both incumbent carriers use
FCRM, while the new entrant accommodates requests for seats on a first-come, first-served basis. As a
result, even at low capacity, the incumbent carriers allocate seats to higher fare classes and ensure that
late-booking passengers will find availability. Given a fixed entrant capacity, this leads to increased
market revenues, compared to FCFS on all carriers, by as much as 9% (at low entrant capacity). As new
entrant capacity increases, more seats become available for passengers to travel. Since the new entrant is
accepting passenger bookings on a first-come, first-served basis, this increase in capacity has the effect of
letting more passengers travel, but also of diverting some of the incumbents' late-booking traffic towards
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the new entrant (since it remains available longer in the booking process). Furthermore, since the new
entrant offers cheaper fares than the incumbents, this diversion also leads to revenue dilution, hence the
decrease in total market revenues at high new entrant capacity when only the incumbents use FCRM.
Figure 6.12 also shows the effects of the competitive revenue management situation on total market
revenues and highlights the lower revenues when all carriers use FCRM compared to the other two cases.
This observation might initially appear to be counter-intuitive, in that one would have expected that when
all carriers use some form of revenue management, revenues would increase overall. It is not the case
here, for the following reasons. When all carriers use FCRM, they all protect for later-booking high-fare
passengers. As a result, since the new entrant carrier offers a cheaper unrestricted fare, and ensures that
the fare remains available, most late-booking passengers will travel on the new entrant, thus leading to
revenue dilution for the market overall. Consequently, the incumbent carriers will be forced to carry more
low-fare traffic. The combination of revenue management and revenue dilution by the new entrant leads
to this situation whereby having all carriers use FCRM leads to lower market revenues, as compared to
having all carriers accommodating seat requests on a first-come, first-served basis. It is the combination
of different fare structures on incumbents and new entrant, and the use of revenue management by the
new entrant (as well as by the incumbent carriers), which leads to this decrease in total market revenues.
Airline-Level Impact
Figure 6.13 shows that Airline 1 revenues follow the same pattern as total market revenues in terms of
which competitive revenue management setting leads to the highest revenues (as shown in Figure 6.12).
Two important observations emerge:
" First, revenues on Airline 1 decrease with increasing new entrant capacity, unlike total market
revenues, which generally increased with new entrant capacity
* Second, the ranking of revenues remains unchanged as the revenue management environment
changes: The greater the new entrant's capacity, the smaller Airline l's revenues. Relative
changes however, vary as a function of the competitive revenue management situation.
We therefore focus on the relationship between new entrant capacity and revenue management, and
explain how revenue management affects the relative change in revenues, average fares and traffic on the
incumbent and new entrant carriers.
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Figure 6.13: Airline 1 revenues as
Scenario 3 LM
a function of new entrant capacity and revenue management settings -
To understand the impact of entrant capacity and revenue management on Airline l's revenues, we look
at loads by fare class on Airline 1, as shown in Figure 6.14, and on the new entrant (Airline 3), as shown
in Figure 6.15. Clearly, the patterns are quite different depending on the competitive revenue management
situation.
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Figure 6.14: Airline 1 loads by fare class - Scenario 3 LM
With none of the carriers using revenue management, traffic decreases substantially in the lowest fare
class (Q) on Airline 1, as new entrant capacity increases. Since the new entrant is accommodating
passenger bookings on a first-come, first-served basis, the greater its capacity, the longer its low fare seats
are likely to be available (until the advance purchase requirement closes the class down), and the greater
Airline 3's traffic in M/Q class (hence the decreasing the traffic in Q class on Airline 1). This is apparent
in Figure 6.15, which shows new entrant loads by fare class, and the fact that M/Q loads increase
substantially with new entrant capacity, relative to the slower increase in Y/B loads. This decrease in
Airline 1's Q class traffic allows for more high fare passengers to travel in the higher fare classes, and
compensates some of the losses incurred by the loss of low-fare traffic. This is again reflected in Figure
6.18.1, which shows Airline 1's average fare as a function of new entrant capacity, and the fact that it
increases on Airline 1 with new entrant capacity. Overall, Airline 1's revenues suffer from increasing new
entrant capacity, but its average fare increases.
When only the incumbents use FCRM, the same pattern appears for the new entrant's traffic as when
none of the carriers used revenue management, as should be expected since the new entrant does not
change its seat allocation mechanism and maintains an FCFS approach to accepting seat requests. On the
nonstop incumbent (Airline 1) however, the impact of increasing new entrant capacity is far greater. The
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reason once again lies in the fact that the incumbent carriers are using FCRM, as opposed to FCFS. As a
result, the nonstop incumbent carrier anticipates late-booking full-fare passengers and protects seats for
them. The result is a shift in passenger mix towards higher fare classes (higher loads in Y, B and M
classes) relative to equivalent cases without revenue management. The increase in average fare (shown in
Figure 6.18.1) when only the incumbents use FCRM relative to when they used FCFS further supports
this observation. The outcome of this "better" passenger mix is that diversion from the nonstop incumbent
towards the new entrant, as new entrant capacity increases, takes away passengers in all fare classes and
hurts incumbent revenues substantially more than in when all carriers use FCFS, as shown in Figure 6.13.
Figure 6.18.1 corroborates the fact that passengers are diverted from all fare classes almost equivalently,
as the average fare remains almost stable with increasing new entrant capacity. This shows that the
passenger mix does not change substantially despite a decrease in Airline l's total traffic. As new entrant
capacity gets large (3x50), more low-fare passengers are diverted, as evidenced by the slight increase in
the nonstop incumbent's average fare.
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Figure 6.15: New entrant (Airline 3) loads by fare class - Scenario 3LM
- 182-
Effect of Revenue Management on Traditional Measures of Airline Performance
Finally, when all carriers use FCRM, traffic on the new entrant carrier behaves quite differently as new
entrant capacity increases. Since all carriers are now using FCRM, the new entrant expects late-booking
high-fare passengers, and thus protects for them. As a result, its loads in Y/B class are high from the start,
i.e. even at low entrant capacity (relative to the other two cases). As new entrant capacity increases, traffic
in Y/B class also increases, but far less than in M/Q class, where traffic is initially very low (at low
entrant capacity). The lesser increase in Y/B class traffic as new entrant capacity increases is due to the
fact that the new entrant is using FCRM and thus already carrying a significant amount of high fare
passengers even at low capacity.
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Figure 6.16: New entrant revenues as a function of revenue management and capacity settings - Scenario 3 LM
(FCFS All and (FCRM; FCRM; FCFS) overlap)
On the nonstop incumbent carrier, traffic reacts differently to increasing new entrant capacity. Y class
traffic decreases as the new entrant's capacity increases and diversion increases. Similarly, B and M
traffic decreases with increasing new entrant capacity. In Q class, however, loads initially increase -
because the nonstop incumbent compensates for lost Y, B and M traffic with Q class traffic - and
eventually decrease at high new entrant capacity as it starts diverting low-fare traffic, as explained in
Chapter 5. This observation is supported by the average fare on the nonstop incumbent: It initially
decreases sharply as the passenger mix shift towards lower fare classes, and increases slightly afterwards,
as Q class traffic decreases.
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Figure 6.17: Traffic on airlines 1 and 3 as a function of new entrant capacity and revenue management
settings - Scenario 3 LM (FCFS All and (FCRM; FCRM; FCFS) overlap on the new entrant
carrier)
As shown in Figure 6.17, traffic decreases both on the nonstop incumbent carrier and on the new entrant
carrier (at low entrant capacity) when either only the incumbents use FCRM or when all carriers use
FCRM, showing that both carriers are more selective in allowing passengers to book. At higher new
entrant capacity, traffic increases slightly on the nonstop incumbent when all carriers use FCRM (as
compared to when only the incumbents use FCRM), as it tries to make up for some of its lost high-fare
traffic by carrying a few more lower-fare passengers and takes advantage of demand stimulation. On the
new entrant carrier, traffic keeps decreasing, as the new entrant becomes more selective of its passengers.
The average fare on the new entrant carrier also decreases with increasing new entrant capacity, as shown
in Figure 6.18, but remains greater than when the new entrant uses FCFS (in the other two cases).
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Fig 6.18.1 - Airline 1 Average Fare Fig 6.18.2 - Airline 3 Average Fare
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Figure 6.18: Average fare on airlines 1 and 3 as a function of new entrant capacity and revenue management
settings - Scenario 3 LM (FCFS All and (FCRM; FCRM; FCFS) almost overlap on the new
entrant carrier)
The overall impact of having all three carriers use FCRM is negative at the total revenue level, as
mentioned earlier. This result is primarily due to the fact that the new entrant carrier offers a two-tier fare
structure which dilutes total market revenues. It is this effect that is felt when all carriers use FCRM.
FCRM still maximizes each individual airline's revenues, given the competitive situation. This case
shows that from a market standpoint, FCRM on all carriers leads to lower revenues than if the new entrant
carrier were accepting requests for seats on a first-come, first-served basis, once again because of the
lower fares on the new entrant and the ensuing diversion of traffic. In conclusion, in an asymmetric fare
structure environment, we observe that revenue management still leads to revenue gains for individual
carriers, but that overall market revenues may suffer from the asymmetry and use of revenue
management. Other results (not shown here) support the fact that the incumbent carriers have lower
revenues without revenue management than with revenue management when competing with a new
entrant using FCRM.
In addition, these results also highlight the effects of revenue management on average fares, revenues and
traffic on the incumbent and new entrant carrier. Average fares are much more affected by entry under
symmetric revenue management conditions (FCFS or FCRM on all competitors) and react in opposite
way to increasing new entrant capacity: They increase under FCFS on all carriers, but decrease with
increasing new entrant capacity under FCRM on all carriers.
Summary
Scenario 3 LM results show that at the total market level, revenue management has a diverse effect. When
only the incumbent carriers use FCRM, total market revenues increase (relative to FCFS on all carriers)
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because the new entrant fills its seats from the bottom up, i.e. from the lower fares up. The incumbent
carriers are consequently able to use revenue management to leverage the passenger mix and increase the
average fare paid by its average passenger. Conversely, when all carriers use FCRM, total market
revenues decrease compared to the case where none of the carriers use FCRM, or when only the
incumbents use FCRM. In this case, we explained that the new entrant now also maximizes its revenues,
which creates severe dilution on the incumbent carriers because of the lower fare structure offered by the
new entrant. The asymmetry of the fare structures between the incumbents and the new entrant carrier is
responsible for the decrease in market revenues observed when the new entrant uses revenue
management. By maximizing its revenues, the new entrant hurts total market revenues.
The nonstop incumbent carrier's revenues follow the same pattern as total market revenues: They increase
when only the incumbents use FCRM, but decrease when the new entrant matches the revenue
management.
These results show the importance of the relative fare structure (in combination with the competitive
revenue management situation) in explaining the impacts of entry on traditional measures of airline
performance. The asymmetry in fare structures between the incumbent carriers and the new entrant,
combined with the various revenue management situations tested here, explains the various effects on
fares, revenues and traffic observed in this section.
Scenario 3 FM: Full Match
In Scenario 3 FM, all three carriers offer the same fare structure. The new entrant still offers a two-tier fare
structure, with a lower fare than originally offered on the incumbent carriers, by $10 (before entry). In this
case, the incumbent carriers fully match the new entrant's fare structure.
Market-Level Impact
Figure 6.19 shows total market revenues as a function of new entrant capacity and revenue management
settings, and highlights the fact that revenues are affected jointly by new entrant capacity and revenue
management settings. In particular, given a revenue management setting, revenues increase with capacity,
regardless of the revenue management setting. The greater the capacity on the new entrant, the higher the
revenues in the market. In addition, given a capacity setting, we also note that total market revenues
increase as the airlines move to FCRM compared to FCFS acceptance of booking requests.
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Figure 6.19: Total market revenues as a function of revenue management settings and new entrant capacity -
Scenario 3 FM
Relatively speaking, the increase in total market revenues can be as high as 4.7% when the incumbents
use FCRM relative to FCFS, and up to 5% from when all three carriers use FCRM relative to FCFS.
Table 6.11 shows the details of absolute and relative increases in revenues as a function of new entrant
capacity. It also shows that the relative increase in revenues decreases with increasing new entrant
capacity, which is again a consequence of the lesser capacity constraints.
The increase in revenues is much larger when only the incumbents use FCRM compared to FCFS on all
carriers than when all carriers use FCRM compared to only the incumbents. The intuition is that both
incumbent carriers already use FCRM, which severely decreases the potential for revenue increases when
the new entrant also uses FCRM. In addition, at low entrant capacity, the relative capacity on the new
entrant is far smaller than that of the incumbents combined. As a result, the effect of using FCRM is much
smaller than when only the incumbents move to FCRM, as apparent in Table 6.11. As new entrant
capacity increases, the new entrant's relative capacity also increases. However, as mentioned earlier, the
potential for revenue increases is now smaller, since total market capacity is rather large, hence the
smaller relative gains.
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Entrant Daily Capacity Airline 1 Revenues Relative Revenue Change
% of (FCFS; (FCRM; (FCRM; (FCFS; (FCRM; (FCRM;
Absolute nonstop FCFS; FCRM; FCRM; FCFS; FCRM; FCRM;
incumbent FCFS) FCFS) FCRM) FCFS) FCFS) FCRM)
3x15 50% $13,389 $14,013 $14,062 4.7% 5.0% 0.3%
3x25 83% $14,398 $14,807 $14,827 2.8% 3.0% 0.1%
3x30 100% $14,797 $15,111 $15,116 2.1% 2.2% 0.0%
3x50 167% $15,709 $15,784 $15,805 0.5% 0.6% 0.1%
Table 6.11: Total market revenues by case, and relative revenue increase as a function of revenue
management - Scenario 3 FM
Figure 6.20 shows that total market traffic increases with capacity, regardless of the revenue management
setting. This observation is expected and very intuitive: The greater the available capacity, the more
passengers are able to travel.
Given a new entrant capacity, traffic decreases when airlines use FCRM, and more precisely, in all cases
other than 3x50, traffic initially decreases when only the incumbent carriers use FCRM, but increases
slightly when the new entrant matches the incumbents' revenue management. As mentioned before, the
decrease in traffic when the incumbents use FCRM is explained by the fact that the incumbents become
more selective of the passengers they carry, while the new entrant continues to fill up with early-booking
traffic (c.f. Scenario 1). At high entrant capacity, loads continue to decrease when the new entrant also
uses FCRM, as it also becomes more selective of its traffic. At lower entrant capacity, traffic increases
slightly because the new entrant also becomes more selective, but diverts some of the high-fare traffic
from the incumbents to itself. As a consequence, the incumbents compensate with more low-fare traffic,
and relatively more than they lost high-fare traffic, in an attempt to balance the fare differential. This
leads to a slight increase in total loads, as shown in Figure 6.20.
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Figure 6.20: Total market traffic as
Scenario 3 FM
a function of new entrant capacity and revenue management settings -
Figure 6.21 shows the average market fare as a function of new entrant capacity and competitive revenue
management settings. The case where carriers use FCFS clearly differs from the cases where either the
incumbents only, or all carriers, use FCRM. Indeed, when all carriers use FCFS, the average market fare
increases with new entrant capacity, while in both other cases, the average market fare decreases with
increasing new entrant capacity. In addition, when carriers use FCRM, the average fare is higher than
when all carriers accept seat requests on a first-come, first-served basis. The curves converge to the same
limit, as new entrant capacity increases. These effects are comparable to those observed in Scenario 1
since all carriers now offer the same fare structure, and the reader is thus referred to the discussion
relative to Scenario 1 for more details on the effects of revenue management on average fares.
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Figure 6.21: Average market fare as
Scenario 3 FM
a function of new entrant capacity and revenue management settings -
Airline-Level Impact
Figure 6.22 shows Airline 1 revenues as a function of both new entrant capacity and competitive revenue
management settings. Airline 1 revenues generally decrease as new entrant capacity increases. In
addition, the incumbent's revenues increase when it uses FCRM, relative to FCFS revenues. The increase
in revenues is greater if the new entrant does not also implement revenue management. When the
incumbent carrier protects for later-booking, high fare passengers, it increases its revenues. When the new
entrant carrier also matches this strategy, all carriers have to share revenues, and the incumbent carrier
does not benefit as much, but still benefits from revenue management. Once again, these results are
similar to those observed in Scenario 1 and can be explained in the same way.
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Figure 6.22: Airline 1 revenues as a function of new entrant capacity and competitive revenue management
settings - Scenario 3 FM
Figure 6.23 shows the impact of revenue management and new entrant capacity on the nonstop
incumbent's traffic and average fare, and explains the behavior of revenues described previously. As the
incumbent carriers start using FCRM (but the new entrant does not), traffic on Airline 1 decreases: The
nonstop incumbent trades some of its "high probability of purchasing a ticket" low fare passengers for full
fare passengers with a lower probability of actually booking, hence the overall increase in revenues but
decrease in total traffic. Figure 6.23 shows that while under asymmetric revenue management conditions,
the nonstop incumbent's loads are lower than in the other two cases, its average fare is higher. As new
entrant capacity increases, the difference in traffic and average fare between cases decreases, as revenue
management becomes less of an advantage when capacity constraints (and consequently load factors)
decrease.
When all carriers use FCRM, the nonstop incumbent's traffic and average fare reach a middle ground
between the case where none of the carriers use revenue management and the case where only the
incumbents do. The reason is that when the new entrant also uses FCRM, the probability of increasing
revenues by trading a low-fare passengers for a less likely high-fare passenger becomes lower since
airlines 1 and 3 share these passengers. It consequently becomes better (revenue-wise) for the nonstop
incumbent carrier to let a few more low-fare passengers book, which has the dual effect of increasing
traffic and the decreasing average fare (compared to the asymmetric revenue management case).
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Figure 6.23: Airline 1 traffic and average fare as a function of revenue management and new entrant
capacity
Figure 6.24 shows new entrant revenues as a function of its capacity and competitive revenue
management settings. New entrant revenues increase with capacity, but also with revenue management
(as was the case in Scenario 1).
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Figure 6.24: New entrant revenues as a function of new entrant capacity and competitive revenue
management settings
Figure 6.25 shows traffic and average fare on the new entrant carrier as a function of its capacity and of
the competitive revenue management situation. Traffic increases with new entrant capacity, and is highest
when the incumbent carriers are the only competitors to use FCRM. Figure 6.25.2 shows the average fare
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on the new entrant carrier, and particularly that it is considerably higher when the new entrant carrier uses
FCRM. This effect of revenue management plays a critical role in illustrating the inadequacy of
traditional aggregate measures of airline performance in understanding the nature of the incumbents'
competitive response to entry.
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Figure 6.25: New entrant traffic and average fare as a function of new entrant capacity and competitive
revenue management settings
Comparing incumbent and new entrant average fares, we observe that in Scenario 3 FM, new entrant
average fares behave very differently from incumbent average fares, both as a function of new entrant
capacity, and as a function of the competitive revenue management situation. When all carriers use FCFS,
the carrier with the greater capacity has the higher average fare. We explained that this is due to the fact
that the carrier with greater capacity is able to accommodate more high fare demand, since it books late.
When only the incumbents use FCRM, regardless of the new entrant capacity settings tested here, the
incumbent carrier maintains a higher average fare. In this case, the incumbents use FCRM, which allows
them to keep seats available for later-booking passengers, and thus increase their revenues. Finally, when
all carriers use FCRM, the opposite of FCFS on all carriers is observed: The carrier with the smaller
capacity has the higher average fare. In this case, the carrier with smaller capacity carries mostly high fare
passengers and therefore has a higher average fare.
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Figure 6.26: Incumbent and new entrant average fares as a function of new entrant capacity and competitive
revenue management situation - Scenario 3 FM
Summary
In Scenario 3 FM, we therefore observed similar effects of revenue management on traditional measures of
airline performance to those of Scenario 1. We explained that these similar results are the consequence of
the symmetric fare structures offered by the competitors: All carriers use an identical two-tier fare
structure. These results thus further illustrate the importance of the combined effects of the competitive
revenue management situation, the relative fare structure between competitors and the new entrant's
relative capacity on average fares, revenues and traffic.
6.2. Summary and Comparison of Scenarios 0 through 3: Impacts of
Revenues Management and Cross-Scenario Comparisons
Having looked at the impact of revenue management on revenues, traffic, and average fares in each of the
previous four scenarios, we now focus on the effect of revenue management across scenarios and
highlight the great importance of revenue management with respect to the change in aggregate measures
of airline performance as a function of new entrant capacity.
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6.2.1. Market-Level Comparisons
Figure 6.27 shows total market revenues in the various scenarios tested and as a function of both the
revenue management situation and the new entrant's relative capacity. It highlights in particular the usual
revenue-increasing effect of entry (as discussed in Chapter 5) on total market revenues. Only in Scenario
2 FM is there a decrease in total market revenues following entry because of the revenue dilution caused by
the incumbent carriers' matching the new entrant's single low fare. In addition, this figure also illustrates
the changing effect of revenue management as a function of the competitive situation. In the case of entry
with symmetric fares, revenues increase with new entrant capacity and are lowest under FCFS acceptance
of seat request (in scenarios 1 and 3 FM, except Scenario 2 FM, as mentioned).
Under asymmetric fare structures (scenarios 2 LM and 3 LM), revenue management has varying effects on
total market revenues. In the case of entry under Scenario 2 LM conditions, revenue management on the
incumbent carriers leads to a decrease in total market revenues as the new entrant's capacity increases -
as explained in Section 6.1.3 - because the new entrant diverts increasing numbers of passenger from the
incumbent carriers. Under Scenario 3 LM, total market revenues are lower when all carriers use FCRM than
when all carriers accept seat requests on a first-come, first-served basis.
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Figure 6.27: Total market revenues by scenario as a function of the competitive revenue management
situation and new entrant capacity (a: FCFS on all carriers; b: FCRM on incumbents, FCFS on
entrant; c: FCRM on all carriers)
Figure 6.28 further highlights the changing effects of revenue management on average market fares
depending on the carriers' use of FCRM or FCFS and on the relative fare structure on the competitors. In
this case, under symmetric fare structures, our results show that the average market fare is impacted quite
differently depending on whether the airlines use revenue management or not. For example, in scenarios 1
and 3 FM - where all carriers use the same fare structure - when none of the carriers use revenue
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management, the average market fare increases with increasing new entrant capacity (as more high fare
passengers are able to travel). Conversely, as soon as the incumbents use FCRM, the average market fare
decreases with increasing new entrant capacity, as the new entrant carrier now diverts some of the high
fare traffic to its increasingly available lower fare classes. This example clearly highlights the effect of
revenue management, independently of any particular response from the incumbent carriers (beyond
matching the new entrant's fare structure).
Under asymmetric fare structures, revenue management also has a noticeable impact on average market
fares, even though it does not affect the trend of decrease in average fare (with increasing new entrant
capacity). Scenarios 2 LM and 3 LM both exhibit a decrease in average market fare as new entrant capacity
increases, but the average fare is higher when only the incumbent carriers use FCRM. In the case where
all carriers use FCRM (in Scenario 3 FM only), the average market fare is actually lower than in either of
the other two cases simulated.
Aggregate measures of performance (revenues, fares and traffic) are therefore highly susceptible, even at
the total market level, to changes in the revenue management environment, in the competitive fare
structures and in the relative new entrant capacity (as discussed in Chapter 5). In the next section, we
focus on the impacts at the airline level.
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Figure 6.28: Average market fare by scenario as a function of the competitive revenue management situation
and new entrant capacity
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6.2.2. Airline-Level Comparisons
Nonstop Incumbent Carrier (Airline 1)
Figure 6.29 illustrates how incumbent revenues respond to a change in the competitive revenue
management situation, as a function of new entrant capacity. It shows in particular that, although
incumbent revenues decrease with increasing new entrant capacity (regardless of the competitive revenue
management situation), incumbent revenues are usually lowest when all carriers use FCFS, and higher
under the assumption of revenue management by either the incumbents alone or by all three competitors.
As previously discussed, under symmetric fares, the nonstop incumbent carrier achieves its highest
revenues when it uses FCRM while the new entrant carrier accepts requests for booking on a first-come,
first-served basis, and incurs a decrease in revenues when all competitors use revenue management
(relative to this asymmetric competitive revenue management situation). We already explained that the
increased competition for high fare passengers is responsible for this decrease in incumbent revenues in
this particular case. Conversely, under asymmetric fare structures (scenarios 2 LM and 3 LM), when only the
incumbent carriers use FCRM, Airline 1 revenues are higher than when all carriers use FCFS. In Scenario
3 LM however, under symmetric revenue management conditions, Airline l's revenues are lower than even
FCFS revenues. We discussed this particular case and explained that the loss in revenues on Airline 1 is
the result of increased competition for high fare traffic, which, combined with a lower fare structure on
the new entrant carrier, leads to high revenue dilution from Airline 1 to Airline 3.
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Figure 6.29: Airline 1 revenues by scenario as a function of the competitive revenue management situation
and new entrant capacity
Unlike its revenues, Airline l's average fares follow a more variable pattern as a function of the
competitive revenue management situation. Its average fare in the market can increase, decrease or
remain somewhat stable following as new entrant capacity increases, as shown in Figure 6.30. Once
again, the effect of revenue management is closely linked to the relative new entrant capacity and fare
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structure. In the case of symmetric fares, the incumbent's average fare decreases with increasing new
entrant capacity, is highest when only the incumbent carriers use FCRM and lowest when all carriers use
FCFS. As previously mentioned, it is once again the increased competition for high revenue traffic -
when all carriers use FCRM - which leads to the lower average fare on the incumbent (relative to FCRM
on the incumbents only).
In asymmetric fare cases (scenarios 2 LM and 3 LM), the incumbent's average fare behaves very differently
as the competitive revenue management situation changes. When all carriers use FCFS, the incumbent's
average fare increases with increasing new entrant capacity, since the new entrant carrier diverts mostly
lower fare traffic and leaves the incumbent with less traffic but higher revenue passengers. When only the
incumbent carriers use FCRM, the incumbent's average fare tends to remain relatively stable as new
entrant capacity increases, with a tendency to increase at very high new entrant capacity. Under Scenario
3 LM when all carriers use FCRM, the incumbent carrier's average fare suffers a sharp decrease with
increasing new entrant capacity, unlike the other two cases under Scenario 3 LM- Once again, the increase
in competition for high revenue, late booking traffic leads to the decrease in incumbent average fare under
this scenario. Furthermore, the asymmetric fare structure provides the new entrant with an additional
competitive advantage which lures passengers to its flights.
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Figure 6.30: Airline 1 average fares by scenario as a function of the competitive revenue management
situation and new entrant capacity
In summary, under symmetric fares, the incumbent's average fare decreases with increasing new entrant
capacity, relatively more when only the incumbent carriers use FCRM. This effect on average fares is a
direct consequence of the relative capacities and competitive revenue management situation, and assumes
a full match from the incumbent carriers.
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Under asymmetric fares, revenue management allows the incumbent carriers to maintain high fare traffic
when they are not competing with a new entrant also using revenue management. Under FCFS, the
carriers fill-up on a first-come, first-served basis, which allows the carrier with the higher capacity to
carry the high fare traffic. When all carriers use FCRM, the incumbent then suffers extensively from the
competitive fare advantage of the new entrant, and its average fare drops quickly with increasing new
entrant capacity. This decrease in average fare is not indicative of a match response from the incumbent
carriers (other than in the lowest fare class), but rather of the greater competition in the market.
New Entrant Carrier (Airline 3)
The new entrant carrier, unlike the nonstop incumbent, benefits from increasing capacity with respect to
revenues, regardless of the revenue management situation. The relative effect of revenue management can
be felt only in the case of differentiated fare structures on the new entrant carrier. In addition, Figure 6.31
shows that new entrant revenues increase when it moves to FCRM, while they can also decrease when the
incumbent carriers move to FCRM, given that the new entrant accepts seat requests on a first-come, first-
served basis. Generally speaking, as long as the new entrant offers some form of product differentiation,
there are revenue gains associated with it moving to FCRM, and these revenue gains are greater when the
incumbent carriers do not match the new entrant's lower fare structure.
Finally, Figure 6.31 also shows that at very high capacity under symmetric fares, new entrant revenues
with FCFS can surpass those with FCRM. This result is the consequence of increased competition for
high fare traffic, as explained previously.
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Figure 6.31: Airline 3 revenues by scenario as a function of the competitive revenue management situation
and new entrant capacity
Figure 6.32 illustrates the impacts of revenue management on new entrant average fares, and particularly
the change in average fare trends under FCRM. Average fares decrease with increasing new entrant
capacity when it uses FCRM, whereas they increase in the cases where the new entrant accepts seat
requests on an FCFS basis. Note that under Scenario 1, the new entrant has a higher average fare when all
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carriers use FCFS at high capacity than when all carriers use FCRM. At high capacity, and under FCFS
acceptance of seat requests, the incumbent carrier fills-up sooner and leaves the high fare traffic to the
new entrant carrier, hence the higher average fare.
Airline 3 Average Fare - Scenario I
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Figure 6.32: Airline 3 average fares by scenario as a function of the competitive revenue management
situation and new entrant capacity
These revenue management effects on the new entrant carrier are expected effects, but nonetheless
highlight the importance and influence of revenue management when studying aggregate measures of
airline performance, such as average fares or revenues.
Relative Average Fares of Incumbent and New Entrant Carriers
The relative average fare of the incumbent and new entrant carriers are also significantly affected by the
revenue management situation, as shown in Figure 6.33. In particular, scenarios 1, 3 LM and 3 FM provide
three interesting cases of the effect of revenue management on relative average fares. In Scenario 1, when
all carriers use FCFS, the new entrant starts out with a lower average fare than the nonstop incumbent,
but, as its capacity increases, so does its average fare (as previously explained). When only the
-205 -
$150
$125
$75
$50
- Sc 3a - FCFS All
-_ Sc 3b - FCRM FCRM FCFS
-- Sc 3c -FCRM All
--- Sc 3a - FCFS All
--- Sc 3b - FCRM; FCRM FCFS
-A- Sc 3c - FCRM All
U
Chapter 6
incumbents use FCRM, Airline l's average fare remains consistently higher than that of Airline 3.
Finally, when all carriers use FCRM, then the new entrant's average fare is initially higher than that of the
incumbent, and gradually decreases as new entrant capacity increases. Scenario 3 FM exhibits similar
behavior - we had explained that scenarios 1 and 3 FM were similar due to the symmetric fares on all three
competitors, albeit with different fare products. Scenario 3 FM has a smaller spread between average fares
and revenue management cases, because of the lesser product differentiation in this case. Scenario 3 LM
presents a variation of the results observed in scenarios 1 and 3 FM-
These results show that the relative average fare between carriers is highly dependent on the competitive
revenue management situation and fare structure, and the relative new entrant capacity. They also
illustrate the inappropriateness of these measures in assessing the response of incumbents to entry.
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Relative Average Fares - Scenario 1
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6.2.3. Summary
The previous discussion of the effect of revenue management on incumbent revenue performance and
traditional measures of airline performance in general has illustrated the importance of revenue
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management in explaining the changes in aggregate measures of airline performance, and more
specifically on average fare, traffic and revenues. Our results have highlighted that:
1. The impact of revenue management on traditional measures of airline performance is closely tied
to relative new entrant capacity and relative fare structure between competitors (limited or full
match, i.e. symmetric or asymmetric fare structure).
2. Revenue management affects aggregate measures of airline performance in very different ways
depending on the scenario and leads to very different outcomes within any given scenario, as a
function of increasing new entrant capacity.
* Under the assumption of revenue management on either the incumbents only or on all
carriers, the effect of increasing new entrant capacity is far greater (and negative) on
incumbent revenues and average fares. Only in the case of Scenario 2 LM is this not true, only
because of the extreme dilution of traffic towards the new entrant, from low-fare passengers
up (as previously discussed).
* Under the assumption of no revenue management, the nonstop incumbent carrier's revenues
also decrease with increasing new entrant capacity, but are relatively less affected by entry.
* Finally, product differentiation on the new entrant (and on the incumbent carriers when they
match the new entrant's fares) plays a critical role in the relative effect of revenue
management. More product differentiation (in Scenario 1) bestows more leverage on the
incumbent carriers who are thus able to extract more revenues from passengers. As a
consequence, they are relatively more affected by low-fare entry than when fare products are
less differentiated (Scenario 3 FM). Asymmetric situations whereby the new entrant carrier
offers a less differentiated fare structure not matched by the incumbent carriers leads to
greater revenue losses on the incumbents, but also to greater average fares, as the incumbent
carriers are then able to maintain the high fare traffic.
3. Use of revenue management generally leads to revenue increases on the airlines using revenue
management. Given that the incumbent carriers use FCRM, the fact that the new entrant also
moves to FCRM increases the competitiveness of the market and thus can lead to a decrease in
incumbent revenues.
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These results thus reinforce Chapter 5 findings that such aggregate measures of airline performance as
average fares provide insufficient information to assess the response of an incumbent carrier to low-fare
entry.
6.3. Sensitivity Analysis
The results presented in Chapter 5 and the first part of Chapter 6 depend on some of the modeling
assumptions in PODS. In particular, we identified three critical parameters for which we test the
sensitivity of the results:
1. Connecting time on Airline 2. As discussed in Chapter 5, Airline 2 offers only connecting service
in the market, with a total travel time of 5h43 compared to lh16 on airlines 1 and 3.
2. Business/Leisure mix. Market parameters are set to reproduce a market where 35% of the traffic
is business traffic, while the remaining 65% are business travelers.
3. Leisure willingness-to-pay curves (demand curves). Market demand is based on willingness-to-
pay curves described in Chapter 5. In particular, traffic stimulation following entry is dependent
upon the shape of the leisure demand curve, which we modify here.
In the following paragraphs we discuss the sensitivity of results with respect to these three parameters.
Our results will show that while results respond to changes in these parameters, the general conclusions
drawn from previous simulations in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 remain unchanged.
6.3.1. Connecting Time on Airline 2
In order to test for the sensitivity of results to the length of the connection through Airline 2's hub, we
decreased the total travel time on Airline 2 according to Figure 6.34. This sensitivity analysis only
involves decreasing the connecting time on Airline 2 as the total travel time on Airline 2 was already
quite high.
- 209 -
Chapter 6
I1hl6 Travel Time on Airline I
Origin Hub H2 Destination
5h43 Baseline Travel Time on Airline 2
2h Travel Time on Airline 2
3h Travel Time on Airline 2
4h Travel Time on Airline 2
5h Travel Time on Airline 2
Figure 6.34: Sensitivity test on connecting time on Airline 2
Our simulation results show that changing connecting time on Airline 2 does not affect the relationship
between Airline 1 and Airline 3's average fares, as shown in Figure 6.35. It does however have an impact
on the actual values of individual carrier's average fares, revenues and traffic, since Airline 2's overall
path quality increases as the total travel time decrease.
Generally speaking, the effect of the change in Airline 2's schedule is a decrease in Airline 1 and Airline
3 revenues (by up to 5% each in the case of FCRM on all carriers, in Scenario 0 for Airline 1 and
Scenario 150 for Airline 3). Conversely, Airline 2's revenues increase by up to 80% (but remain lower
than those of Airline 1). This effect on revenues is accompanied by a slight decrease in traffic on the
nonstop carriers, as Airline 2 diverts a few passengers. The effect on average fares is a slight decrease on
airlines 1 and 3 (as shown in Figure 6.35), and a slight increase on Airline 2.
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Figure 6.35: Sample of sensitivity of results to changes in Airline 2 travel time, FCRM on all carriers
Our simulation results therefore show the robustness of previously simulated results with respect to
changes in Airline 2's schedule, and more specifically a decrease in total travel time on the connecting
carrier.
6.3.2. Business/Leisure Mix of Demand
Given the changes the cyclicality of the airline business and its dependence on the state of the economy,
the mix of business and leisure passengers changes. We therefore tested our results with respect to their
sensitivity to the change in passenger mix. Figure 6.36 shows the various situations tested, with a focus
on an increase in the proportion of business traffic, which is less sensitive to price, but more to
convenience.
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Figure 6.36: Change in business/leisure mix of traffic
Our simulation results show that individual airline performance is affected by the change in
business/leisure mix of traffic. Individual airline revenues decrease as the mix of leisure passengers
increases (since they have a lower willingness to pay), but the split of revenues (revenue share) between
airlines 1 and 3 is unaffected. Airline 2's revenues are even less affected, as it remains the less attractive
choice.
As revenues decrease, loads increase, since the airlines - when they use FCRM or not - are increasingly
willing to carry all traffic, given the lower probability that higher fare passengers will show up. As a
direct consequence, the average fare on airlines 1 and 3 decreases as the proportion of leisure passengers
increases.
Without going into all the details, the general conclusions from previous discussions hold, and the
relationships between aggregate measures of airline performance, relative new entrant capacity,
competitive revenue management situation and fare structures are maintained. As the proportion of
business passengers increases, the relative gains of revenue management decrease slightly since the need
to protect seats for late-booking passengers becomes less critical, as most of the passengers are now late-
booking business passengers.
Scenario 3 LM, however, presents somewhat different results as the leisure mix of passengers varies. Figure
6.37 and Figure 6.38 show the change in average fares on both nonstop carriers as the mix of leisure
passengers changes from 65% (in the standard case) to 40% at the extreme of our sensitivity tests. These
figures show that the behavior of average fares does not change as a function of the new entrant's
capacity and the competitive revenue management situation. Individual carrier average fares increase
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because of the greater proportion of passengers willing to pay a higher fare. On Airline 1, the average fare
increases quickly with increasing new entrant capacity under Scenario 3 LM with FCFS on all carriers, until
it starts decreasing at very high new entrant capacity. This decrease is a consequence of the new mix of
passengers combined with the increased capacity on Airline 3 which can now divert more high fare
passengers. This effect is similar to what we observed in the case of Scenario 2 LM on Airline 1.
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Figure 6.37: Effect of leisure mix on Airline 1 average fares
Airline 3 Average Fare -Sc. 31M - Std Leisure Demand
Entrant Cap. (absolute)
45 75 90 150
$160
iFCFS All
$140 - ---- FCRM vs. FCFS
$120 
& FCRMAll
$100
$80
$60
40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140% 160% 180%
Entrant Cap. (%of NS Inc.)
Figure 6.38: Effect of leisure mix on Airline 3 average
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The bigger change occurs when focusing on relative new entrant and incumbent average fares when all
carriers use FCRM (in the other two cases, the relative values of new entrant and incumbent average fares
remain the same). Under the assumptions of standard demand, the new entrant's average fare was greater
than that of the incumbent carriers, under all capacities tested. Under the assumptions of high leisure
demand, the new entrant's average fare starts at a lower level than that of the incumbent carrier, and
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eventually becomes higher than that of the incumbent carrier, at high new entrant capacity, as the new
entrant's average fare decreases slower than that of the incumbent carrier. This result is the consequence
of the asymmetric fare structures between the two carriers. Indeed, at low entrant capacity, Airline 3,
although it is protecting for late-booking high fare passengers, is constrained as to how many of these
passengers it can carry. As a result, given the high business demand, Airline 1 is relatively unaffected by
the diversion of traffic and carries numerous passengers at its Y class fare. This fare is much higher than
that of the Y class fare on the new entrant, which biases the incumbent's average fare high. When the new
entrant's capacity increases, it is able to divert more passengers and thus affects the incumbent's average
fare.
Overall, our simulation results show that the conclusions from Chapters 5 and 6 generally hold and are
relatively insensitive to changes in the mix of business and leisure passengers. The only notable change
occurs in the case of Scenario 3 LM, under extremely high leisure demand. This case further highlights the
importance of relative new entrant capacity, as the relationship between the two nonstop carriers' average
fares eventually returns to that of standard demand levels, at high new entrant capacity.
6.3.3. Leisure Willingness-to-Pay (Demand) Curve
Our final sensitivity test studies the effect of changes in the leisure demand curve on aggregate measures
of performance and the relationships previously established in Chapters 5 and 6. Figure 6.39 shows the
simulated changes in leisure demand curve. These changes affect leisure passengers' willingness to pay
the higher fares in the market, along with the amount of stimulation created by the lower Q fare.
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Leisure Willingness-to-Pay Curves
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Figure 6.39: Simulated change in leisure demand curve
As mentioned in Chapter 5, the demand curves in PODS depend on two parameters, the "emult" and the
"basefare". In these sensitivity tests, we modify only the basefare value, in order to preserve the shape of
the demand curve.
Once again, results show that the change in demand curve - using either the "low" or the "high" curves
shown in Figure 6.39 - does not significantly affect the performance of the three competitors. The major
trends are that revenues generally decrease on all three carriers as leisure demand decreases, as does
traffic. However, since the business willingness-to-pay has not changed (i.e. business demand curves
remain constant), the average fare on all three carriers tends to increase under the "low" setting.
Conversely, under the "high" setting, opposite results are observed.
Under Scenario 3 LM with all carriers using FCRM, results are once again slightly more affected by the
change in the "basefare" settings than any other scenario. Figure 6.40 shows the effect of the decrease in
traffic stimulation and leisure willingness-to-pay on Airline 1 and Airline 3 average fares as a function of
increasing new entrant capacity and the competitive revenue management situation. It first illustrates that
the impact on the new entrant's average fare is minimal since it is the airline offering the lower fares in
this asymmetric scenario and therefore maintains most of its traffic. On Airline 1, however, the effect is
much more apparent. In scenarios 3 LM with FCFS on all carriers or FCRM on the incumbents only, the
average fares on Airline 1 are higher with a lower basefare as there are fewer leisure passengers traveling.
The overall effect of increasing new entrant capacity and the relative positioning of the incumbent and
new entrant average fares remain unchanged. In this scenario (Scenario 3 LM with all carriers using
FCRM), at high new entrant capacity, the incumbent's average fare increases significantly and becomes
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higher than that of the new entrant. This effect is the consequence of the decrease in leisure traffic. At
high entrant capacity, the lack of capacity constraints on Airline 3 allow it to carry more and more of the
lower fare demand. These passengers are thus diverted, which leads to an apparent increase in Airline l's
average fare. Revenue-wise however, Airline l's revenues decrease with increasing new entrant capacity.
Average Fares - Scenario 3LM - Std Basefare Average Fares - Scenario 3LM - $50 Basefare
Entrant Cap. (absolute) Entrant Cap. (absolute)
$2- 45 75 90150 $5- 45 75 90150
- - Sc3a-Al1 - - Sc3b-Ai1 A Sc3c-A11
$200 --- o--Sc3a-A13 -- --- Sc3b-A13 --- Sc3c-A13 - $200
$150 $150
$100 
- $100
$50 $50
$0 $0
40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140% 160% 180% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140% 160% 180%
Entrant Cap. (% of NS Inc.) Entrant Cap. (% of NS Inc.)
Figure 6.40: Effect of change in leisure demand curve on average fares in Scenario 3 LM (a: FCFS on all
carriers; b: FCRM on incumbents, FCFS on entrant; c: FCRM on all carriers)
In summary, changes in leisure demand stimulation simulated here show that the trends in the results
(identified in Chapters 5 and 6) are relatively insensitive to change in demand curves. The most
noticeable change occurs in Scenario 3 LM and is once again a consequence of the asymmetry in the fare
structures between incumbents and the new entrant carrier.
6.3.4. Conclusions
Sensitivity tests show that, overall, the trends and important factors identified in previous discussions are
unaffected by changes in the simulation parameters. These sensitivity tests emphasized the importance of
the competitive fare structures between incumbent carriers, as well as the critical role of relative new
entrant capacity and competitive revenue management settings in assessing the impacts of entry on
traditional measures of airline performance.
6.4. Conclusions: Lessons Learned from the Single Market Case
The simulation results in this chapter have highlighted the importance of revenue management in
understanding the dynamics of low-fare entry in a single market case, and its impact on traditional
aggregate measures of airline performance. In particular, our simulations show that the use of revenue
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management can lead to various effects on the incumbent carrier's average fare, revenues or traffic. For
example, without revenue management, under Scenario 3 LM assumptions, Airline l's average fare
increases with increasing new entrant capacity, whereas it decreases when all carriers use revenue
management. Under Scenario 1 settings, Airline l's revenues decrease with increasing new entrant
capacity in all cases, but tend to decrease relatively more when only the incumbent carriers use revenue
management.
Similarly, these results also illustrate the effect of revenue management on relative average fare between
the incumbent and new entrant carrier. For example, the incumbent's average fare is always higher than
that of the new entrant carrier under Scenario 3 LM when all carriers use FCFS acceptance of seat requests,
or when only the incumbent carriers use FCRM. When all carriers use FCRM, however, the new entrant's
average fare is higher than that of the incumbent carrier in all cases tested.
These simulations consequently highlight the importance of revenue management in understanding the
behavior of aggregate measures of airline performance following low-fare entry. These simulations also
drew attention to the importance of the relative fare structure between competing carriers. Indeed, we
discussed the close tie between the symmetry (or asymmetry) of the fare structure of the incumbents and
new entrant carrier and the competitive revenue management situation. We showed in Section 6.2.2 that
the effect of revenue management on aggregate measures of airline performance is different depending on
whether the fare structures are identical or not on the competing carriers. In other words, whether the
incumbent carriers fully match the new entrant's fare structure affects the performance of all carriers and
also has an impact on the effect of entry on average fares, revenues and traffic.
Finally, these results also re-emphasized the importance of the factors that we had identified in Chapter 5
as critical in understanding the effect of entry on aggregate measures of airline performance. In particular,
the relative capacity of the new entrant carrier still plays a major role in understanding the effects of
entry.
Overall, these simulations results show that average fares - and other measures of airline performance
such as revenues and traffic - provide a very incomplete picture of the competitive situation and certainly
do not provide any indication as to the price response of incumbent carriers to low-fare entry.
Our simulations implicitly recognize the importance of the path quality on airline revenue performance by
modeling Airline 2 as a connecting carrier, but do not actually model flows of connecting passengers on a
network. In Chapter 7, we will simulate a full network situation with a low-fare carrier entering a subset
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of Airline l's market in order to assess the impact of connecting traffic, and the potential mitigating
effects of carrying more connecting traffic for Airline 1.
-218-
CHAPTER 7
EXTENSION OF RESULTS TO A LARGE
NETWORK ENVIRONMENT: ENTRY IN TEN
MARKE TS
In Chapters 5 and 6, we focused on the impacts of low-fare entry in a single market case, and highlighted
the importance of relative new entrant capacity in the market, as well as pricing and revenue management
effects on traditional measures of airline performance. The results showed that traditional measures of
airline performance paint a very incomplete picture of the competitive response of incumbent carriers to
low-fare entry.
In this chapter, we expand the research to a larger network where the incumbent network carriers now
carry connecting passengers in addition to local market passengers. The purpose of this study is to
illustrate the added complexity in a large network environment and further demonstrate the inadequacy of
traditional measures of airline performance in explaining responses to entry. In particular, the focus will
be on the impacts of the flows of connecting passengers on aggregate measures of airline performance.
In the first section, we discuss the approach and the scenarios chosen to represent entry in a large network
environment. In the second section, we present the results and findings of the simulation.
7.1. Approach
We once again use the Passenger Origin Destination Simulator (PODS) to simulate this larger
competitive airline network. In this chapter, we focus on the case of entry with a two-tier fare structure
and with full match from the incumbent carriers (previously referred to as Scenario 3 FM)- We chose to
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model only this case of entry because it best replicates low-fare entry according to the following
observations:
1. Low-fare carriers usually enter a market with lower fares than previously offered by the
incumbent carriers, and with a simplified fare structure.
2. Incumbent network carriers almost always match the new entrant's fare structure, in order to
remain competitive and in an attempt to maintain their market share (in the local market with
low-fare competition).
Measures of airline performance are still unquestionably affected by the pricing strategy of the new
entrant and the response of the incumbent carriers, as previously illustrated and discussed.
To illustrate the effect of entry and incumbent revenue management in this low-fare airline environment,
we simulate a competitive airline network, with a set of three competing airlines offering service in this
network. Airlines 1 and 2 represent the incumbent network carriers offering service in all the markets in
the network, either nonstop, or connecting through their hub. The new entrant carrier (Airline 3) offers
only nonstop service in a subset of Airline l's nonstop local markets, the ten markets with the highest
local demand from Airline 1's hub.
7.1.1. Simulated Network
The network in which the three competing carriers operate is represented as a network of 40 cities, in
addition to two individual airline hubs (42 cities in total). Figure 7.1 shows a geographical layout of the
network overlaid on a map of the US. It also shows the two network airlines' hubs, HI and H2.
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Figure 7.1: Simulated incumbent networks
Traffic on this network flows only from West to East given that each network airline offers service only
from western spoke cities (1 through 20) to its hub, and from its hub to eastern spoke cities. As a result,
nonstop service is available from cities 1 through 20 to hubs HI and H2, on Airline 1 and Airline 2
respectively, and from hubs HI and H2 to cities 21 through 40, on Airline 1 and Airline 2 respectively. In
addition, airlines 1 and 2 also offer hub-to-hub service between HI and H2. Consequently, passengers
traveling from a western spoke to an eastern spoke must connect either through HI or H2. Passengers
traveling from a western spoke to HI or H2 can either travel nonstop on the appropriate carrier, or
connect through the other carrier's hub. Finally, passengers traveling from either hub to an eastern city
also have the option of flying nonstop from that hub or connecting through the competing carrier's hub.
The new entrant carrier, Airline 3, offers nonstop service in the top ten markets from HI to eastern cities
(c.f. Figure 7.2), and therefore competes directly with Airline l's nonstop service in these markets.
-221-
Chapter 7
339
Figure 7.2: New entrant carrier network
Frequencies and Capacity
Each of the two incumbent network carriers offer three daily departures in each of the 482 markets served
in this network, either as nonstop or connecting itineraries. Flight departures are timed so that each
network airline's hub serves three daily banks allowing for connections from western cities towards
eastern cities. The new entrant's flights coincide with the incumbent carrier's flight departures in the local
market, but the new entrant does not carry any connecting traffic from Airline 1 or Airline 2. In other
words, interlining is not allowed in this simulation (including between Airline 1 and Airline 2).
In terms of capacity, the incumbent carriers each use a total of 126 flights to serve all 482 markets with
three frequencies each and with 100 seats per flight. The new entrant carrier operates 30 flight legs in its
ten markets, with three possible capacity levels of 30, 50 or 70 seats per flight (all flight legs on the new
entrant carrier have the same capacity within a scenario).
7.1.2. Individual Market Parameters
Each market in the network is defined by a set of market parameters including average daily demand, mix
of business and leisure traffic within the market, price-demand curves for each passenger type, as
discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.1. In this network, passenger demand is split identically in each of the
482 markets, with 35% of demand being business oriented and the remaining 65% being leisure demand.
The difference between leisure and business passengers resides in business passengers' willingness to pay
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a higher fare, sensitivity to fare restrictions, and booking behavior. Figure 7.3 shows the willingness to
pay curves of leisure and business passengers in a sample market.
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Figure 7.3: Willingness to pay curves in PODS for a sample market
Pricing in Markets without Low-Fare Competition
In the 472 markets without low-fare competition, the incumbent carriers offer a set of four fare classes,
differentiated according to the "traditional" structure found at legacy network carriers. The highest fare, in
Y class, is unrestricted and does not require any advance purchase. The second highest fare, in B class,
includes a Saturday night stay and a seven-day advance purchase requirement, but is cheaper than the full
fare. M and Q classes have even more severe restrictions and advance purchase requirements, as
summarized and illustrated in Table 7.1. In addition, when there is no low-fare competition in the
network, the incumbent carriers use the standard fare structure in all markets.
Fare Class Fare Restriction A/P
Y $400 None None
B $200 Sat14  7 days
M $150 Sat14 , NR5  14 days
Q $100 Sat 4 , NR"5, CF16  21 days
Table 7.1: Sample incumbent market fares according to the standard fare structure
14 Sat: Saturday night stay requirement
15 NR: Non-refundability
16 CF: Change Fee
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New Entrant Network Presence
As previously mentioned, the new entrant carrier operates in the ten local markets from Airline l's hub
with highest daily passenger demand. The new entrant carrier operates three daily flights, departing at the
same times as Airline l's own flights. We chose to model these flights to depart at identical times to
avoid the added effect of schedule preference for local passengers, and focus on the effect of entry,
revenue management and network flows on airline performance. Table 7.2 shows the percentage of legs,
markets, passengers and revenue-passenger miles (RPMs) affected by the low-fare competition in the ten
markets chosen.
Total Network-Level Leg-Level
Legs Markets Passengers RPMs* Passengers RPMs
Affected 30 10 878 595,306 2,740 1,856,086
Total 126 482 7,200 9,524,153 10,629 10,371,190
Percent 24% 2% 12% 6% 26% 18%
Table 7.2: Percentage of Airline l's affected market, legs, traffic and RPMs upon low-fare entry
While the total number of legs and local markets affected represents about 25% of Airline 1's local
network, the total number of markets affected is only 2% of the 482 markets served by Airline 1's
connecting network. Similarly, the number of passengers and RPMs affected at the market level are also
smaller than at the leg level, as shown in Table 7.2.
7.1.3. Simulated Scenarios
As previously mentioned, we focus our simulations on the case of two-tier entry, matched by the
incumbent carriers. We also refer to this scenario as "two-tier entry in a large network" or "Scenario 3 FM
in a large network". In order to assess the impact of entry and revenue management, we also simulate the
case of the two incumbent carriers competing alone in the network as our baseline scenario.
Baseline Scenario (No Low-Fare Competition)
In the baseline scenario, the two network carriers are competing against each other and offer service in all
482 markets in the network, either nonstop or with connections through each carrier's hub. The fare
* RPMs are Revenue Passenger Miles, i.e. the number of miles flown by revenue-passengers, or the sum
of the distances flown by each individual (paying) passenger. RPMs are the typical measure of airline
consumption.
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structure in each market follows the standard fare structure, as described earlier and illustrated in Table
7.1.
To test for the effect of revenue management on Airline l's revenues, we allow this carrier to use either
leg-based fare class revenue management (referred to as FCRM, and discussed in Chapter 5, Section
5.2.1), or network-based origin-destination revenue management (referred to as Network RM). In the case
of FCRM, we use a combination of Booking Curve detruncation, Pick-up forecasting, and Expected
Marginal Seat Revenue algorithm (Belobaba, 1987 and 1992), as used by many airlines and extensively
described in the PODS and Revenue Management literature (e.g. Gorin, 2000) and introduced in Chapter
5, Section 5.2.1. Under the application of leg-based fare class revenue management, advance purchase
requirements and restrictions are reinforced by revenue management controls to protect seats for later-
booking high-fare passengers, in turn limiting seats made available to early-booking low-fare
passengers1 7. For Network RM, we use the same combination of detruncation and forecasting (now done
at the origin-destination itinerary and fare level rather than at the fare class level), but replace the seat
allocation algorithm by Displacement Adjusted Virtual Nesting (DAVN), as described by Lee (1998).
DAVN, unlike EMSRb, differentiates between local and connecting passengers by evaluating the cost
(revenue loss) of displacing a local passenger when accepting a request for a connecting seat.
Entry with a Two-Tier Fare Structure
In this second scenario, the new entrant carrier offers a simplified two-tier fare structure in the ten
markets where it operates, as illustrated in Table 7.3. In addition to the simplified fare structure, the new
entrant carrier also decreases the lowest available fare (now in M class) by $10 relative to the lowest pre-
entry available fare (then in Q class).
Fare Class Fare Restrictions Advance
Purchase
Y $200 No No
M $90 Sat, NR 14
Table 7.3: Sample fares and fare classes under the two-tier fare structure
The incumbent carriers fully match the simplified fare structure in these ten markets, but maintain their
standard fare structure in all other markets.
17 This is true in the case of high demand flights. On flights with low demand, the revenue management
system actually opens up low-fare availability to allow passengers to book in all fare classes.
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To test the effect of revenue management, we allow for the incumbent carriers to use alternative revenue
management algorithms, while the new entrant carrier uses leg-based fare class revenue management
(FCRM). The incumbent carriers use either leg-based fare class revenue management (FCRM) or
network-based origin-destination revenue management (Network RM), as described above. Table 7.4
summarizes the competitive revenue management cases tested in our simulations of a large network
environment.
Airline No Entrant Two-Tier Entry
Airline 1 FCRM or Network RM FCRM or Network RM
Airline 2 FCRM or Network RM* FCRM or Network RM*
Airline 3 Not applicable FCRM
Table 7.4: Summary of cases tested
7.2. Results
In this section, we discuss the effect of entry, fare match and revenue management in the case of two-tier
entry in a large network and compare our findings to conclusions from previous chapters. In a first sub-
section, we briefly remind the reader of the revenue benefits of Network RM in a competitive airline
network without low-fare competition. We briefly explain the reasons for the revenue gains. In the second
section, we study how entry, network flows and revenue management combined affect individual carrier
performance in this large network environment. We focus on the effect of entry, network flows and
revenue management on traditional measures of performance, and how results differ from the single
market case, as presented in Chapters 5 and 6.
7.2.1. Effect of Network RM and Network Passenger Flows without Low-Fare New
Entrant Competition
The effects of Network RM in a competitive airline network are well documented. It has been shown
(Lee, 1998) that the benefits of Network RM can be attributed to a better management of local and
connecting passengers relative to FCRM: When the airlines use FCRM, they do not differentiate between
local and connecting passengers in their acceptance of booking requests, which can lead the displacement
of one or more local passengers by a connecting passenger, or the displacement of a connecting passenger
* Network RM used by Airline 2 only when Airline 1 also uses Network RM
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by a local passenger. This effect can be relatively minor when flights are not heavily demanded, but
becomes much more critical on high demand flights.
For example, when two flights have high local demand, it is often a better policy to reject connecting
passengers to later accept two local passengers whose combined revenue contribution is higher than that
of the connecting passenger. Conversely, if one of the two flights has low demand, it might be a better
idea to accept a connecting passenger over a local passenger (even on the high demand flight), if the
contribution of the connecting passenger is higher than that of the local passenger on the high demand
flight (since the connecting passenger will not be displacing a local passenger on the low demand flight).
Our results also show that all carriers using Network RM benefit from it: When all competitors use
Network RM, they all benefit from it (relative to FCRM), rather than staying at the same revenue level. In
other words, Network RM increases the "industry's" revenues as a whole, rather than simply
redistributing revenues amongst competitors. Figure 7.4 shows the breakdown of revenues for both
competitors without new entrant competition and the gains (or losses) from Airline 1 using Network RM
alone, or both airlines using Network RM. In particular, Figure 7.4 shows that Airline 1 benefits from
using Network RM whether it is the only airline using Network RM or if both competitors do. When both
competitors use Network RM, the relative gains over FCRM are 0.8% for Airline 1 and 1.55% when only
it uses Network RM. Concurrently, when Airline 1 alone uses Network RM, Airline 2 loses 0.8% in
revenues (relative to FCRM on both competitors), but gains 0.7% when both carriers use Network RM
(again relative to FCRM on both carriers).
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Figure 7.4: Airline 1 and Airline 2 revenues as a function of the competitive revenue management situation
(w/o entrant competition)
The reader is referred to Lee (1998) for more detail on the effect of Network RM on both incumbent
carriers' revenues, local and connecting traffic and load factors. In essence, Network RM, in this
simulated network environment, increases revenues and changes the mix of local and connecting
passengers to maximize individual carriers' revenues.
7.2.2. Effect of Network RM and Network Passenger Flows with Low-Fare New
Entrant Competition
We previously established that the following factors strongly impact the incumbent carriers' performance
measures: Relative new entrant capacity, competitive revenue management situation and pricing decisions
by all carriers. We showed that traditional measures of airline performance do not provide sufficient
information to conclude to unfair competition following entry in the single market case. In this section,
our goal is to provide additional insights on the effect of entry in a larger network. We focus on a single
case of entry - the most likely (and most frequently observed) strategy according to which the new
entrant carrier enters the market with a simplified and reduced fare structure, while the incumbent carriers
fully match the entrant's fare structure (only in the markets with entry). We also assume that the entrant
chooses to enter markets with high demand. This study shows that revenue management and new entrant
capacity still play a significant role in the apparent response of the incumbent carriers, as measured by
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traditional measures of entry (average fares, market share, etc.). In addition, this study also shows that
network passenger flows significantly complicate the picture and lead to additional effects.
In this discussion, we first look at network level effects of entry, which give a broad picture of the effect
of entry, capacity and revenue management on incumbent and new entrant performance. We then focus
on more detailed market-level measures, which highlight the added complexities in a network
environment. This discussion will center on the effects on Airline 1 and Airline 3, as Airline 2 is not
directly impacted by entry, and the effects are therefore much smaller on that carrier, as shown for
example in Figure 7.5.
Network-Level Effect of Entry
The first major impact of entry (and fare match) is a decrease in total revenues for both incumbent
carriers. As summarized in Table 7.2, 2% of Airline l's markets and 26% of its leg-level passengers are
impacted by the new entrant carrier (Airline 3). Entry leads to a decrease in Airline l's revenues, by 5%
to 6% depending on the new entrant's capacity. In addition, Airline 2's revenues also decrease following
entry, but only by 0.5% to 0.6%, increasingly so with increasing new entrant capacity. Figure 7.5 and
Figure 7.6 illustrate the impact of entry, fare match, new entrant capacity and competitive revenue
management settings on incumbent carrier revenues.
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Figure 7.5: Incumbent carrier revenues as a function of new entrant capacity and competitive revenue
management situation
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Figure 7.5 shows that the combination of fare match and entry has a greater impact on Airline 1's
revenues than increasing new entrant capacity (given that the entrant is already competing and that the
incumbents have matched its fares). This result reflects the combined effects of entry and the lower fare
structure on the incumbent network carriers as they match the entrant's two-tier fare structure in the ten
"low-fare" markets. As new entrant capacity increases, revenues decrease on both carriers, but more
slowly than upon entry (and fare match). In addition, Figure 7.5 also shows that revenue management
leads to revenue gains on both incumbent carriers, as previously described without new entrant
competition. Airline l's revenues are highest when it is the only carrier using Network RM, somewhat
lower when both incumbents use Network RM, and even lower when both carriers use FCRM.
Conversely, Airline 2's revenues are at their lowest when Airline 1 is the only carrier to use Network RM.
When both carriers use FCRM, Airline 2's revenues are somewhat higher, due to the lack of competition
for connecting passengers from Airline 1. Finally, when both carriers use Network RM, Airline 2's
revenues increase because Airline 2 now balances its loads of local and connecting traffic to maximize its
revenues. These results already highlight the impact of revenue management by itself on incumbent
carrier revenues and further illustrates that this effect is independent of new entrant competition.
Relative Incumbent Revenue Losses Compared to No Entrant
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Airline 1 Airline 2
Figure 7.6: Incumbent revenue losses as a function of the competitive revenue management situation and
new entrant capacity, relative to the same revenue management methods on the incumbents,
without low-fare competition
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Figure 7.6 shows that the relative losses on both incumbent carriers increase with new entrant capacity,
regardless of the competitive revenue management situation, given the competitive revenue management
situation. For example, compared to Airline 1 using Network RM and Airline 2 using FCRM without
low-fare competition, when competing against the new entrant under the same revenue management
conditions on the incumbents and FCRM on the new entrant, Figure 7.6 shows that the relative revenue
losses range between 5.7% and 6.2% on Airline 1 and are about 0.5% on Airline 2. In addition, the
magnitude of the revenue loss is the same in all scenarios, but varies greatly from Airline 1 to Airline 2,
as we already explained that Airline 2 is far less affected by entry. Figure 7.7 shows the revenue gains
attributable to Network RM on Airline 1, and illustrates that in all cases of entry (or even without low-
fare competition), Airline 1 gains from Network RM, irrespective of whether it is the only carrier to use
Network RM. It also shows that the incumbent's relative revenue gains due to Network RM tend to
decrease as new entrant capacity increases. This is a consequence of the decrease in load factors on
Airline 1 following entry (c.f. Table 7.5): This decrease in average load factors diminishes the ability of
Airline 1 to benefit from revenue management in general, hence the decrease in relative revenue gains
from Network RM on Airline 1.
WaC
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Figure 7.7: Airline 1 revenues and relative gains from Network RM as a function of new entrant capacity
(per local market)
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While these results confirm that Network RM leads to an increase in incumbent revenues, they also
highlight the robustness of the revenue gains attributable to Network RM under the assumption of low-
fare competition: Low-fare competition does not affect the potential for revenue gains from revenue
management. The performance of incumbent carriers under low-fare competition had not previously been
assessed in other research work, and this simulation shows that it is beneficial for the incumbent carriers
to continue to use Network RM under the assumption of low-fare competition in a subset of their markets.
On the new entrant carrier, network revenue numbers show that increasing new entrant capacity leads to
increasing revenues (Figure 7.8). A more interesting result is that new entrant revenues can increase when
Airline 1 switches to Network RM, while the new entrant continues to use FCRM. This result occurs in
the case of high new entrant capacity (50 or 70 seats per flight). We will explain this effect in more detail,
but it is a consequence of Airline 1's ability to differentiate between local and connecting passengers and
the decreasing revenue contribution of local market passengers with increasing new entrant capacity. As a
result, the incumbent carrier focuses more on connecting passengers, which ultimately benefits the new
entrant by spilling local traffic which is then carried by Airline 3.
* FCRM All
$105,000 - MNet.RM (Al 1) vs. FCRM (Als 2 & 3)
o Net. RM (Als 1 & 2) vs. FCRM (Al 3)
$100,000 -
* $95,000 -
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$85,000
90 seats/market 150 seats/market 210 seats/market
Figure 7.8: New entrant revenues as a function of its capacity and the competitive revenue management
situation
Table 7.5 summarizes network-level measures of airline performance for the simulations discussed above.
Even at the network level, our results show that new entrant capacity plays a very important role on
incumbent carrier performance, as does the competitive revenue management situation. Network flows
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also have a significant impact on the results, as we have observed that the new entrant carrier can benefit
from Airline 1 using Network RM, relative to Airline 1 using FCRM. This result differs from previous
results showing that the new entrant's revenues increased only when it matched the incumbent carriers'
more advanced revenue management method (Scenario 3 cFM in Chapter 6).
The effects of revenue management, network flows, new entrant capacity and response of the incumbent
carriers, although apparent at the total network level (as highlighted in this section), become even more
evident when focusing on market-level measures of airline performance (such as average fares, revenues
and traffic).
Revenues ALFs
Net vs. FCRM Net. vs. Net. Net vs. FCRM Net. vs. Net. &
NE Cap FCRM All & FCRM & FCRM FCRM All & FCRM FCRM
0 $1,233,694 $1,252,809 $1,243,013 84.54 84.90 83.93
Airline 1: 3x30 $1,166,354 $1,181,603 $1,173,192 84.33 84.81 83.90
Incumbent 3x50 $1,161,462 $1,175,822 $1,167,756 84.36 84.70 83.88
3x70 $1,160,733 $1,174,835 $1,166,774 84.36 84.69 83.87
Airline 3: 3x30 $87,458 $87,140 $86,670 75.00 75.33 75.01
New Entrant 3x50 $99,851 $99,983 $99,277 54.32 55.20 54.743x70 $102,057 $102,697 $101,788 39.76 40.71 40.28
RASM Market Share (RPM)
0 $0.101 $0.102 $0.101 49.2% 49.4% 49.1%
Airline 1: 3x30 $0.095 $0.096 $0.096 48.2% 48.4% 48.2%
Incumbent 3x50 $0.095 $0.096 $0.095 48.1% 48.2% 48.0%
3x70 $0.095 $0.096 $0.095 48.1% 48.2% 48.0%
Airline 3: 3x30 $0.144 $0.143 $0.142 2.1% 2.1% 2.1%
New Entrant 3x50 $0.098 $0.099 $0.098 2.6% 2.6% 2.6%3x70 $0.072 $0.072 $0.072 2.6% 2.7% 2.7%
Table 7.5: Revenues, average load factors, revenues per available seat mile (RASM) and market share by
airline pre- and post-entry
Market-Level Impacts of Entry
We now explore market-level results to explain the impact of network flows on aggregate measures of
airline performance and how their behavior in response to entry and fare match differs from our results in
the single market case. In addition, we explain the impact of Network RM on the new entrant's revenues,
and more specifically the reason for the observed revenue gains on the new entrant when Airline 1 moves
to Network RM.
This section is divided into three subsections. In the first subsection, we focus on the impact of entry on
the incumbent carriers and describe the effect of entry on market-level measures of performance. We
examine how flows of network (connecting) passengers affect these measures and add to the effect of
revenue management and new entrant capacity. In the second subsection, we focus on the effect of
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network flows and revenue management on the new entrant carrier, and explain why the new entrant can
gain revenues as a consequence of Airline l's move to more advanced Network RM. Finally, we briefly
compare the performance of the incumbent relative to that of the entrant, as affected by the network
environment and competitive revenue management situation.
Incumbent Carrier (Airline 1)
As previously discussed, the incumbent carrier is affected by the new entrant's capacity and the
competitive revenue management situation in the market. The choice of revenue management system on
the incumbent carrier then modifies the flow of connecting passengers to maximize network revenues on
the incumbent carrier, which in turn affects local market performance (on Airline 1 and all other carriers).
As observed in Chapters 5 and 6 in the single market case, incumbent average fares decrease with
increasing new entrant capacity in all ten markets with entry. This decrease in average fare following
entry occurs regardless of the revenue management situation. In addition, as previously mentioned, the
initial effect of entry and match on incumbent average market fares is far greater than the effect of
increasing new entrant capacity (because of the change in fare structure on the incumbents, in addition to
the effect of entry). For example, on average in the ten markets affected by entry, the average incumbent
market fare decreases by 25% to 32% (depending on the revenue management situation) following entry
with 30 seats per flight on the new entrant carrier and match of the fare structure. By comparison, when
the new entrant's capacity increases from 30 to 70 seats per flight, the incumbent's average market fare
decreases by 1% to 2.5% depending on the competitive revenue management situation. Figure 7.9 shows
the impact of entry and increasing new entrant capacity on incumbent average local market fare.
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Figure 7.9: Incumbent average local market fare (averaged over 10 markets with entry)
Another less intuitive result is that the effect of revenue management is now quite different from what we
observed in the single market case. Indeed, as shown in Figure 7.9, without new entrant competition,
when Airline 1 uses Network RM, its average fare in the ten markets with entry decreases relative to
FCRM on all carriers, and further decreases when both incumbent carriers use Network RM. By
comparison, in the single market case, when either of the incumbent carriers used FCRM (rather than
FCFS), the average market fare increased on the incumbent carrier. This relationship between average
fares in various cases of revenue management remained unchanged as new entrant capacity increased. In
this case, Figure 7.9 shows that the ranking of average local market fare on Airline 1 changes as a
function of revenue management and pre- and post-entry. Post-entry and fare match, Airline l's average
local market fare under FCRM on all carriers is the lowest of the three competitive revenues management
scenarios, when it was the highest pre-entry. Concurrently, the average fare under Network RM on
Airline 1 alone becomes the highest fare. This change in average local market fare rankings is a direct
consequence of the flows of network passengers: Pre-entry, since the ten local markets of interest are
among the most heavily demanded markets in the network, FCRM will generally allocate a high amount
of seats to higher fare class passengers, regardless of whether they are on connecting or local itinerary,
and thus potentially sell a relatively higher number of full fare local seats, thus increasing the average
market fare. In addition, as shown in Figure 7.10.1, under FCRM, Airline 1 sells relatively fewer low-fare
local seats than connecting low-fare seats (in Q class), thereby getting lower revenues by displacing pairs
of local passengers whose total revenue contributions might have exceeded the connecting fare. By
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comparison, when the incumbent network carrier (Airline 1) uses Network RM, it manages its inventory
of local and connecting seats in a better way (revenue-wise) relative to FCRM, which translates into an
increase in local passenger traffic in all fare classes, as shown in Figure 7.10.1. The underlying
explanation is that two local passengers (including low-fare passengers) bring a higher revenue
contribution than a single connecting passenger in the same fare class. As a result, more local passengers
are able to travel and local market revenues increase with Network RM on the incumbent carrier. The
incumbent's average market fares decrease, as the incremental revenues come disproportionately from
low-fare local passengers. When both incumbent network carriers switch to Network RM, this effect is
further accentuated (because Airline 2 becomes more competitive in managing its mix of local and
connecting traffic, and competes with Airline 1 for high fare connecting traffic), and Airline l's average
market fare decreases even more.
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Figure 7.10: Airline 1 traffic by fare class (pre-entry and post-entry as a function of competitive revenue
management settings)
Post-entry and fare match, with Network RM, Airline 1 still manages its mix of local and connecting
passengers differently than with FCRM by accounting for the potential revenue loss associated with
displacing local passengers. In this case, Network RM allows Airline 1 to realize that the contribution of
local passengers has severely decreased (because of the switch to a two-tier structure in these ten markets,
the decrease of the lowest available market fares and the increase in competition for local traffic), and to
therefore focus more on connecting passengers. The overall impact of the changes in passenger traffic
shown in Figure 7.10.2 is an increase in local market average fare when Airline 1 uses Network RM alone
by up to 4% (relative to FCRM) and an increase by up to 2% when both incumbent carriers use Network
RM (relative to FCRM). In this last case, the average local market fare on Airline 1 is lower than when it
was the only carrier using Network RM, because of increased competition between incumbents for
connecting traffic. These results therefore highlight the effect of network flows (and revenue
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management) on the incumbent carrier's average fares, revenues and mix passenger traffic in the ten
markets with low-fare competition.
Figure 7.11 shows local market revenues and average fares on Airline 1 in the ten local markets with low-
fare competition and highlights the change in Airline 1's revenues and average fares with entry and
revenue management.
Average Market Revenues and Fares on Airline 1
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Figure 7.11: Airline 1 revenues and average fares in 10 markets with entry
Figure 7.11 also shows that Airline l's local revenues increase when both incumbent carriers use Network
RM, relative to the case where only Airline 1 was using Network RM. The reason is that when Airline 2
becomes more conscious of the difference between local and connecting passengers (with Network RM),
it also improves on its mix of local and connecting passengers, and thus forces Airline 1 to revise its own
optimization of local and connecting passenger mix. As a result, Airline l's local revenues increase while
its average fare decreases (relative to the case where Airline 1 is the only carrier to use Network RM),
since it has now become important to carry more local passengers because of the increased competition
for connecting traffic. The increase in revenues however comes from lower fare local passengers, which
causes the decrease in local average market fare on Airline 1 (c.f. Figure 7.11). Figure 7.12 shows the
average traffic per leg on Airline 1 on the legs affected by entry, as well as the mix of local and
connecting passengers in each of these cases. It illustrates the decrease in local market traffic under low-
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fare competition, when the incumbent carriers move to Network RM. Figure 7.12 also shows that
compared to no entrant competition, the effect of Network RM is quite different. Indeed, without low-fare
competition, Network RM on the incumbent carrier leads to an increase in the percentage of local market
traffic carried, as the revenue contribution of local passengers is greater and the incumbent carrier thus
benefits from carrying more of them. With low-fare competition, this proportion tends to decrease. By
comparison, low-fare competition leads to a decrease in the contribution of local passengers, which
Network RM recognizes, thus leading to the increase in connecting traffic. When both carriers use
Network RM, increased network competition leads to an increase in the competition for connecting traffic
between airlines 1 and 2, which forces the incumbent (Airline 1) to rely even more on local traffic.
Without low-fare competition, this translates into an even greater increase in the proportion of local
traffic. In addition, as shown in Figure 7.12, when both carriers use Network RM, Airline 1's load factors
increase, as Airline 1 now allows more passengers to travel in order to increase its revenues, since it
cannot increase its per passenger revenue contribution (average fare) given the increased competition for
both local and connecting traffic.
Airline 1 Loads per Leg (on Affected Legs)
100 1 Connecting Traffic m Local Traffic
90 /
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
0
FCRM Net. vs. FCRM Net. vs. Net. FCRM Net. vs. FCRM Net.vs. Net.
FCRM
No Entrant Low -Fare Competition (3x30)
Figure 7.12: Average loads and mix on airline l's legs affected by low-fare entry
Finally, Figure 7.13 illustrates the effect of entry on incumbent and new entrant market shares, computed
over the ten local markets with low-fare entry. It shows the substantial decrease in market share following
entry, regardless of the competitive revenue management situation, and the additional impact of
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increasing new entrant capacity on Airline l's market share. In addition, as shown on Figure 7.13, and as
explained earlier, Airline l's market share also depends on the competitive revenue management situation
as follows: When all carriers use FCRM, the inability of the incumbents to distinguish between local and
connecting passengers leads to higher market share in the ten markets with low-fare competition. When
Airline 1 uses Network RM, it spills lower fare local traffic and thus loses market shares relative to
FCRM on all carriers. Finally when both incumbents use Network RM, Airline 1 carries slightly more
local traffic to compensate for the increase in competition for connecting traffic.
00% 100% 100%
90% 90% 90%
80% 80% 80%
70% 70% 70%
60% 60% 60%
50% 50% 50%
50%3 Airline 3 5 Airline 3 -
40% -3 A irline 2 40% -E Airline 2 4% 11
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Figure 7.13: Incumbent and new entrant market share in the ten markets with low-fare entry, pre- and post-
entry, as a function of the competitive revenue management situation
These simulation results thus establish the importance of the flows of network traffic and their effect on
local market revenues, market shares and average fares on the incumbent network carriers. Flows of
network passengers are tightly linked to revenue management in that they enable network revenue
management systems to increase network revenues by tweaking local and connecting traffic at the
network level.
New Entrant Carrier (Airline 3)
We already observed the effects of new entrant capacity on total entrant revenues and noted that new
entrant revenues can increase (c.f. Figure 7.8 and Figure 7.14) when only Airline 1 uses Network RM, at
high new entrant capacity, relative to FCRM on Airline 1. In this section, we explain why this is the case,
and thus highlight the joint impact of revenue management and flows of network traffic on the new
entrant carrier, while incumbent average local market fares increase (relative to FCRM), as discussed in
the previous section.
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The changing mix of local and connecting passengers on the incumbent carrier explains the potential
revenue gains on the new entrant carrier. At low entrant capacity, the new entrant carrier fills up relatively
quickly. As a result, the incumbent carrier is able to extract relatively higher fares from a portion of the
local passengers (late-booking, high willingness-to-pay passengers). When only it uses Network RM, the
incumbent carrier focuses on these higher fare passengers, forcing lower fare passengers on the new
entrant carrier. Since the entrant carrier's capacity is limited, its revenue per passenger (and thus average
fare) decreases when Airline 1 uses Network RM, which consequently leads to a decrease in local
revenues (on Airline 3). When both incumbents switch to Network RM, Airline 1 must now increase its
reliance on local traffic (because of Airline 2's better management of local and connecting traffic takes
away some of Airline 1's former connecting traffic). As a result, the new entrant loses even more local
traffic to Airline 1 and its revenues further decrease.
By comparison, at higher entrant capacity, the entrant is able to accept all requests for seats. This has the
effect of diluting some of the former full fare traffic towards the lower fare class. As a result, when the
incumbent carrier switches to Network RM, local traffic becomes very unattractive, relative to connecting
traffic. Local passengers are therefore spilled to the new entrant carrier, into its lower fare class. These
passengers do not displace high fare passengers (given the entrant's high capacity) and only lead to an
increase in the new entrant's revenues (but a decrease in its average market fare). However, when both
incumbent carriers use Network RM, it again becomes more important for Airline 1 to carry more local
traffic (even low-fare local traffic) to compensate for the loss in connecting traffic incurred by Airline 2's
use of Network RM. This directly impacts Airline 3's revenues, hence the loss in revenues (relative to
FCRM on all carriers).
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Figure 7.14: New entrant relative revenue variation as a function of its capacity and the competitive revenue
management situation (compared to FCRM on all carriers, with 30, 50 or 70 seats per flight on
the new entrant carrier)
We have therefore shown that flows of network passengers, when managed by the nonstop incumbent
carrier using advanced network revenue management, can lead to an increase in new entrant revenues:
Airline 1 becomes more selective in the passengers it chooses to carry, and therefore rejects some of the
local traffic whose revenues have become too diluted (by the entrant's presence), thus allowing the new
entrant carrier to increase its traffic and consequently its revenues. This somewhat unexpected result
further highlights the importance of network flows and revenue management in understanding the effects
of entry on aggregate measures of airline performance.
Figure 7.15 summarizes the new entrant's average fare in each of the ten markets with entry, as a function
of new entrant capacity and competitive revenue management settings. It shows in particular that at high
new entrant capacity, its average market fare tends to decrease when Airline 1 uses Network RM.
Combined with the revenue increase, this reinforces the observation that the new entrant carries more
traffic, albeit at lower fares. When both incumbents use Network RM, the new entrant's average fare
increases (compared to the case where Airline 1 is the only carrier using Network RM), which illustrates
the loss in lower fare traffic on the new entrant carrier when the incumbent carriers become more
competitive for connecting traffic, and are therefore forced to also focus more on local market traffic.
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Figure 7.15: New entrant average fare
situation
as a function of its capacity and the competitive revenue management
Comparison of Measures of Airline Performance
We now compare Airline 1 and Airline 3's average fares and revenues in the ten markets with entry,
given the network environment. Figure 7.16 shows the total local market revenues in the ten markets with
low-fare competition, in the case where all carriers use FCRM. It shows that Airline l's local market
revenues remain higher than those of the new entrant carrier at low entrant capacity, but decrease and
drop below those of the new entrant as its capacity increases. This relationship is comparable to the
relationship observed in Chapter 6. The difference is the capacity level (on the new entrant) at which both
carriers extract the same revenues from the local market. In the single market case, under Scenario 3 FM
with symmetric fares and symmetric revenue management, the airline with the greater capacity achieved
the higher local market revenues. Now, given the availability of network passengers in addition to local
market traffic, Airline 3 gets a disproportionate share of local market revenues at a lower capacity level.
This capacity value is influenced by the choice of markets with entry, the network flows and the relative
revenue contribution of connecting passengers (as compared to that of local market passengers).
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Figure 7.16: Airline 1 and 3 revenues in the ten markets with low-fare entry - FCRM on all carriers
In the other two competitive revenue management situations, this picture (Figure 7.16) is similar, thus
indicating that the relative revenues between Airlines 1 and 3 are mostly influenced by new entrant
capacity and less by competitive revenue management settings.
These results illustrate the importance of the flows of network passengers. Without connecting traffic, as
simulated in the single market case, under symmetric revenue management and symmetric fares, 50% of
capacity translates into 50% of traffic and revenues in the market. When connecting passengers also travel
on local flight legs, these relationships do not hold anymore and individual carrier performance is
affected, as previously discussed.
Figure 7.17 shows the average market fare on both Airline 1 and Airline 3 and illustrates the relative
impact of new entrant capacity and revenue management on average fares. The first observation is that
new entrant capacity has a much greater effect on the new entrant's average fare than on the incumbent's:
As its capacity increases, the new entrant dilutes local market revenues and therefore experiences a
decrease in its own average market fare. By comparison, the incumbent carrier also experiences a
decrease in average market fare, but to a lesser extent since Airline 1 is able to trade local passengers for
connecting passengers, when the local passengers' revenue contribution becomes too low (relative to that
of connecting passengers).
Figure 7.17 also shows that the new entrant's average market fare can be higher than that of the
incumbent carrier, but typically isn't anymore (contrary to some of the scenarios simulated in Chapter 6).
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We had established in Chapter 6 that the carrier with the smaller capacity had the higher average fare. In
this network context, this simple relationship no longer holds, for two reasons:
1. Given the network dimension of the airline problem, it is impossible to differentiate local
capacity from connecting capacity on a particular flight leg, for the incumbent carrier. This point
refers to the dichotomy of supply and demand (c.f. Chapter 3, Section 3.2).
2. Because of network flows, the revenue management system is willing to reject local passengers in
return for higher fare connecting passengers, which was not an option in Chapter 6. As a direct
consequence, the number of local passengers changes as a function of the connecting traffic
carried on the flight legs in the ten markets, which directly affects the average market fare.
As a result, the network carrier is able to maintain a higher average local market fare by carrying local
passengers paying relatively higher local fares and mixing in connecting traffic when the revenue
contribution (i.e. fare) of local passengers becomes lower than that of the connecting passengers.
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Figure 7.17: Average market fare on airlines 1 and 3 as a function of new entrant capacity
Figure 7.17 also illustrates the impact of revenue management on the relative fare of airlines I and 3.
When all carriers are using FCRM, the new entrant's local market fare can be higher than that of the
incumbent carrier, at low entrant capacity. In this case (30 seats per flight on the new entrant), the
incumbent carrier does not differentiate between local and connecting passengers, and is therefore
carrying more local passengers, but at relatively lower average fares. The new entrant carrier, since its
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capacity is limited, is able to keep a high percentage of full fare passengers. When the incumbents use
Network RM, Airline l's average fare increases, as it trades low-fare local passengers for higher fare
connecting passengers. At the same time, some of these rejected low-fare local passengers travel on
Airline 3, which decreases its average fare slightly and leads to the inversion of the incumbent's and the
new entrant's relative average fares.
At higher entrant capacity, Network RM has the same effect on the new entrant's and the incumbent's
average fare, but the incumbent's average fare remains substantially higher than that of the new entrant's.
The explanation here is that the new entrant's large capacity leads to a decrease in average fare, since the
additional passengers carried are mostly low-fare local passengers (who were previously unable to travel
for lack of available capacity). The incumbent once again trades these undesirable (revenue-wise)
passengers for connecting passengers, and thus maintains a higher average local market fare.
7.3. Conclusions
Simulation in a larger network shows that relative new entrant capacity and revenue management still
play an important role in the effect of entry on incumbent (and new entrant) performance: Revenues,
average fares, market share and load factors are diversely affected by entry, as a function of revenue
management and entrant capacity. In addition, the general conclusions from Chapters 5 and 6 still hold, in
that increasing new entrant capacity and the competitive revenue management situation have a dramatic
effect on traditional aggregate measures of airline performance, which thus should not be used an
indicator of incumbent response to entry.
Furthermore, the simulation shows that network flows have an additional impact on the performance of
incumbent carriers in three ways:
* First, they allow the incumbent carrier to mitigate the impact of entry at the total network level by
replacing local market traffic with connecting traffic.
* Second, they also have a very important impact on the change in average market fare on the
incumbent carrier. Since the incumbent carrier does not need to focus as much on local traffic, its
average market fare is less affected by entry than it was in the single market case. In addition, the
impact of relative new entrant capacity (on average fares only) is attenuated, once again because
of network flows of passengers.
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* Third, although average fares are less affected by entry in a network environment, local market
revenues tend to suffer more from entry than in the single market case, for the same reasons that
explain the lesser effect on local market average fares. The incumbent carriers adjust their mix of
local and connecting passengers to recognize the revenue dilution created by the low-fare carrier
in the local markets. They therefore focus on high fare local market traffic and forego low fare
traffic, which reduces local market revenues.
In terms of the relative impact of increasing new entrant capacity on relative average fares of the nonstop
incumbent and the new entrant, the simulation results show that it is the new entrant's average local
market fare that is most affected by its capacity, and the competitive revenue management situation,
although incumbent revenues are also severely affected by increasing new entrant capacity. In other
words, given that the new entrant operates in the network, its average market fare is more affected by a
change in new entrant capacity than the incumbent's average market fare.
The simulation results also show that the new entrant can benefit from Network RM on Airline 1 in the
case where it has relatively high capacity and Airline 1 is the only carrier using Network RM. Figure 7.18
summarizes the effect of Airline 2's revenue management system on the new entrant's revenues. The less
aggressive the competition for connecting traffic, the less competitive the local market and the more
revenues the new entrant gets. In particular, when Airline 2 does not use Network RM, it does not
differentiate between local and connecting passengers at the flight leg level, and is therefore less
aggressively competing for connecting traffic with Airline 1. As a result, if Airline 3's capacity is low, its
effect on the average fare paid by local passengers is low, that is the revenue dilution in the local market
is low because it is limited by the entrant's capacity. Local traffic thus remains attractive for Airline 1
which then negatively affects Airline 3's revenues. Conversely, when Airline 2 uses Network RM, it
makes the distinction between local and connecting traffic, which leads to an increase in competition for
connecting traffic between the two incumbent network carriers. As a result, Airline 1 is forced to carry
more local traffic in those markets with high local demand, to mitigate the increased competition for
connecting traffic. This directly affects Airline 3's revenues which decrease as Airline 1 takes away more
local traffic.
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Figure 7.18: Effect of Airline 2's revenue management system on new entrant revenues, given Airline 1 uses
Network RM
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CONCLUSIONS
The preceding chapters have studied the effects of low-fare new entrant competition in the airline industry
by first focusing on case studies and then by simulating various cases of entry with the Passenger Origin
Destination Simulator. The case studies have demonstrated that average fares, local market revenues and
traffic provide little information with respect to the nature of incumbent response to low-fare entry, and
whether the response is predatory. In addition, these case studies have also provided us with valuable
information with respect to the factors affecting the performance of incumbent and new entrant carriers
following entry. The simulations have enabled us to test the effects of entrant capacity, entrant pricing
strategy and response from the incumbent carriers, revenue management, and network flows of
passengers on these same measures of airline performance. The simulation results have clearly shown that
these factors have a substantial individual effect and combined impact on average market measures and
that they should not be overlooked or ignored when attempting to establish predatory conduct in airline
markets.
This chapter concludes this dissertation by summarizing the important findings of this research and its
relevance in understanding competition in the airline industry. We then discuss potential extensions and
future research directions to be explored.
8.1. Research Findings and Contributions
The findings and contributions of this research can be separated into two major categories. First, this
research has identified the critical factors explaining new entrant and incumbent carrier performance
following low-fare entry in a market, or a subset of incumbent markets. These factors are new entrant
capacity relative to incumbent capacity, pricing strategy of the new entrant carrier and response from the
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incumbent airline, use of revenue management by some or all competitors, and flows of network
passengers. Second, this research has also illustrated the individual effects of each of these factors, as well
as their combined impact on average market fares, local market revenues and local market traffic, through
the use of simulation. We have shown that these aggregate measures of airline performance do not
provide sufficient information regarding the performance of incumbent or new entrant carriers, or on the
competitive response of incumbent carriers to infer predatory conduct. Furthermore, this research has
shown that the incumbent carrier's revenue maximizing response to entry varies as a function of the
competitive revenue management situation and the entrant's pricing strategy.
Previous research efforts based most of their conclusions regarding incumbent carrier performance and
response to low-fare entry on average fares, revenues and traffic. Some incumbent carrier responses to
entry have even raised the question of predatory pricing based on the analysis of these average market
measures. Building on these findings, we observed that entry generally leads to a decrease in incumbent
revenues and average fare, an increase in traffic, and that the incumbent's average fare tends to remain
higher than that of the new entrant carrier in the market. Suspicion of predatory pricing has been raised in
some cases where the incumbent carrier's average fare is equal to, or drops below that of the new entrant
carrier, while traffic increases and revenues decrease. However, as our two case studies clearly highlight
in Chapter 4, these traditional measures of airline performance paint a very incomplete picture of the
actual response of incumbent carriers to low-fare entry. For example, despite the different perception of
competitive behavior in the Atlanta-Orlando market (not generally regarded as anti-competitive) and in
the Detroit-Boston market (often presented as potentially anti-competitive), we have shown that
incumbent local market traffic, revenues and average fare responded similarly to low-fare entry. Yet, the
competitive outcome of entry in these particular markets was quite different: Spirit failed to establish
itself in the Detroit-Boston market (and exited the market within two quarters of entry), while AirTran
succeeded in the Atlanta-Orlando market.
These case studies brought to light some of the factors explaining the effect of entry on aggregate
measures of airline performance. These factors are entrant capacity (relative to the incumbent carrier) and
pricing response of the incumbents to entry. In addition, affecting the outcome of competitive interactions
between incumbents and new entrant carriers in these case studies are the effects of competitive revenue
management and flows of network passengers. These last two factors have consistently been ignored in
the analysis of competitive airline markets, and yet play a critical role in understanding the effects of
entry on aggregate measures of airline performance, as we have shown in this research.
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Given these factors, we simulated a single market case of entry in order to illustrate their effects on
individual airline performance. We showed in Chapter 5 that, when all carriers use fare class revenue
management (FCRM), increasing relative new entrant capacity generally leads to a decrease in incumbent
revenues, traffic and market share following entry. The effect on average fares, however, is dependent on
the combined effects of price response to entry and relative new entrant capacity. Under symmetric fares
(identical fares on both the incumbent and the new entrant), the incumbent's average fare decreases with
increasing new entrant capacity. When the incumbent carrier only matches the lowest available fare in the
market (asymmetric fares), its average fare can actually increase as new entrant capacity increases.
Equally importantly, the relative average fare between the nonstop incumbent and the new entrant carrier
depends both on the competitive pricing situation (symmetric or asymmetric fares) and new entrant
capacity relative to that of the incumbent carrier. Under full match cases, the carrier with the greater
capacity has the lower average fare. Under limited match and under the assumption of entry with a two-
tier fare structure (Scenario 3 LM), the new entrant's average fare remains consistently higher than that of
the incumbent carrier, regardless of the new entrant's tested capacity level. These simulations underscore
the importance of both new entrant capacity and pricing strategy of the incumbent and new entrant
carriers (and revenue management) in explaining the effects of entry on average fares, traffic and
revenues. In addition, while the incumbent carrier never actually undercuts the new entrant's fare
structure, the simulation results show that there are a wide variety of possible effects of entry on average
market measures.
The explanation of the effects of relative new entrant capacity and competitive incumbent response on
aggregate measures of airline performance also relied heavily on the competitive revenue management
situation (that is, whether one or all competitors use revenue management). Chapter 5 highlighted the
effects of new entrant capacity, entrant pricing strategy, and competitive incumbent response, and further
uncovered the additional impacts of revenue management on traditional aggregate measures of airline
performance. In Chapter 6, we consequently simulated entry in a single market environment, but allowed
the use of revenue management by all competitors to change so as to assess its effect on traditional
measures of airline performance. In each of the scenarios of entry tested in Chapter 5, we observed that
changing the competitive revenue management situation affected each carrier's average fare as well as the
relative ranking of average fares between carriers. In particular, our simulation results show that in the
case of entry with a two-tier fare structure on the new entrant carrier, fully matched by the incumbent
carriers, the nonstop incumbent's average fare remains consistently higher than that of the new entrant
when only the incumbents use revenue management. Conversely, when all carriers use the same revenue
management method (or lack thereof), the carrier with the greater capacity has the lower average fare. In
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contrast, when the incumbent carriers do not match the fares on the new entrant carrier, the competitive
pricing situation, combined with revenue management, leads to very different effects on the competitors'
average fares. With no revenue management on the new entrant carrier, the incumbent carrier's average
fare consistently increases with increasing new entrant capacity and remains higher than that of the new
entrant, as it diverts more and more traffic. However, when all carriers use revenue management, the
incumbent carrier's average fare then drops sharply and remains lower than that of the new entrant
carrier, because of the revenue management system's ability to differentiate between low-fare and high-
fare traffic on all competitors in the market. These results highlight the importance of revenue
management by itself, as well as the combined effects of revenue management, pricing strategy of the
incumbent and new entrant carrier, and relative new entrant capacity in explaining the effects of entry on
aggregate measure of airline performance. They also emphasize the lack of information provided by these
measures.
Our simulations in Chapters 5 and 6 thus showed that entry leads to a decrease in revenues and traffic on
the incumbent carriers, while total market revenues and traffic tend to increase. The effect on average
fares, both on individual carriers and between carriers, depends greatly on the relative capacity of the new
entrant carrier, the competitive pricing situation and the use (or absence) of revenue management on some
or all competitors. These results, which reflect the competitive effects of entry in any industry, further
emphasize the importance of the pricing and capacity strategy of the airline (in this single market case).
The simulations revealed the often ignored importance of airline revenue management - along with
pricing and new entrant capacity - in explaining the performance of individual carriers, as well as the
irrelevance of average fares, local market revenues and traffic in assessing the nature of an incumbent's
response to entry. In addition, our results also showed that, contrary to common perception, matching the
new entrant's pricing strategy does not always provide the "best" (i.e. revenue-maximizing) response to
entry by the incumbent carriers. Careful consideration of the competitive environment (use of revenue
management by some or all competitors, new entrant capacity and pricing strategy) should be the
determinant of incumbent response to entry.
While Chapters 5 and 6 provided interesting insights into the factors affecting the performance of airline
competitors in a single market environment, these simulations intentionally left out the effects of network
passenger traffic, which is an essential component of a network carrier's passenger and revenue stream. In
Chapter 7, we extended our simulations to a larger network environment where we modeled a low-fare
new entrant carrier operating in a subset of markets of one of the incumbent network carriers, and offering
a simplified two-tier fare structure fully matched by the incumbent carriers. Our results show that network
flows of passengers have a significant impact on individual carrier performance, an impact which adds on
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to the previously described effects of relative new entrant capacity, competitive pricing and revenue
management. As a consequence of these flows of passengers, the incumbent carrier is able to focus less
on local market traffic upon low-fare entry, which leads to a decrease in the effect of entry on average
local market fare (in the markets with entry). Conversely, the effect on revenues and traffic is even more
pronounced than in the single market case. Our results also highlight the importance of revenue
management in such a network environment, including the finding that advanced network revenue
management can potentially benefit the new entrant carrier by focusing the incumbent carriers on
connecting traffic rather than on lower fare local traffic. These results therefore reinforce that relative new
entrant capacity, and competitive pricing and revenue management affect measures of average fare,
revenue and traffic, but also highlight the dampening effect of flows of network passengers with respect
to the decrease in the incumbent carrier's average fare after entry (as compared to the single market case).
Additional findings from these network simulations include the robustness of revenue management gains
in a low-fare world - relative revenue gains from network revenue management, as shown in Chapter 7,
are relatively unaffected by low-fare entry. This effect had not been previously tested for, and provides
important insights for traditional network carriers operating in a low-fare environment.
Finally, this research has provided considerable insights into the competitive behavior of airline markets
faced with low-fare competition. These findings should provide a basis for policy-makers and airline
executives when evaluating the response of incumbent carriers to low-fare entry. In particular, the focus
of competitive analyses should both be on pricing responses to entry as well as on the impacts of revenue
management and network flows of traffic. These insights should be used when applying a rule of reason,
as advocated by Joskow and Kelovorick (1979), Dodgson et al. (1991), or Spector (2001).
8.2. Application to Studies of Competition in Airline Markets
Typical studies of competition in airline markets (e.g. US DOT, 2001) identify predatory conduct based
on observations of average market fares, traffic and revenues, as previously discussed. In this section, we
discuss three typical observations leading to suspicion of predatory conduct and show, based on our
results, how these findings may be ambiguous and lead to erroneous conclusions regarding predatory
behavior in airline markets.
Response to entry raises suspicion when:
1. The incumbent carrier's average market fare is lower than that of the new entrant carrier. This is
often seen as an indication of aggressive pricing response from the incumbent carrier.
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2. The incumbent carrier's average market fare decreases after entry. The decrease in incumbent
average fare is assumed to reflect an aggressive incumbent pricing response.
3. The incumbent carrier's local market traffic increases, but its local market revenues decrease.
Decreasing revenues and increasing traffic are again presumed to reflect an overly aggressive
pricing response leading to greater traffic but lower revenues.
In the following sections, we discuss each of these effects of entry on average market measures and
explain how they can lead to erroneous conclusions regarding the nature of the incumbent carrier's
response to low-fare entry. Based on our simulation results, which do not imply any predatory motive on
the part of the incumbent carrier and further allow only a limited set of responses from the incumbent
carriers (constant incumbent capacity, limited or full match of entrant fares), we demonstrate how the
above guidelines can lead to the conclusion that the incumbent carrier responded to low-fare entry with
predatory practices, when in fact it did not.
8.2.1. Lower Incumbent Carrier Average Fare Relative to Entrant Average Fare
Our simulation results show that a lower average fare on the incumbent carrier should not be used as an
indication of predatory pricing. For example, as shown in Figure 8.1, the incumbent carrier's average
market fare is consistently lower than that of the new entrant carrier, despite the limited response strategy
of the incumbent carrier. The explanation for this result is that under the assumption of entry with a two-
tier fare structure, as is the case in this example, the fact that the entrant carrier is offering a differentiated
fare structure, but at lower fares than the incumbent, and using revenue management, leads to diversion of
the incumbent's high fare business traffic, and affects its average fare.
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Figure 8.1: Average market fares on the incumbent and new entrant carrier, under Scenario 2 LM with
FCRM on all carriers
8.2.2. Decrease in Incumbent Average Fare as an Indication of Predatory Pricing
Our simulation results have shown that low-fare entry is usually accompanied by a decrease in the
incumbent's average market fare. This effect is often construed as an indication of aggressive response
and potential predatory pricing in response to entry.
As shown in Figure 8.2, a more aggressive response to low-fare entry does not necessarily lead to a lower
average fare. In the case of entry with a two-tier fare structure with all carriers using fare class revenue
management, Figure 8.2 shows that the incumbent carrier's average fare is lower under the more
aggressive response strategy (full match) only at low entrant capacity. The explanation for this result lies
in the amount of passengers that are potentially diverted from the incumbent carrier. In the limited match
case, at high entrant capacity, diversion of traffic from the incumbent carrier to the entrant is so high that
the effect on the incumbent's average fare is greater than if it had matched the fare structure on the new
entrant carrier.
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Figure 8.2: Incumbent carrier average fare as a function of the incumbent pricing response - Scenario 2
with FCRM on all carriers
8.2.3. Traffic Increases and Revenue Decreases as Indicators of Aggressiveness of
Response to Low-Fare Entry
The combination of the effects of low-fare entry on incumbent carrier traffic and revenues is often used as
a means of identifying predatory responses to entry. For example, an increase in traffic accompanied by a
decrease in local market traffic could be considered an unprofitable and potentially predatory response to
entry. However, as shown in Figure 8.3, under Scenario 2 assumptions in the single market case, the full
match response, while it is the response strategy which leads to an increase in incumbent carrier traffic
(and a decrease in revenues), is also the response strategy which maximizes incumbent carrier revenues.
The less aggressive limited match response does not allow the incumbent carrier to retain as much traffic
in the local market, and affects its local market revenues. As a result, the combination of a decrease in
incumbent carrier revenues and increase in traffic should not be used as an indication of predatory
behavior.
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Figure 8.3: Incumbent carrier traffic and revenues as a function of its pricing response - Scenario 2 with
FCRM on all carriers
In addition, our simulation results in a large network environment also show that network flows of
passengers can lead to a greater decrease in local market revenues, but a lower decrease in total network
revenues. The trade-off between local and connecting passengers - through the use of revenue
management - can lead to a greater decrease in local market revenues compared to total network
revenues, thus further emphasizing that revenues don't provide information on the nature of the
competitive response of incumbent carriers faced with low-fare competition.
INCUMBENT REVENUE RECOVERY
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Figure 8.4: Difference between local market revenue losses and total network revenue losses on the
incumbent carrier under low-fare entry in a network environmnet (as simulated in Chapter 7)
In summary, the traditional indicators of potential predatory conduct, incumbent average fare relative to
new entrant average fare, decrease in incumbent average fare and decrease in incumbent revenues, appear
-257-
$14,000
$12,000
$10,000
$8,000
$6,000
$4,000
$2,000
Chapter 8
to be very misleading and to potentially lead to erroneous conclusions regarding predatory conduct in the
airline industry.
Finally, in its 1998 publication, the US DOT defines predatory practices as price cuts or capacity
increases that:
* Cause the incumbent to forego more revenues than all of the New Entrant's capacity could have
diverted from it, or
* Result in substantially lower operating profits (or increased operating losses) than would a
reasonable competing strategy.
Our results have shown that neither of these conditions should be used as indications of predatory
conduct, as such effects could follow from low-fare entry despite any sort of response other than a limited
match from the incumbent carriers, as highlighted in Figure 8.5. It illustrates that, despite a limited match
response from the incumbent carrier, the decrease in its revenues at low entrant capacity is greater than
the revenues of the entrant carrier. These, and other results, emphasize the difficulty in establishing
predation in the airline industry and the inadequacy of some existing approaches.
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Figure 8.5: Incumbent and new entrant revenues under Scenario 2LM with FCRM on all carriers
These results clearly show that guidelines such as the ones discussed above provide very poor guidance
regarding the potential for predatory pricing or predatory behavior in the airline industry. In particular,
such approaches at best indicate the potential for predatory behavior, but do not provide a conclusive
indication of predation. In addition, they ignore the effects on average market measures of new entrant
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capacity, incumbent and new entrant pricing strategies, use or absence of revenue management on the
incumbent and new entrant carrier, and flows of network passengers. Evaluation of competitive
responses to low-fare entry should therefore take into account all of these factors which are specific to the
airline industry.
8.3. Future Research Directions
This research has presented important findings related to industry-specific attributes such as revenue
management and network flows of passengers and their effect on traditional measures of airline
performance. However, this research did not attempt to provide a definitive answer or test to predatory
practices in the airline industry, but rather strived to offer a more complete look at the characteristics of
the airline industry and their effects on competition.
As we discuss in the following sections, further research directions should be centered on three major
directions:
1. New entrant size and presence in the incumbent carrier's network.
2. Improved passenger choice modeling to better reflect airline passenger behavior.
3. Definition of a metric or test to measure the validity of claims of predatory behavior.
8.3.1. New Entrant Size and Presence in the Incumbent Carrier's Network
The results presented in Chapter 7 discuss the impacts of entry in a large network environment and the
effects of network revenue management and network flows of passengers on aggregate measures of
airline performance. The size of the network, as well as the extent of the new entrant carrier's presence in
the incumbent's network, are certain to influence the simulation results. An important extension of this
research would therefore be to determine to what extent the new entrant carrier's presence in the network
(much in the same fashion as the new entrant's relative capacity played a very important role throughout
this thesis) has an impact on the performance of the incumbent carriers and their ability to mitigate the
effect of entry on their revenues, fares and traffic. Current growth of low-fare new entrant carriers has
dramatically increased the exposure of network carriers to low-fare competition. Network carriers are
increasingly likely to be facing competition from multiple low-fare new entrant carriers, thus impacting
increasing proportions of their overall network operations.
In addition, our simulations also focused on modeling point-to-point low-fare new entrant carriers. While
this type of low-fare new entrant carriers is currently prevalent in the airline industry, there are also a
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number of low-fare new entrant carriers operating out of "focus cities" closely resembling hubs (as
discussed in Chapter 2). As a consequence, these carriers are also able to divert connecting traffic from
network carriers, which has a potential to further affect network carrier performance.
Finally, the possibility of interlining between carriers was also ruled out, thus eliminating the transfer of
passengers between a network carrier on a portion of her trip and a low-fare competitor on another
portion of her trip. This type of passenger behavior, while infrequent, also has an effect on the type of
traffic carried by the network carriers, and thus has the potential of affecting the outcome of low-fare new
entrant competition. For example, a passenger switching from connecting travel on the incumbent carrier
from origin to destination through the carrier's hub, to half of its travel on the incumbent carrier and the
other half on the new entrant carrier, changes, in the view of the network carrier, from being a connecting
passenger to a local passenger, even though she was still connecting, but on another carrier. This effect
will affect the network carrier's revenue management system and potentially lead to additional impacts on
measures of performance.
Testing for these three effects would provide additional valuable understanding of the competitive
interactions between incumbent and new entrant carriers in the airline industry.
8.3.2. Passenger Choice Modeling
As discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.1., the Passenger Origin Destination Simulator is organized along
four major components: The historical database, the forecasting engine, the revenue management
optimizer and the passenger choice model. The choice model is single-handedly the most critical
simulation component and determines the choice of individual passengers. It is therefore crucial that the
choice model represent passenger behavior as realistically as possible. Chapter 6, Section 6.3 presented a
discussion of the sensitivity of results to some of the major modeling assumptions (schedule, demand
curves and mix of business and leisure passengers), and showed that the results were quite robust to
changes in these settings. The passenger choice model, however, is dependent upon a set of assumptions
regarding the behavior of air travel passengers. Among the most critical assumptions are the following:
1. Passenger demand can be segmented between leisure and business passengers, and each segment
behaves differently. While this assumption was true before 2001, it remains unclear whether this
segmentation of passenger demand is still a valid one. Travel demand has been greatly affected
by both the economic downturn in 2001 and the event of September 11, 2001. Further research on
this change in passenger demand would provide additional insights on the behavior of air
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travelers and potentially allow for modifications to the PODS choice model to better reflect
reality.
2. Passengers choose to travel based on a decision window, which gives each passenger an earliest
allowable departure time and a corresponding latest allowable arrival time. While this assumption
was generally true pre-2001, the rapid development of the internet sales channel, along with the
capability to search for the lowest available fare, has the potential to change the behavior of air
travel passengers with respect to schedule preference. Further research on the actual behavior of
passenger with respect to schedule preference, and on the effect of fare search capabilities on
previously described results, constitutes an important next step to this research and to the PODS
simulator.
Other parameters such as the marketing tools available to the airlines were also left out of the simulation.
For example, as discussed in Chapter 3, frequent flyer programs constitute very important means to
ensure passenger loyalty, and are likely to play a part in the choice of passengers faced with low-fare
competition. In addition, other marketing tools, which are more and more prominently publicized in the
airline industry, also affect passenger choice and were not modeled here. For example, leg-room, seat
comfort or in-seat televisions all affect passenger choice.
8.3.3. Definition of a Metric to Evaluate Claims of Predatory Behavior
Finally, probably the most challenging task is the definition of a metric on predatory behavior in the
airline industry. This research has focused on the effects of relative new entrant capacity, competitive
pricing and revenue management, and network flows of passengers on traditional measures of airline
performance and thereby established that these aggregate measures of performance do not provide
sufficient information as to the response of incumbent carriers to entry or to the actual performance of
individual carriers, particularly in a network environment.
In accordance with previous work on predatory behavior, we find it important to study each individual
case of alleged predation carefully, and to use a rule of reason to assess whether the claims of predatory
behavior are relevant. As second step in the determination of whether predation has occurred involves the
use of a test of predatory behavior. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, none of the cost-based tests
advocated by Areeda and Turner (1975) or Joskow and Klevorick (1979) can be directly applied to the
airline industry because of the importance of network flows of traffic and the mix of local and connecting
traffic on local flight legs resulting in the dichotomy of supply and demand. At the same time, the output
limitation or price maintenance requirements advocated by Williamson (1977) and Baumol (1979) cannot
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apply to the airline industry, which is a seasonal industry where prices and demand vary tremendously
within the course of a one year period.
As a result, the design of a metric or test of predatory behavior, specific to the airline industry, constitutes
a very challenging potential extension to this research. The interactions between capacity, pricing,
revenue management and network flow effects should be accounted for in the design of such a metric, and
make its definition and creation all the more challenging.
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